Szymecki v. Houck , 353 F. App'x 852 ( 2009 )


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  •                                 UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-1094
    DEBORAH SZYMECKI,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    and
    CHESTER SZYMECKI,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    ASHLEY HOUCK,
    Defendant – Appellee,
    and
    THE CITY OF NORFOLK,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Norfolk.      Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
    Senior District Judge. (2:08-cv-00142-HCM-TEM)
    Submitted:    September 22, 2009            Decided:   November 24, 2009
    Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Stephen Merrill, GHENT LAW OFFICES, Norfolk, Virginia, for
    Appellant. Edward A. Fiorella, Jr., FRAIM AND FIORELLA, Norfolk,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Deborah       Szymecki    appeals   the   district      court’s    order
    granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant based on
    qualified immunity and dismissing Szymecki’s 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    (2006) complaint in which she alleged violations of her First
    Amendment rights.         Finding no error, we affirm.
    This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
    granting summary judgment.            Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v.
    G.D.F., Inc., 
    211 F.3d 846
    , 850 (4th Cir. 2000).                          “Qualified
    immunity protects government officials from civil damages in a
    § 1983 action insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
    established       statutory    or     constitutional      rights     of     which     a
    reasonable       person    would     have   known.”       Edwards    v.     City     of
    Goldsboro, 
    178 F.3d 231
    , 250 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).            In determining whether a defendant
    is    entitled     to     qualified     immunity,     a    court     must     decide
    (1) whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right
    and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time
    of the alleged misconduct.              Walker v. Prince George’s County,
    
    575 F.3d 426
    , 429 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan,
    
    129 S. Ct. 808
    ,    815-16     (2009)).     However,     “judges       of     the
    district courts and the courts of appeals [are] permitted to
    exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
    prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
    3
    first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
    hand.”    Pearson, 
    129 S. Ct. at 818
    .
    In determining whether there has been a violation of a
    constitutional right, the court should identify the right “at a
    high     level    of   particularity.”                Edwards,    
    178 F.3d at 251
    (citations omitted).           To decide whether that right was clearly
    established, “courts in this circuit [ordinarily] need not look
    beyond    the     decisions     of     the    Supreme      Court,       this    court      of
    appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case
    arose . . . .”           
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).        Accordingly, if the right is recognized in another
    circuit and not in this circuit, the “official will ordinarily
    retain the immunity defense.”                 
    Id.
           Moreover, the contours of
    the    constitutional        right   “must       be    sufficiently      clear      that    a
    reasonable       official      would     understand        what     [she]      is        doing
    violates that right.”           Hope v. Pelzer, 
    536 U.S. 730
    , 739 (2002)
    (citation omitted).
    Here,      the    district       court     concluded     that      Szymecki’s
    asserted First Amendment right to record police activities on
    public property was not clearly established in this circuit at
    the time of the alleged conduct.                      We have thoroughly reviewed
    the    record    and   the    relevant       legal     authorities      and    we    agree.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.
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    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions   are   adequately   presented    in   the    materials
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    5