Mario Escalante v. Anderson County Sheriff's Dept , 698 F. App'x 754 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-6452
MARIO ESCALANTE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ANDERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF JOHN
SKIPPER, in his official and individual capacities; SERGEANT ANDREW R.
HYSLOP, in his official and individual capacities; DEPUTY BRANDON
SURRATT, in his official and individual capacities; DAVID L. RODGERS, d/b/a
Whitehall Express Mart; JANICE W. RODGERS, d/b/a Whitehall Express Mart,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
CITY OF ANDERSON POLICE DEPARTMENT; CHIEF OF POLICE JAMES S.
STEWART, in his official and individual capacities; JOHN DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Anderson. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (8:15-cv-00177-MGL)
Submitted: September 29, 2017 Decided: October 12, 2017
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Donald L. Smith, DONALD SMITH LAW FIRM, Anderson, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Phillip E. Reeves, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South,
Carolina; J. Victor McDade, DOYLE, TATE & MCDADE, Anderson, South Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Mario Escalante appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for
reconsideration of its August 16, 2016, order adopting the recommendation of the
magistrate judge and granting summary judgment to Appellees in his civil action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and South Carolina state law. On appeal, Escalante challenges
the magistrate judge’s February 2, 2016, order granting the motion of Appellees Hyslop
and Surratt seeking a protective order excluding their personal cellular phone numbers
and records from discovery and the district court’s August 16 summary judgment order.
We affirm.
With respect to the February 2 order, Escalante argues that it was error to prohibit
the discovery of the cellular phone records of Hyslop and Surratt. Because the magistrate
judge, rather than the district court, issued the ruling granting the motion for a protective
order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) governs. Under Rule 72(a), if an aggrieved party fails to
timely object to a magistrate judge’s order ruling on a nondispositive motion in the
district court, then thereafter the “party may not assign as error a defect in the [magistrate
judge’s] order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see Solis v. Malkani, 638 F.3d 269, 274 (4th Cir.
2011). The record does not indicate that Escalante ever objected to the magistrate
judge’s ruling granting the motion for a protective order. Accordingly, he has waived
appellate review of this issue. Malkani, 638 F.3d at 274. We thus affirm the February 2
order.
Next, applying a de novo standard of review, Lawson v. Union Cty. Clerk of
Court, 828 F.3d 239, 247 (4th Cir. 2016), we have reviewed the record and the parties’
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briefs and find no reversible error in the district court’s August 16 grant of summary
judgment to Appellees. Accordingly, we affirm that order for the reasons stated by the
district court. Escalante v. Anderson Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 8:15-cv-00177-MGL
(D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2016).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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