Carston Woodson v. United States , 690 F. App'x 844 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-1255
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1257
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1259
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1260
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1261
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1262
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
2
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1263
CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:17-cv-00046-HEH; 3:17-cv-00047-
HEH; 3:17-cv-00048-HEH; 3:17-cv-00049-HEH; 3:17-cv-00050-HEH; 3:17-cv-00051-
HEH; 3:17-cv-00052-HEH;)
Submitted: May 25, 2017 Decided: May 30, 2017
Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carton Markel Woodson, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Carston Markel Woodson seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his
complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2012), for failing to
state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 12(h)(3). This court may exercise
jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and
collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). Because the district court identified
deficiencies that Woodson may remedy by filing an amended complaint, we conclude
that the order Woodson seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable
interlocutory or collateral order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d
619, 623–24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10
F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. We “remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow
[Woodson] to amend his complaint.” Goode, 807 F.3d at 630. We also deny leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and deny Woodson’s motions to deconsolidate his seven
nearly identical cases, “to invoke the law of disqualification force,” to set aside the order
to dismiss the complaints, and for default judgment.
DISMISSED AND REMANDED
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