United States v. Damon Jones , 637 F. App'x 89 ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-4309
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DAMON KEYON JONES,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.   N. Carlton Tilley,
    Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:97-cr-00178-NCT-1)
    Submitted:   December 18, 2015            Decided:   December 23, 2015
    Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.    Ripley Rand, United
    States Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Damon Keyon Jones appeals from the district court’s amended
    judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
    48    months’      imprisonment.          On    appeal,     Jones       argues      that    this
    sentence is substantively unreasonable.                    We affirm.
    This court will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation
    of supervised release “if it is within the statutory maximum and
    is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’”                     United States v. Webb, 
    738 F.3d 638
    ,    640      (4th    Cir.     2013)   (quoting       United     States       v.    Crudup,
    
    461 F.3d 433
    , 438 (4th Cir. 2006)).                       When reviewing whether a
    revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
    sentence         for     unreasonableness,            “follow[ing]           generally          the
    procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
    review      of    original        sentences.”           Crudup,    
    461 F.3d at 438
    .
    A supervised            release      revocation         sentence        is      procedurally
    reasonable        if     the    district        court    considers        the       Sentencing
    Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and
    explains the sentence adequately after considering the policy
    statements        and    the    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)       (2012)       factors       it    is
    permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation case.
    See    
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)       (2012);       Crudup,    
    461 F.3d at 439
    .
    A revocation           sentence      is    substantively          reasonable          if        the
    district         court    states      a    proper       basis     for     concluding            the
    defendant        should     receive       the       sentence    imposed,         up    to       the
    2
    statutory maximum.           See Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 440
    .                    Only if a
    sentence     is   found     procedurally         or    substantively       unreasonable
    will    we      “then      decide    whether          the     sentence      is     plainly
    unreasonable.”          
    Id. at 439
     (emphasis omitted).                   A sentence is
    plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
    
    Id.
    Jones    contends     that    his    48-month         revocation     sentence      is
    substantively unreasonable because the district court did not
    consider certain mitigating factors proffered in support of a
    sentence within the advisory policy statement ranges of 12 to
    18 months’ imprisonment and imposed the revocation sentence to
    punish him for his conduct violating supervised release rather
    than for his breach of trust.                    Contrary to Jones’ assertion,
    however, the record makes clear that the district court heard
    his    arguments      in    mitigation      at    the       revocation     hearing       but
    rejected them in light of the nature and circumstances of his
    violative      behavior,     his    history      and    characteristics,           and   the
    need for the revocation sentence to sanction his breach of trust
    on release, all factors the court was permitted to consider in
    imposing a revocation sentence.                   See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3553
    (a)(1),
    3583(e);       U.S.     Sentencing    Guidelines            Manual   ch.    7,     pt.   A,
    introductory      cmt.     3(b)     (U.S.   Sentencing         Comm’n      2015)    (“[A]t
    revocation the [district] court should sanction primarily the
    defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
    3
    limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and
    the criminal history of the violator.”).          We therefore conclude
    that the revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable
    and affirm the district court’s amended judgment.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions   are   adequately   presented   in   the   materials   before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-4309

Citation Numbers: 637 F. App'x 89

Judges: Motz, Duncan, Diaz

Filed Date: 12/23/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024