In Re: Chase Hunter v. ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1981
In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Appellant.
No. 15-1985
In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Appellant.
No. 15-2128
In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:15-cv-00414-HEH; 3:15-cv-00336-HEH; 3:15-cv-00206-
HEH)
Submitted: January 26, 2016 Decided: April 7, 2016
Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chase Carmen Hunter, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Chase Carmen Hunter
challenges the district court’s dismissal of Hunter’s complaints
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
On appeal, Hunter argues that (1) the district judge should have
recused himself, (2) the district court’s orders did not comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) or 58, and (3) she is entitled to
the relief sought.
Because Hunter failed to seek recusal in the district
court, she has failed to preserve this issue for appellate
review. Accord Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d
572, 592 (4th Cir. 2015). We discern no exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances in this case justifying review of
this issue on its merits. Id.; see Corti v. Storage Tech.
Corp., 304 F.3d 336, 343 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t remains the law of this circuit that when a
party to a civil action fails to raise a point at trial, that
party waives review of the issue unless there are exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances justifying review.”).
We next review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
decision to dismiss Hunter’s petitions under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Michau v. Charleston Cty., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006)
(identifying standard of review). Hunter contends that the
district court’s order should be overturned because, by failing
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to make specific findings of fact, it did not comply with Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) or 58. Hunter misconstrues these rules.
Rule 52(a)(1) requires that a district court, “[i]n an action
tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
. . . find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law
separately,” and enter judgment in accordance with Rule 58.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). Rule 58 provides general rules
regarding the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. The
district court violated neither of these rules. Because the
action did not go to trial, Rule 52(a)(1) is inapplicable. Rule
58 does not require the district court to make findings of fact.
In her final argument, Hunter reiterates the allegations
contained in her petitions for declaratory judgment, and claims
that she was entitled to relief. First, the district court
properly found that the relief she sought in her first petition
had already been denied by the district court, and was
subsequently denied by this court. In re: Hunter, No.
3:14-cv-00648 (E.D. Va. PACER Nos. 2, 4), aff’d, 621 F. App’x
253 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2062). Second, we find no error in
the district court’s dismissal of Hunter’s conclusory challenge
to the constitutionality of a Virginia statute. Finally, we
agree with the district court’s determination that it lacked
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in her third petition.
See Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718-19 (4th
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Cir. 2006) (holding that “state-court loser” seeking redress in
federal district court asserts claim that “is, by definition,
‘inextricably intertwined’ with” state court decision and
therefore outside federal court’s jurisdiction).
Hunter has filed numerous frivolous appeals and petitions
for mandamus in the last two years. Hunter is warned that
similar filings in the future may result in issuance of an order
to show cause why a prefiling injunction or other sanctions
should not be entered against her by this court.
We dismiss Hunter’s appeals as frivolous. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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