Lee Pele v. Pennsylvania Higher Education ( 2015 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-2202
    LEE PELE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION      ASSISTANCE     AGENCY,   d/b/a
    American Education Services,
    Defendant – Appellee.
    ------------------------------
    JON H. OBERG,
    Amicus Supporting Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
    District Judge. (1:13-cv-01531-JCC-TRJ)
    Argued:   May 12, 2015                     Decided:   October 21, 2015
    Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit
    Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Scott Matthew Michelman, PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION
    GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.     Paul D. Clement,
    BANCROFT PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.  ON BRIEF: A.
    Hugo Blankingship, III, Thomas B. Christiano, BLANKINGSHIP &
    CHRISTIANO, P.C., Reston, Virginia; Allison M. Zieve, PUBLIC
    CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jill
    M. deGraffenreid, McLean, Virginia, Joseph P. Esposito, William
    E. Potts, Jr., HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Washington, D.C.; George
    W. Hicks, Jr., Raymond P. Tolentino, BANCROFT PLLC, Washington,
    D.C., for Appellee. Bert W. Rein, Michael L. Sturm, Christopher
    M. Mills, Brendan J. Morrissey, Stephen J. Obermeier, WILEY REIN
    LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff         Lee     Pele    filed       suit    against          the    Pennsylvania
    Higher    Education       Assistance         Agency       (“PHEAA”)          under       the    Fair
    Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.                               Concluding that
    PHEAA was an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entitled to
    share    in    the     Commonwealth’s         Eleventh-Amendment                  immunity      from
    suit,    the    district       court    granted       PHEAA’s          motion       for    summary
    judgment       and    dismissed       the    action.           We    vacate        the    district
    court’s judgment and remand.
    I.
    Absent          consent     by    the     state           or    valid        Congressional
    abrogation, the Eleventh Amendment bars an action in federal
    court seeking money damages against a state.                                See, e.g., Bland
    v. Roberts, 
    730 F.3d 368
    , 389-90 (4th Cir. 2013); Lee-Thomas v.
    Prince George’s Cty. Pub. Sch., 
    666 F.3d 244
    , 248 (4th Cir.
    2012).        “This    immunity       also    protects          state    agents          and    state
    instrumentalities, meaning that it protects arms of the State
    and State officials.”             
    Bland, 730 F.3d at 389-90
    (citations and
    internal quotation marks omitted)).
    PHEAA was created by the Commonwealth in 1963 as a “body
    corporate       and    politic    constituting            a     public       corporation         and
    government         instrumentality,”         24     Pa.        Stat.    §    5101,        for    the
    purpose       of      “improv[ing]          access        to        higher        education        by
    originating, financing, and guaranteeing student loans,” United
    3
    States    ex   rel.    Oberg    v.    Pa.     Higher    Educ.     Assistance     Agency
    (“Oberg    II”),      
    745 F.3d 131
    ,     135    (4th    Cir.    2014).          After
    discovery focusing on the nature of PHEAA’s relationship to the
    Commonwealth, PHEAA moved for summary judgment, arguing that it
    is an “arm” of the Commonwealth and therefore protected from
    Pele’s lawsuit by the Eleventh Amendment.
    Considering      the     evidence      developed      through      discovery     in
    light of the factors this court has identified as relevant to
    the   arm-of-state      question,          see,   e.g.,     Md.   Stadium      Auth.    v.
    Ellerbe Becket Inc., 
    407 F.3d 255
    , 261 (4th Cir. 2005), the
    district court concluded that PHEAA had carried its burden of
    proving that it is an arm of the Commonwealth, see Hutto v. S.C.
    Ret. Sys., 
    773 F.3d 536
    , 543 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that in
    the Eleventh-Amendment context, whether a state-created entity
    is an arm of its creating state is an affirmative defense that
    must be proven by the entity asserting immunity).
    Pele appeals.          Pele argues that the evidence and relevant
    state statutes do not support the district court’s conclusion
    but   instead      establish        that     PHEAA     is   not     an   arm    of     the
    Commonwealth.
    II.
    Whether a state-created entity is an arm of its creating
    state and therefore entitled to assert the state’s sovereign
    4
    immunity is a question of law reviewed de novo.                         
    Hutto, 773 F.3d at 542
    .
    In an opinion also filed today, we addressed PHEAA’s status
    as an arm of the Commonwealth in connection with claims asserted
    against PHEAA under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§
    3729-33.     See United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ.
    Assistance Agency (“Oberg III”), No. 15-1093 (4th Cir. filed
    Oct. 21, 2015).          In Oberg III, we concluded that PHEAA is not an
    arm   of    the     Commonwealth          because:           PHEAA    is      financially
    independent       from    the     Commonwealth         and    supports        itself     with
    revenues generated through PHEAA’s commercial financial-services
    activities;       PHEAA    is     statutorily         vested     with      and    in     fact
    exercises     control      over     its     commercially        generated        revenues,
    notwithstanding          the      deposit        of    these     revenues         in     the
    Pennsylvania       Treasury;        and     PHEAA,          through     its      board    of
    directors,    sets       policy    and    makes       the    substantive       fiscal     and
    operational decisions for the corporation.
    Although there are some procedural differences between this
    case and Oberg, the arm-of-state question in Oberg was governed
    by the same factors applicable here and was otherwise materially
    identical to the arm-of-state question presented in this case. *
    *The FCA imposes civil liability on “any person” who makes
    or presents a false claim for payment to the federal government,
    31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), a term that does not include states or
    (Continued)
    5
    Because the district court’s analysis is inconsistent with our
    decision in Oberg III, we hereby vacate the district court’s
    order and remand for further proceedings on the merits of Pele’s
    claims against PHEAA.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    state agencies, see Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex
    rel. Stevens, 
    529 U.S. 765
    , 787-88 (2000). In Oberg II, we held
    that because “personhood” is an element of an FCA plaintiff’s
    case, the FCA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a
    state-created entity is not an arm of the state. See Oberg 
    II, 745 F.3d at 136
    .
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-2202

Judges: Traxler, Gregory, Keenan

Filed Date: 10/21/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024