United States v. Mark Aranjo , 599 F. App'x 118 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4544
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARK ARANJO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00270-MOC-1)
Submitted: March 26, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
J. Michael McGuinness, THE MCGUINNESS LAW FIRM, Elizabethtown,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mark Aranjo appeals the district court’s order revoking his
supervised release and sentencing him to eight months’
imprisonment and one year of supervised release. Aranjo’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning whether (a) the district court erred
in revoking Aranjo’s supervised release, (b) Aranjo’s sentence
is unreasonable, and (c) Aranjo had ineffective assistance of
counsel. Aranjo was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but he has not filed one. We affirm in part
and dismiss in part.
On July 17, 2014, while this appeal was pending, Aranjo’s
prison term ended, and he began serving his new term of
supervised release. We may address sua sponte whether Aranjo’s
challenge to his imprisonment has become moot, for mootness is a
jurisdictional question “grounded in the ‘case-or-controversy’
requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.” United
States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2013)
(referencing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). Because
Aranjo’s eight-month prison term has expired, and no collateral
consequences thereof appear on the record, there is no live
controversy regarding this issue. See United States v. Hardy,
545 F.3d 280, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2008). Aranjo’s challenge to his
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prison sentence is therefore moot, and we dismiss this portion
of the appeal.
However, we retain jurisdiction to review his current term
of supervised release and the district court’s revocation
decision. Because Aranjo admitted all four of the charged
supervised release violations, the district court’s revocation
decision was proper. See United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d
279, 283 (4th Cir. 1999). Turning to the court’s imposition of
the additional term of supervised release, we conclude that the
district court’s imposition of the one-year term was not plain
error. See United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir.
2013) (stating standard of review); United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006). Finally, we deem Aranjo’s
ineffective-assistance claim inappropriate for resolution on
direct appeal because the record does not conclusively establish
his counsel’s ineffectiveness. See United States v. Baptiste,
596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot insofar as
Aranjo challenges his expired term of imprisonment and affirm
the remainder of the district court’s judgment. This Court
requires that counsel inform Aranjo, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
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review. If Aranjo requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this Court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Aranjo.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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