United States v. Izell Grissett, Jr. , 606 F. App'x 717 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4573
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    IZELL DELOREAN GRISSETT, JR., a/k/a Buddy,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Columbia.    Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
    District Judge. (3:13-cr-00134-JFA-2)
    Submitted:   March 27, 2015                 Decided:     April 13, 2015
    Before KEENAN and    HARRIS,   Circuit   Judges,   and   DAVIS,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David Bruce Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Nancy Chastain Wicker, William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant
    United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Izell Delorean Grissett, Jr., was charged in five counts of
    a seven-count indictment with:                (1) conspiracy to distribute and
    distribution of 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 280 grams or
    more of crack cocaine, 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846 (2012) (Count
    One); (2) Hobbs Act robbery, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
     (2012) (Count
    Four); (3) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation
    to a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (2012) (Count Five); (4) being a felon in possession of
    a firearm and ammunition, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (2012) (Count Six);
    and (5) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
    of   cocaine    and   a    quantity      of     crack      cocaine,      
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2012) (Count Seven).                The jury found Grissett guilty
    on   all   counts;    he   was       sentenced        to   life   plus    ten    years’
    imprisonment.    Grissett noted a timely appeal.
    Counsel    has   filed      a    brief    in     accordance   with       Anders   v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), conceding that there are no
    meritorious     issues     for       appeal     but    questioning       whether       the
    district court erred in denying Grissett’s motion for judgment
    of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.                            Grissett has
    filed a pro se supplemental brief raising two additional issues:
    (1) the district court erred when it issued a modified Allen
    charge to the jury; and (2) the district court erred in applying
    the murder cross-reference at sentencing.
    2
    This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of a
    motion for judgment of acquittal.                      United States v. Strayhorn,
    
    743 F.3d 917
    , 921 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2689
    (2014).        In    assessing       the       sufficiency      of       the    evidence,         we
    determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
    conviction    when        viewed    in     the      light    most        favorable      to    the
    Government.         
    Id.
             “Substantial        evidence        is    evidence      that       a
    reasonable     finder       of     fact        could       accept        as    adequate       and
    sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
    a reasonable doubt.”             United States v. Jaensch, 
    665 F.3d 83
    , 93
    (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).                                 The test is
    whether    “any     rational       trier       of     fact     could      have       found    the
    essential    elements       of     the    crime       beyond    a    reasonable         doubt.”
    United States v. Madrigal-Valadez, 
    561 F.3d 370
    , 374 (4th Cir.
    2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).                            An appellate court
    “may   not    weigh       the    evidence        or    review       the       credibility         of
    witnesses. . . . [t]hose functions are reserved for the jury.”
    United    States    v.     Wilson,       
    118 F.3d 228
    ,    234       (4th      Cir.     1997)
    (internal citation omitted).
    With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the record
    and find that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a
    conviction as to each of the counts with which Grissett was
    charged.      Testimony         established         that     Grissett         was   part     of    a
    long-term cocaine and crack cocaine distribution operation in
    3
    the    Columbia,       South    Carolina       area.      According         to     witnesses,
    Grissett       and     his    co-conspirator          planned       and    carried       out     a
    robbery of one of their suppliers in June 2010, during which
    Grissett       shot     and    killed     Hector       Carrion.            Based    on        this
    evidence, we find that the district court did not err in denying
    Grissett’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
    Turning to Grissett’s pro se claims, he first argues that
    the district court erred in issuing a modified Allen charge that
    eliminated any mention of the words “minority” or “majority”
    with regard to the jurors’ votes.                      The modification was agreed
    upon by both parties because the jurors had mistakenly indicated
    their split in the votes in their message to the judge.                                        “An
    Allen charge, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v.
    United       States,     
    164 U.S. 492
           (1896),     is     ‘[a]n      instruction
    advising deadlocked jurors to have deference to each                                  other’s
    views,       that     they    should     listen,      with     a    disposition          to     be
    convinced, to each other’s argument.’”                       United States v. Burgos,
    
    55 F.3d 933
    ,     935    (4th     Cir.   1995)    (quoting       United       States       v.
    Seeright, 
    978 F.2d 842
    , 845 n.* (4th Cir. 1992)).                            We review the
    content of an Allen charge for abuse of discretion.                                      United
    States v. Burgos, 
    55 F.3d at 935
    .                       An “Allen charge must not
    coerce the jury, and it must be fair, neutral and balanced.”
    United       States    v.     Cropp,    
    127 F.3d 354
    ,     359       (4th   Cir.     1997)
    (internal citations omitted).                      We conclude that the district
    4
    court’s charge was not coercive nor can Grissett show that he
    suffered any prejudice as a result.                       Finally,              Grissett
    challenges         the    application     of       the   murder    cross-reference     at
    sentencing.          The     advisory   Sentencing         Guidelines    provide      that
    “[i]f       a    victim    was   killed        under     circumstances       that   would
    constitute murder under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1111
     had such killing taken
    place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the
    United States, apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder) . . . if the
    resulting offense level is greater than that determined under
    this    guideline.”              U.S.     Sentencing         Guidelines       Manual     §
    2D1.1(d)(1)         (2013).       The     Government        must     prove    the   facts
    underlying a cross-reference by a preponderance of the evidence.
    United States v. Davis, 
    679 F.3d 177
    , 182 (4th Cir. 2012).                             We
    find that the testimony established that the killing of Hector
    Carrion constituted first degree murder within the meaning of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1111
    .            Also, because the application of               § 2D1.1(d)(1)
    did    not      increase     Grissett’s    mandatory         minimum    sentence,      his
    reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United
    States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
     (2013) is misplaced.
    In       accordance    with   Anders,        we   have     reviewed   the    entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.         We therefore affirm the district court’s order.                       This
    court requires that counsel inform Grissett, in writing, of the
    right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    5
    further review.      If Grissett requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
    then counsel may move in this Court for leave to withdraw from
    representation.      Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Grissett.       We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before    this   Court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    6