United States v. Craig Anderson , 624 F. App'x 106 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4033
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CRAIG OKEIDO ANDERSON, a/k/a Snap, a/k/a Sir Chill, a/k/a
King Hundredgrand, a/k/a Yung Royalty,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:14-cr-00042-WDQ-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: December 14, 2015
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mirriam Z. Seddiq, SEDDIQ LAW FIRM, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Zachary
A. Myers, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Craig Okeido Anderson appeals his conviction after pleading
guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Anderson claims that the district court erred by denying his
motion to withdraw his plea and by denying him the right to
counsel at the hearing on that motion. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d
376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012). “A defendant has no absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea, and the district court has discretion to
decide whether a fair and just reason exists upon which to grant
a withdrawal.” Id. at 383-84 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “The most important
consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at which the guilty plea
was accepted.” Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 384 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (setting forth factors courts consider). “Thus,
when a district court considers the plea withdrawal motion, the
inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea
was both counseled and voluntary.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Anderson contends that his plea colloquy was defective
because, after he stated under oath that he was a U.S. citizen,
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the district court did not warn him of the potential immigration
consequences of pleading guilty. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(O). Upon review of the record, we conclude that any
such error is harmless because Anderson had actual notice of
these possible immigration consequences because they were
included in the plea agreement. We further conclude that
Anderson entered his guilty plea voluntarily and that the
district court was within its discretion to deny his motion to
withdraw it. Finally, we reject Anderson’s claim that, at the
plea-withdrawal hearing, he suffered a complete deprivation of
his right to counsel when counsel informed the district court
that he ethically could not present Anderson’s arguments. To
the extent Anderson wishes to argue that his counsel’s
performance was ineffective, that claim should be raised, if at
all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. See United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing
standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raised on
direct appeal).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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