Martin Sharpe v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7582
MARTIN JAMES SHARPE, a/k/a James Martin Sharpe, a/k/a James
Sharpe,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SCDC; DR. WILLIAM
AKERMAN, SCDC Dental Director; DR. UBAH, Dentist Lee CI;
MCCLARY, Dental Assistant Lee CI; GREGG, Dental Assistant
Broad River CI; DWIGHT D. MCMILLIAN, Broad River
Correctional Institution,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(4:13-cv-01538-DCN)
Submitted: March 26, 2015 Decided: April 3, 2015
Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Martin James Sharpe, Appellant Pro Se. James E. Parham, Jr.,
Irmo, South Carolina; Ashley S. Heslop, TURNER, PADGET, GRAHAM &
LANEY, PA, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Martin James Sharpe appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012) action following the district court’s order
accepting in part the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Sharpe
alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs when they failed to treat his painful
wisdom tooth and delayed referral to an oral surgeon for its
extraction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court
and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir.
2012). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To prevail on a claim of constitutionally inadequate
medical care, a plaintiff must establish acts or omissions
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harmful enough to constitute deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
First, he must objectively show that the deprivation suffered or
the injury inflicted was sufficiently serious. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A serious medical need “is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko
v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Next, the prisoner must show that the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference can be
established by showing that the medical treatment was “so
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.”
Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled
in part on other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
“[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care”
does not satisfy the standard, and thus mere negligence in
diagnosis or treatment is insufficient. Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105-06. Moreover, mere disagreement between an inmate and
medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides
no basis for relief. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th
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Cir. 1975). Instead, officials evince deliberate indifference
by acting intentionally to delay or deny the prisoner access to
adequate medical care or by ignoring an inmate’s known serious
medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Young v. City of
Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2001). “A delay in
treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay
exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s
pain.” McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010)
(vacating and remanding summary dismissal of complaint alleging
three-month delay in dental treatment); see Smith v. Smith, 589
F.3d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding claim of delay in
administering prescribed medical treatment stated an Eighth
Amendment claim).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sharpe,
we conclude that the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Defendant McMillian and Defendant Akerman. However,
we find the district court’s reliance on Dulany v. Carnahan, 132
F.3d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997), with regard to Sharpe’s claims
against Defendant Ubah, to be misplaced. Sharpe’s sworn
declaration creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to
Defendant Ubah’s knowledge of Sharpe’s serious medical needs and
precludes summary judgment as to Defendant Ubah. Accordingly,
we vacate that portion of the district court’s order. The
district court’s finding that Ubah was entitled to qualified
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immunity based on the lack of a constitutional violation is also
vacated. This case is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
We deny Sharpe’s motion for the appointment of counsel. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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