United States v. Charles Waddell ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4286
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES F. WADDELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00032-GMG-JES-1)
Submitted: March 24, 2015 Decided: May 22, 2015
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen
M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Tara Tighe, Assistant United States Attorney,
Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles F. Waddell pled guilty, without the benefit of a
written plea agreement, to failing to update his sex offender
registration, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2012). At
the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 hearing, the
magistrate judge advised Waddell that he faced a maximum term of
supervised release of three years, when in fact he faced a
statutory maximum term of life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2012).
The magistrate judge also did not advise Waddell of the
consequences of violating supervised release. The district
court sentenced Waddell to 30 months’ imprisonment and 40 years’
supervised release.
On appeal, counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging Waddell’s
conviction and sentence. After conducting our review pursuant
to Anders, we sought supplemental briefing to address whether
the magistrate judge plainly erred by: (1) inaccurately
advising Waddell of the maximum term of supervised release; and
(2) failing to explain the consequences of violating supervised
release. Although we conclude that the issues raised in the
Anders brief are without merit, we find that the magistrate
judge committed reversible error at the Rule 11 hearing.
Accordingly, we vacate Waddell’s conviction and remand for
further proceedings.
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Because Waddell did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Waddell must demonstrate
that (1) the district court committed an error; (2) the error
was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). In
the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden of
demonstrating that an error affected his substantial rights by
showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled
guilty but for the Rule 11 omission. United States v.
Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). The correction
of such an error lies within our discretion, which we exercise
only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Henderson, 133 S.
Ct. at 1127 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The parties agree that the magistrate judge’s inaccurate
statement regarding the maximum term of supervised release and
failure to advise Waddell of the consequences of violating
supervised release qualify as plain errors. The parties
dispute, however, whether the errors affected Waddell’s
substantial rights and whether we should exercise our discretion
to correct the errors. After reviewing the record, we conclude
that there is a reasonable probability that Waddell would not
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have pled guilty had the magistrate judge accurately advised him
of the statutory maximum term of supervised release and the
consequences of violating supervised release. We also exercise
our discretion to correct the errors.
We are particularly troubled by the vast disparity between
the 3-year term of supervised release Waddell was advised he
could receive and the 40-year term the court actually imposed.
See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir.
2009) (observing that there is a “dramatic difference between a
three year period of supervised release and a lifetime of
supervised release” and vacating judgment on plain error
review). Moreover, there is no evidence that Waddell was
otherwise aware, before or during the Rule 11 hearing, of the
consequences of violating supervised release or that the court
could impose a lifetime term of supervised release. Finally,
Waddell expressed displeasure and frustration with government
oversight during his allocution, suggesting that Waddell might
very well have decided to plead not guilty and take his chances
at trial had the magistrate judge advised him that he could be
under close supervision for the rest of his life.
We agree with the Government that the fact that Waddell did
not move to withdraw his plea or object in any other form when
he later discovered that he was misadvised of the maximum term
of supervised release at the Rule 11 hearing serves as some
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evidence that he would have pled guilty even if the magistrate
judge had fully complied with Rule 11. See Massenburg, 564 F.3d
at 343-44. On balance, however, we conclude that the magistrate
judge’s errors affected Waddell’s substantial rights. We
therefore vacate Waddell’s conviction and remand the case to the
district court so that Waddell may plead with the “ability to
evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting
criminal responsibility.” ∗ United States v. Thorne, 153 F.3d
130, 133 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no other meritorious issues. This
court requires that counsel inform Waddell in writing of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Waddell requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
∗
Because we vacate Waddell’s conviction, we do not address
his sentence. We note, however, that after we ordered
supplemental briefing in this case, we held, in accordance with
a recent clarifying amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, that
“failing to register as a sex offender under [the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act] is not a ‘sex offense’ for
the purposes of the Guidelines.” United States v. Collins, 773
F.3d 25, 32 (4th Cir. 2014); see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 5D1.2 cmt. n.1 (2014). Although the amendment did not
alter the statutory penalties, the Guidelines recommendation for
Waddell’s term of supervised release is now five years.
Collins, 773 F.3d at 32; see USSG § 5D1.2 cmt. n.6.
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Waddell. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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