United States v. Alberto Mendoza-Martinez ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4210
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALBERTO MENDOZA-MARTINEZ, a/k/a Alberto Martinez Mendoza,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00355-CCE-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2015 Decided: October 6, 2015
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alberto Mendoza-Martinez pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to unlawfully reentering the United States after
being removed following an aggravated felony conviction, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012). On appeal,
Mendoza-Martinez argues that his 50-month sentence, which was
one month below the top of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range of 41-51 months, is both procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[,] under
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, this court considers whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s Guidelines
range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failed to explain the selected sentence sufficiently. Id. at
49-51.
Mendoza-Martinez does not dispute the computation of his
Guidelines range. He instead asserts that the district court
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did not adequately explain its reasons for rejecting Mendoza-
Martinez’s arguments in favor of a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range. Mendoza-Martinez contends that his arguments
in mitigation — particularly, Mendoza-Martinez’s inevitable
removal to Mexico and the loss of contact with his family in
America that is likely to follow; his admitted reentries and
reasons for them; and his family support and employment
opportunities in Mexico — supported the imposition of a sentence
at the bottom of the Guidelines range. Mendoza-Martinez
preserved this issue for appeal by requesting a sentence lower
than that which was ultimately imposed. United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010).
While the court acknowledged the difficult family situation
in which Mendoza-Martinez found himself and Mendoza-Martinez’s
assurances that he would not again return to the United States
without authorization, it rejected the contention that these
facts warranted a lower sentence. The district court acted well
within its discretion in giving greater weight to the factors it
identified, particularly Mendoza-Martinez’s refusal to abide by
the law, which was evidenced by his repeated commission of drug
crimes and reentries after removal. See United States v.
Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
“district courts have extremely broad discretion when
determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
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factors”). On this record, we cannot accept Mendoza-Martinez’s
claim of reversible procedural error because the district
court’s explanation for the selected sentence reflects it had
“considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis
for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” United
States v. Avila, 770 F.3d 1100, 1108 (4th Cir. 2014) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mendoza-Martinez next contends that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances. This claim similarly derives from the arguments
pressed by defense counsel in favor of a sentence at the bottom
of the Guidelines range.
“A sentence within the Guidelines range is presumed on
appeal to be substantively reasonable.” United States v.
Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 2015). “Such a presumption
can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
We discern no abuse of the district court’s discretion on
this record. As noted above, the district court expressed
concern about Mendoza-Martinez’s repeated criminal conduct and
the resulting risk of harm to the public, which are in direct
alignment with two of the § 3553(a) factors, see 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of offense); id. § 3553(a)(2)(C)
(need to protect public), and relied on these factors to support
the selected sentence. We are not persuaded by Mendoza-
Martinez’s claim that his personal history and characteristics,
particularly the strain his removal will place on his family,
outweigh the district court’s assessment of these § 3553(a)
factors. We therefore conclude that Mendoza-Martinez has not
overcome the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded
his within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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