Mika'ya Shakur v. Henry Ponton , 627 F. App'x 280 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7252
MIKA’YA ALI SHAKUR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HENRY PONTON, Warden; MRS. SANDERS, Hearing Officer; LT.
MOICHECK, Lead Investigator,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:13-cv-00406-RAJ-LRL)
Submitted: December 22, 2015 Decided: January 6, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mika’ya Ali Shakur, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mika’ya Ali Shakur appeals the district court’s orders
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action for failure to
state a claim for relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
(2012), and denying his postjudgment motion to amend. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Shakur first challenges the district court’s dismissal of
his due process challenge to his institutional conviction. We
review de novo the dismissal of an action for failure to state a
claim under § 1915A(b)(1). Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail,
407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005). To survive dismissal, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In making this determination, we need not
accept “legal conclusions drawn from the facts, . . .
unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record reveals no error in the district
court’s conclusion that Shakur failed to state a cognizable
deprivation of his due process rights. See Superintendent,
Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); see also Kennedy v.
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Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that
mere violation of state law does not support federal due process
violation). Although Shakur argues that the district court
should not have dismissed his action without sua sponte granting
leave to amend, we find no error in the court’s refusal to grant
such leave under the circumstances presented. See Matrix
Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193
(4th Cir. 2009).
Shakur similarly argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his postjudgment motion to amend the
complaint. We review the denial of a postjudgment motion to
amend for abuse of discretion. Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012).
A plaintiff cannot amend as of right after the dismissal of his
action with prejudice. Sachs v. Snider, 631 F.2d 350, 351 (4th
Cir. 1980). Instead, the district court may not grant a
postjudgment motion to amend a complaint unless the judgment is
set aside or vacated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b).
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “To determine whether
vacatur is warranted, however, the court need not concern itself
with either of those rules’ legal standards,” but “need only ask
whether the amendment should be granted, just as it would on a
prejudgment motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).”
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Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir.
2011).
Shakur did not provide the court with a proposed amended
complaint, preventing the court from determining whether Shakur
could meet the requirements for amendment. Moreover, our review
of the amended complaint Shakur ultimately filed supports the
court’s decision to deny amendment. See Matrix Capital, 576
F.3d at 193.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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