Brown v. LaManna , 304 F. App'x 206 ( 2008 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-6840
    LLOYD EUGENE BROWN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    JOHN J. LAMANNA, Warden of FCI-Edgefield; WAYNE SMITH, Camp
    Administrator;   BRIAN   FINNERLY,  Special  Housing   Unit
    Lieutenant; JASON KAPRAL, Special Housing Unit Officer and
    in their official capacities,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Charleston.      R. Bryan Harwell, District
    Judge. (2:06-cv-00390-RBH)
    Submitted:    November 21, 2008             Decided:   December 29, 2008
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
    per curiam opinion.
    Lloyd Eugene Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Lloyd Eugene Brown appeals from the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his suit regarding
    prison    conditions.             Brown      raises        claims    under       Biven   v.    Six
    Unknown Named Agents, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971), the Americans with
    Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).                                   We
    find that Brown’s claims of overcrowding and violations of the
    ADA    and    RA    were     correctly        rejected        by     the    district      court.
    Accordingly,        we     affirm     the    judgment        on     these    claims      for   the
    reasons stated by the district court.                              Brown v. LaManna, No.
    2:06-cv-00390-RBH (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2008).                             However, we vacate
    the    portion      of     the    district        court’s      order        granting     summary
    judgment on Brown’s claims that his crutches were improperly
    confiscated, that he was denied recreation for sixty-five days,
    and    that    he    was    not      given    a       handicapped      accessible        shower.
    Finding that Brown has raised disputed issues of material fact
    concerning these claims, we remand them for further proceedings.
    To     state       a    claim       for       relief     under       the    Eighth
    Amendment, the plaintiff must establish that a prison official
    was    deliberately         indifferent        to      a   serious     condition,        medical
    need, or risk of harm.                See Short v. Smoot, 
    436 F.3d 422
    , 427
    (4th    Cir.       2006).        In    addition,           conditions       that    deprive      a
    prisoner       of     basic       human      needs,         involve        the     wanton      and
    unnecessary          infliction         of        pain,       or      constitute         extreme
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    deprivation disproportionate to the severity of the crime amount
    to   cruel    and    unusual     punishment        under       the    Eighth    Amendment.
    Rhodes v. Chapman, 
    452 U.S. 337
    , 347 (1981).                             With regard to
    lack of recreation, an inmate must show specific harm resulting
    from   the    deprivation       and    a   complete       denial       for     an    extended
    period of time.             Compare Mitchell v. Rice, 
    954 F.2d 187
    , 192
    (4th   Cir.    1992)        (seven    months       without      out-of-cell          exercise
    violated     constitutional          standards       of   decency),       and       Knight   v.
    Armontrout, 
    878 F.2d 1093
    , 1095-96 (8th Cir. 1989) (thirteen
    days   without       recreation       does     not    rise      to     Eighth       Amendment
    violation).              Complaints    about       infrequent         showers        state     a
    constitutional            violation    only        upon    a         showing        that     the
    deprivation         is     a   serious       one     to    which       defendants          were
    deliberately indifferent. See Wilson v. Seiter, 
    501 U.S. 294
    ,
    303 (1991).
    We review de novo a district court’s order granting
    summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable
    to the nonmoving party.               Bogart v. Chapell, 
    396 F.3d 548
    , 555
    (4th   Cir.    2005).          Summary     judgment       is    appropriate          when     no
    genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.                         See Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(c); United States Dep’t of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 
    377 F.3d 345
    , 350 (4th Cir. 2004).                    The non-movant is entitled “to
    have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his
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    version of all that is in dispute accepted, [and] all internal
    conflicts in it resolved favorably to him.”                               Charbonnages de
    France v. Smith, 
    597 F.2d 406
    , 414 (4th Cir. 1979).                               To raise a
    genuine issue of material fact, Brown may not rest upon the mere
    allegations or denials of his pleadings.                       Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
    Rather, he must present evidence supporting his position through
    “depositions,       answers      to    interrogatories,           and       admissions      on
    file, together with . . . affidavits, if any.”                            Celotex Corp. v.
    Catrett,    
    477 U.S. 317
    ,    322       (1986)     (quoting      Fed.    R.    Civ.    P.
    56(c)).
    The district court relied primarily on the affidavits
    of   a   prison     physician     and    the       Defendants        to    show    that    the
    Defendants contacted prison medical staff and determined that
    crutches were not medically required once Brown was transferred
    to   the   Special    Housing         Unit    (“SHU”),     where      he     remained      for
    sixty-five days.           Specifically, the court noted that “medical
    records    stated     that    Plaintiff           was   able    to    ambulate       without
    assistance” and that Defendants were informed as such when they
    inquired.    These determinations formed the basis of the district
    court’s decision.
    However,       our    review      of    the   medical         records    reveals
    that they are, in fact, ambiguous.                        They do not state that
    crutches or a wheelchair are medically necessary, but they also
    do   not    state    that     Brown      can       ambulate      without       assistance.
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    Instead, they merely record that, in the summer prior to his
    stint in SHU, Brown ambulated with crutches.                        As such, we find
    that the medical records are insufficient to show that Brown was
    ambulatory        without     assistance.             Moreover,         Brown     submitted
    affidavits        and    other      evidence      showing       that,     prior    to     his
    incarceration,          he   had    been    found     to   be    disabled,        requiring
    crutches and/or a wheelchair; that he was unable to stand or
    walk without assistance; that he repeatedly complained of pain
    while   in     SHU;      that      he     repeatedly       complained      of     lack    of
    recreation and access to the shower while in SHU; that, when he
    was transferred during his stay in SHU, officials used crutches
    or a wheelchair; and that, since being released from SHU, he has
    been confined to a wheelchair.
    While Brown does not (and logically could not) dispute
    that officials checked on his condition and were told by medical
    staff   that       crutches        were    not    a    medical      necessity,          these
    affidavits cannot completely shield Defendants from claims of
    deliberate        indifference.             First,     Brown      asserts        that     his
    condition was blatant and obvious--he could not stand or walk
    without assistance and was constantly in a great deal of pain.
    See Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 
    58 F.3d 101
    , 105 (4th
    Cir. 1995) (noting that official cannot hide behind an excuse
    that he was unaware of a risk, if the risk was obvious and that
    official     is    charged         with    confirming      inferences       he    strongly
    5
    suspects       exist).      Second,      if     Brown’s      allegations          are     true,
    Defendants were obliged to further investigate his condition to
    determine       if    it     had    deteriorated        or      whether      the        initial
    diagnosis      was    incorrect.         See       McElligott    v.    Foley,       
    182 F.3d 1248
    ,    1258    (11th      Cir.    1999)      (holding      that     jury        could   find
    deliberate indifference where prison staff failed to respond to
    deteriorating condition); Greeno v. Daley, 
    414 F.3d 645
    , 655
    (7th    Cir.    2005)      (finding      that       “dogged[]    persist[ance]            in   a
    course of treatment known to be ineffective” can violate the
    Eighth Amendment).               While Brown did see a physician while in
    SHU, Defendants do not allege that they asked this physician
    about Brown’s condition, even after receiving Brown’s grievances
    stating that he was unable to shower or recreate.                            Finally, the
    fact that the crucial conversation between medical staff and the
    prison     officials        was    not    reduced       to    writing        or    otherwise
    memorialized         in    the    medical     records     would       seem    to    militate
    against blindly accepting its veracity, especially in light of
    Brown’s conflicting affidavits.
    In short, we find that Brown has sufficiently raised a
    material issue of fact as to whether crutches or a wheelchair
    were medically necessary for him to ambulate, recreate, take a
    shower, ease his pain, and prevent further damage.                                 Moreover,
    Brown presented evidence showing that he could not recreate or
    take a shower without assistance and that Defendants refused
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    assistance in the face of his obvious need, resulting in over
    two months without a shower or recreation.                           In addition, Brown
    asserts    that     the    Defendants’     failure        to    address         his   obvious
    needs resulted in a deteriorated condition.                           While a trier of
    fact     may     find     that,   under      all    the      circumstances,           prison
    officials        were     entitled    to     rely    on        the     medical        staff’s
    conclusions or were not aware of Brown’s condition, Brown has
    raised questions about the credibility of Defendants’ affidavits
    and other material issues of fact that should be resolved at
    trial.     See Gray v. Spillman, 
    925 F.2d 90
    , 95 (4th Cir. 1991)
    (holding that summary judgment may not be granted when there is
    opposing sworn testimony, even when one side’s story is hard to
    believe).
    Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment
    on     Brown’s    claims     discussed       above     and      remand      for       further
    proceedings.        The remainder of the district court’s judgment is
    affirmed.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions       are    adequately       presented         in   the     materials
    before    the     court    and    argument     would      not    aid      the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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