Parsons v. Wynne ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-1876
    ATHENA E. PARSONS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    MICHAEL W. WYNNE, Secretary of the Air Force,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
    Senior District Judge. (4:05-cv-00036-HCM)
    Submitted:   February 5, 2007              Decided:   March 9, 2007
    Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Athena E. Parsons, Appellant Pro Se.       Kent Pendleton Porter,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Athena E. Parsons appeals the district court’s order granting
    summary judgment in favor of Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air
    Force, on Parsons’ claim of retaliation under Title VII of the
    Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
    17 (2000).     On appeal, Parsons argues that the district court
    should have granted her motion to defer a decision on Wynne’s
    motion to dismiss or for summary judgment until after the Supreme
    Court issued Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 
    126 S. Ct. 2405
    (2006).    She     asserts   that    under    the    standard     articulated       in
    Burlington, the district court erred in finding she did not allege
    an   adverse   employment    action    sufficient         to   state   a   claim   of
    retaliation under Title VII.          Finding no error, we affirm.
    The district court did not err or abuse its discretion in
    denying Parsons’ motion to defer; it had no way of knowing the
    Supreme Court would render the Burlington decision only three weeks
    after its decision on Wynne’s motion. Moreover, the district court
    correctly observed it was speculative to assume the Supreme Court’s
    decision   would    alter    the    prevailing      law   in   this    circuit     for
    evaluating a retaliation claim brought under Title VII.
    An appellate court, however, applies the law as it exists at
    the time of the appeal.            See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of
    Durham, 
    339 U.S. 268
    , 281 (1969).             Assuming for purposes of this
    - 2 -
    appeal that the Burlington standard applies to retaliation claims
    brought by federal employees, we nevertheless affirm.
    To state a prima facie claim for retaliation, “a plaintiff
    must   show    that      a   reasonable     employee   would    have     found     the
    challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means
    it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
    supporting a charge of discrimination.”              Burlington, 
    126 S. Ct. at 2415
     (internal quotations and citations omitted).                    Parsons points
    to several actions by her supervisors that she claims amount to
    “materially adverse” employment actions.                Because she failed to
    present these actions to the district court, however, we will not
    consider them on appeal.             See Muth v. United States, 
    1 F.3d 246
    ,
    250 (4th Cir. 1993).            Moreover, the district court held that
    Parsons did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation with
    regard to three allegations because she could not prove a causal
    connection between the challenged actions and her prior protected
    activity,     or   because     she    did   not   establish    she    was   actually
    entitled    to     the   claimed     benefit.      Because     Parsons      does   not
    challenge these holdings on appeal, we do not consider them.                       See
    Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 
    178 F.3d 231
    , 241 n.6 (4th Cir.
    1999).
    With regard to the two remaining actions that Parsons properly
    presented to the district court and preserved for appellate review,
    we conclude that even under the Burlington standard, she is unable
    - 3 -
    to establish a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to
    either of them.     Neither her May 2002 performance evaluation nor
    her removal from the alternate work schedule would have “dissuaded
    a   reasonable    worker   from    making   or    supporting   a   charge   of
    discrimination.”     Burlington, 
    126 S. Ct. at 2415
    .        Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
    favor of Wynne on Parsons’ retaliation claim.              We dispense with
    oral   argument    because   the    facts   and    legal   contentions      are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-1876

Judges: Williams, Michael, Motz

Filed Date: 3/9/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024