United States v. Amlee , 305 F. App'x 146 ( 2008 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-4156
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    KIRBY LOREN AMLEE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 08-4157
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    KIRBY LOREN AMLEE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
    District Judge. (1:06-cr-00376-NCT-1; 1:06-cr-00424-NCT-1)
    Submitted:   September 29, 2008          Decided:   December 31, 2008
    Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Gregory Davis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.   Michael Francis Joseph, Angela
    Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Kirby Loren Amlee pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
    agreement, to two counts of possession of firearms in commerce
    after having been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(6), 924(a)(2) (2000), and was
    sentenced to 46 months imprisonment.      Amlee’s counsel has filed a
    brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for
    appeal,   but   questioning   whether   the   district   court   erred   in
    sentencing Amlee.     Amlee has filed a supplemental pro se brief
    addressing these issues and asserting that he received ineffective
    assistance of counsel.    Finding no error, we affirm.
    Because Amlee did not move in the district court to
    withdraw his guilty plea, any challenge to the propriety of the
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error.           United
    States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525 (4th Cir. 2002).             Before
    accepting a plea, the district court must ensure that the defendant
    understands the nature of the charges against him, the mandatory
    minimum and maximum sentences, and various other rights, so it is
    clear the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily entering his plea.
    The court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
    the plea.     Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 116 (4th Cir. 1991). Our review of the plea hearing
    transcript reveals that the district court conducted a thorough
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    Rule 11 colloquy, ensuring that Amlee’s plea was knowing and
    voluntary and that there was an independent factual basis for the
    plea.
    This court reviews the sentence imposed by the district
    court for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
    Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007); see also United
    States v. Pauley, 
    511 F.3d 468
    , 473 (4th Cir. 2007).                             When
    sentencing    a    defendant,   a   district       court   must:    (1)    properly
    calculate    the    guideline   range;      (2)    treat   the     guidelines      as
    advisory; (3) consider the factors set out in 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a)
    (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); and (4) explain its reasons for selecting
    a sentence.       Pauley, 
    511 F.3d at 473
    .         We presume that a sentence
    within the properly calculated sentencing guidelines range is
    reasonable.       United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir.
    2007); see also Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462-69
    (2007)   (upholding      application       of     rebuttable     presumption       of
    correctness of within-guideline sentence).                 Here, the district
    court followed the appropriate procedures in sentencing Amlee, and
    we find no abuse of discretion in its imposition of the 46-month
    sentence.    We therefore find that Amlee’s sentence is reasonable.
    Amlee contends that the district court erred by failing
    to downwardly depart from the guideline range pursuant to U.S.
    Sentencing    Guidelines    Manual     §    5K1.13    (2007),      based    on    his
    diminished capacity.       This ruling is not reviewable unless the
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    district court was under the mistaken impression that it lacked the
    authority to depart.           United States v. Brewer, 
    520 F.3d 367
    , 371
    (4th    Cir.    2008)    (no    authority       to   review     denial   of    downward
    departure, even after Booker); see also United States v. Cooper,
    
    437 F.3d 324
    , 333 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases declining to
    review a district court’s decision not to depart, even after
    Booker). Here, the district court clearly understood its authority
    to depart; therefore, this claim is not cognizable on appeal.
    Amlee also asserts a challenge to the effectiveness of
    his trial attorney.            Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
    are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
    establishes ineffective assistance.                  United States v. Richardson,
    
    195 F.3d 192
    ,   198     (4th   Cir.   1999).         To   allow    for   adequate
    development      of     the    record,    claims      of   ineffective     assistance
    generally should be brought in a 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     (2000) motion.
    United States v. King, 
    119 F.3d 290
    , 295 (4th Cir. 1997).                       We find
    that    the    record    does    not     conclusively       establish     ineffective
    assistance.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                           We
    therefore affirm Amlee’s convictions and sentence.                         This court
    requires that counsel inform Amlee, in writing, of his right to
    petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
    If Amlee requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
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    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.    Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Amlee.      We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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