United States v. Blythe ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4686
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TAMARA SUE BLYTHE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CR-02-73)
Submitted: February 23, 2006 Decided: March 1, 2006
Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, Gretchen C. F. Shappert, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
At a June 2005 revocation hearing, Tamara Blythe admitted
to violations of her supervised release. The district court
revoked her supervised release and ordered her to serve eight
months’ imprisonment, a term within the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range. Blythe’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his
opinion, there exist no meritorious grounds for appeal. However,
counsel addresses whether the district court erred by failing to
expressly state that Blythe’s sentence was imposed upon
consideration of the sentencing factors* set forth in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), notwithstanding the statement
in the court’s written judgment that the factors were considered.
Although she was informed of her right to do so, Blythe elected not
to file a pro se supplemental brief.
In accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005), a sentencing court should determine the sentencing range
under the Guidelines, consider the factors under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a), and impose a reasonable sentence within the statutory
maximum. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th
Cir. 2005). “A sentence imposed within the properly calculated
Guidelines range . . . is presumptively reasonable.” United
*
Blythe did not object to the alleged omission at the
sentencing hearing.
- 2 -
States v. Green, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 267217, at *5 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). With these principles in
mind, we conclude that Blythe has not demonstrated plain error that
affected her substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of her
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 3 -