Temesgen Abdissa v. Merck Corporate , 637 F. App'x 101 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2186
TEMESGEN TESHOME ABDISSA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MERCK CORPORATE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:15-cv-00393-BO)
Submitted: February 29, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016
Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Temesgen Teshome Abdissa, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Temesgen Teshome Abdissa appeals the district court’s order
granting his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and summarily
dismissing his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). Abdissa alleged that Merck Corp.
discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 &
Supp. 2015). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally
construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). Once construed liberally, however, a federal court must
dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time the court
determines that “the action . . . is frivolous or malicious[,]
. . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,]
or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We review
dismissals of a complaint as frivolous for an abuse of
discretion. Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256–57 (4th Cir.
2004).
It does not appear beyond doubt that Abdissa’s complaint
“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566
F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims
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include those whose factual allegations are so nutty,
delusional, or wholly fanciful as to be simply unbelievable.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Indeed, even
at the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) stage, a complaint may proceed
“even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the
alleged] facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote
and unlikely.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district
court dismissed the complaint without giving Abdissa an
opportunity to clarify his claims, see Coleman v. Peyton, 340
F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding that, if pro
se complaint contains potentially cognizable claim, plaintiff
should be given opportunity to particularize allegations), we
vacate the district court’s order dismissing Abdissa’s complaint
as frivolous and remand to permit Abdissa to amend his complaint
and for further proceedings. We express no opinion as to the
viability of Abdissa’s underlying claims. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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