White v. Eaton Corporation Short Term Disability Plan ( 2009 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-2010
    CHRIS WHITE,
    Plaintiff − Appellee,
    v.
    EATON   CORPORATION  SHORT   TERM    DISABILITY       PLAN;   EATON
    CORPORATION LONG TERM DISABILITY
    PLAN,
    Defendants − Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Anderson.    Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
    (8:04-cv-01848-HFF)
    Argued:   October 29, 2008                 Decided:   January 21, 2009
    Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, and John
    T. COPENHAVER, JR., United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Anna K. Raske, BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF,
    L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Robert Edward Hoskins,
    FOSTER LAW FIRM, L.L.P., Greenville, South Carolina, for
    Appellee.   ON BRIEF: Jeffrey D. Zimon, BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER,
    COPLAN & ARONOFF, L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    This      case       involves   the    decision    of    Eaton    Corporation
    (“Eaton”)      to     terminate      the   short    term     disability     (“STD”)
    benefits    of      one   of   its   former     employees,    Christopher      White.
    White received STD benefits under the Eaton Corporation Short
    Term Disability Program (the “Plan”) from June 27, 2003 through
    November 12, 2003, at which time Eaton determined that White was
    capable of returning to work as a machinist and terminated his
    benefits.        After exhausting Eaton’s internal appeals process,
    White brought suit in federal district court, arguing that Eaton
    abused   its     discretion     in   denying     further     STD   benefits.     The
    district court concluded that Eaton did abuse its discretion and
    that White was entitled to further STD benefits.                   We affirm.
    I.
    White began working for Eaton as a machinist on January 29,
    2001.    He began experiencing back pain in 2002 and underwent
    surgery to repair a herniated disk on August 23 of that year.
    Dr. Michael Kilburn performed the surgery, and by November of
    2002 it appeared that White’s back pain was no longer an issue.
    White’s back pain resumed the following summer, however, and on
    June 26, 2003, he ceased his employment with Eaton.                         He then
    returned to Dr. Kilburn on July 8, 2003 and again on July 17,
    3
    2003.     These visits resulted in Dr. Kilburn providing White with
    a lumbar epidural steroid injection and a work release.
    On August 19, 2003, White visited Dr. Kilburn again, but
    this time White informed the doctor that he was in litigation
    with Eaton about a possible worker’s compensation claim.                                 Dr.
    Kilburn noted that White was “doing well” and “no longer [had]
    any appreciable pain in his left leg,” but chose to refer him to
    another    doctor,      Dr.    Kevin       Kopera,       because      an   appraisal      of
    White’s workplace duties was “outside the realm of [Kilburn’s]
    expertise.”       (J.A.       at   527.)         Dr.    Kopera      evaluated    White    on
    September 9, 2003 and made the following observations:
    Mr. White was limited greatly in terms of flexion and
    extension at the waist and both of these movements
    tended to aggravate his low back pain.          Lateral
    bending in each direction appeared to be less
    restricted   but   also   produced   some   amount   of
    discomfort. . . . Mr. White did have some increased
    symptoms with the left straight leg raise test in a
    sitting position in terms of increased discomfort.
    (J.A. at 592.)          These observations led Dr. Kopera to conclude
    that    White   was   suffering       from       “[c]hronic      low    back    pain   with
    lumbar    degenerative        disc    disease          and   possible      residual    left
    sided lumbar radiculopathy.”                (J.A. at 592.)           Concerning White’s
    ability    to   work,    Dr.       Kopera    observed        that    White     “appear[ed]
    limited in his ability to bend and lift and seems to be limited
    at this point primarily to sedentary work activities.”                           (J.A. at
    592.)     Ten days after the visit with Dr. Kopera, White visited
    4
    his primary care physician, Dr. Oliver Willard, who noted that a
    July    3,   2003    MRI     of     White’s         back       showed    “recurrent          disc
    extrusions    left     &    right      of   center       at     L5-S1”    and       a    “[s]mall
    posterolateral disc protrusion L4-5.”                      (J.A. at 594.)
    On October 30, 2003, White performed a Functional Capacity
    Evaluation (“FCE”) arranged by the Plan’s Claims Administrator,
    Broadspire Services, Inc. (“Broadspire”).                           The purpose of the
    FCE was to establish “[White’s] physical status, [as well as]
    restrictions and limitations” on his ability to return to work
    as a machinist.        (J.A. at 532.)               Importantly, the FCE concluded
    that White “did not demonstrate ability to meet the following
    job demand categories:                 Walk and Reach Immediate.”                       (J.A. at
    532.)     Despite this observation, the FCE ultimately found that
    White’s “[p]hysical abilities do match the job description of a
    machinist.”     (J.A. at 533.)              It therefore concluded that White
    “demonstrated        the      ability       to       physically          return          without
    modifications.”        (J.A. at 533.)
    Eaton denied White’s claim for continued STD benefits on
    November 12, 2003, in reliance upon the conclusions of the FCE.
    White exercised his right to appeal this determination, asked
    for     additional     time       to    prepare          his    appeal        and       submitted
    additional evidence in support of his appeal.                             This additional
    evidence consisted of affidavits from White and Dr. Kopera, as
    well    as   medical       records      from       Dr.    Kopera,       Dr.    Willard,       and
    5
    physicians at Piedmont Internal Medicine (“PIM”).                            White also
    submitted his MRI results from 2002 and 2003.
    Dr. Kopera’s and White’s affidavits both described White’s
    symptoms and concluded that he was unable to return to work.                           In
    particular, Dr. Kopera noted that White “suffers from a number
    of   back      problems       including    degenerative         disc   disease,      left
    lumbar radiculopathy, and severe and chronic back pain.”                            (J.A.
    at 569.)        He concluded that White was “completely and totally
    disabled”       based    on    White’s     “physical     problems      and    the    side
    effects of his prescription medications.”                     (J.A. at 573.)
    White also submitted his MRI from July 3, 2003, the report
    for which stated “[t]here is some degeneration of the L5-S1 disc
    as   previously         demonstrated      with    some    chronic      discovertebral
    changes in the endplates surrounding the L5-S1 disc.”                          (J.A. at
    604.)          In   addition,     the     report    remarked       that      the    “L4-5
    demonstrates a very small left posterolateral disc protrusion
    with no nerve root impairment” and that the L5-S1 had “recurrent
    disc extrusions.”          (J.A. at 604.)        There was also evidence of an
    “asymmetric left posterolateral disc bulge or broad-based disc
    protrusion at this level, which does not appear to impinge on
    the left L5 nerve root in the neutral foramen.”                     (J.A. at 604.)
    This    information       was     forwarded      to    a   Broadspire       peer-
    reviewer,       Dr.   Michael     Goldman,      D.O.,    for    further   evaluation.
    Dr. Goldman, who did not examine White personally, concluded
    6
    that    White    “has    no     specific      neuromuscular           or    musculoskeletal
    definitions       that        would     contraindicate              his      returning        to
    occupational         activities.”            (J.A.       at   612.)         He     summarized:
    “Therefore, based on my review of all of the medical records
    available to me, it is my opinion that the medical records as
    reviewed fail to support functional impairment that preclude the
    claimant      from     returning      to     his     occupational          activities       from
    11/12/03 to the present time.”                (J.A. at 612-13.)
    By    letter    dated    February          14,    2004,   Broadspire          informed
    White    that    it     was   upholding        the       original      decision       to    deny
    continuation of his short-term disability benefits.                                The letter
    stated its conclusion as follows:
    While the affidavits of Dr. Kopera and your client
    state   general   complications   of   his   medications
    preclude his return to work, there was insufficient
    objective, quantifiable medical evidence presented to
    substantiate this assertion.    There were no specific
    neuromuscular, musculoskeletal or cognitive deficits
    confirmed   that  would   preclude   your  client   from
    performing his normal job duties.
    (J.A. at 615.)          This letter also informed White of his right to
    a     final    appeal     within       180     days.           White       again     requested
    additional time to appeal, but never filed additional medical
    evidence in support of his claim.                    On April 16, 2004, as part of
    the final appeal, Broadspire employed another peer reviewer, Dr.
    Robert Ennis, to examine all of White’s medical documentation.
    Dr.    Ennis    concluded       “the    claimant’s            medical      records     do    not
    7
    support    a     functional    impairment     that     would   prevent       him    from
    working between 11/13/03 and the present time.”                 (J.A. at 623.)
    Finally, Broadspire submitted White’s file to the Medical
    Review Institute of America (MRIoA) for independent review.                          In
    its May 12, 2004 report, the MRIoA concluded that “[a] review of
    the records does not support the patient’s claim of disability.
    He has continuing complaints of back pain, but multiple physical
    exams     have    shown     limited     objective      findings.   .     .     .   Most
    importantly, the FCE – the best test of his functional abilities
    –   demonstrates      that    he   is   capable   of    performing     his     regular
    work.”    (J.A. at 512.)
    Eaton issued White a final determination letter on June 3,
    2004,     upholding       Broadspire’s     denial      of   benefits     for       White
    effective November 13, 2003.               The determination letter stated
    its conclusion as follows:
    The objective findings described in the medical
    records, functional capacity evaluation, peer reviews
    and the independent medical reviews do not support a
    finding of ongoing disability which would prevent Mr.
    White from performing the essential duties of his
    regular position as a machinist as of November 13,
    2003.    In addition, each medical reviewer of Mr.
    White’s information concluded that the objective
    information did not support a finding that Mr. White
    was unable to perform the essential duties of his job.
    The   functional   capacity   evaluation   performed   on
    October   30,    2003,   specifically    concluded   that
    “physical abilities do match the job description of
    machinist.”
    8
    (J.A. at 509.)          White responded by filing a civil action, under
    the     Employee      Retirement        Income      Security      Act      (“ERISA”),      
    29 U.S.C.A. § 1132
    (a)(1)(B) (West 1999), on June 10, 2004 in the
    United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
    On September 4, 2007, the district court entered an opinion and
    order,       granting       summary     judgment     in    favor      of    White.        The
    district court determined that Eaton abused its discretion by
    relying on the FCE, which the district court claimed suffered
    from an “internal contradiction.”                   (J.A. at 721.)          The district
    court was also troubled by Eaton’s treatment of White’s MRI – it
    noted    that    “[d]efendants’          rejection        of   the    findings       of    the
    abnormalities observed above, without any explanation as to why
    they were doing so, was not the result of a deliberate and
    principled reasoning process.”                 (J.A. at 724.) Consequently, the
    district      court     ordered       Eaton   to    pay   White      STD   benefits       from
    November 13, 2003 onward.              (J.A. at 705.)
    II.
    A.
    We   review     a    district     court’s     decision       to    grant     summary
    judgment de novo, and we employ the same legal standards applied
    by the district court.             Elliot v. Sara Lee Corp., 
    190 F.3d 601
    ,
    605 (4th Cir. 1999).              When, as in this case, an ERISA benefit
    plan vests discretionary authority to make benefits eligibility
    9
    determinations with the plan administrator, a reviewing court
    evaluates         a    denial   of    benefits    under   an   abuse   of   discretion
    standard. 1           Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
    126 F.3d 228
    ,
    232 (4th Cir. 1997).                  Under this standard, an administrator’s
    decision “will not be disturbed if it is reasonable,” even if we
    “would have come to a different conclusion independently.”                           
    Id.
    To   be     reasonable,         the    decision    must   be    “the   result   of    a
    deliberate principled reasoning process” and be “supported by
    substantial evidence.”                 Brogan v. Holland, 
    105 F.3d 158
    , 161
    (4th       Cir.       1997)   (internal    quotation      marks   omitted).      This
    reasonableness inquiry is guided by eight non-exclusive factors:
    (1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and
    goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the materials
    considered to make the decision and the degree to
    which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary's
    interpretation was consistent with other provisions in
    the plan and with earlier interpretations of the plan;
    (5) whether the decisionmaking process was reasoned
    and   principled;  (6)   whether   the   decision   was
    consistent   with  the   procedural   and   substantive
    requirements of ERISA; (7) any external standard
    relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the
    fiduciary’s motives and any conflict of interest it
    may have. 2
    1
    The Plan provides:    “The Plan Administrator shall have
    discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
    and to construe any and all terms of the Plan, including, but
    not limited to, any disputed or doubtful terms.” (J.A. at 496.)
    2
    We note that a conflict of interest can no longer operate
    to reduce the deference given to a fiduciary’s discretionary
    decision to deny benefits.     See Champion v. Black & Decker
    (U.S.) Inc., No. 07-1991, slip op. at 8 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2008)
    (Continued)
    10
    Booth v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 
    201 F.3d 335
    , 342-43 (4th Cir.
    2000).     We turn now to the merits of Eaton’s appeal.
    B.
    In Donovan v. Eaton Corp., 
    462 F.3d 321
     (4th Cir. 2006), we
    affirmed     a    district     court’s       grant     of    long-term      disability
    benefits to another Eaton employee.                     In that case, as here,
    Eaton claimed that there was a lack of objective evidence of
    disability and denied benefits.                
    Id. at 324-26
    .          We found that
    decision    unreasonable,         however,     because      of    Eaton’s    “wholesale
    disregard” of evidence supporting the employee’s claim.                         
    Id. at 329
    .       Specifically,      Eaton      focused      on     a    statement    by     the
    employee’s       doctor    that    suggested      she       was   still     capable    of
    performing sedentary activities, without addressing a subsequent
    statement by the same doctor in which the doctor determined that
    the employee was totally disabled.                   
    Id.
         We also observed that
    Eaton’s in-house peer reviewers ignored evidence favorable to
    Donovan’s    claim,       including   Donovan’s        own    statements      regarding
    her pain levels and ability to engage in everyday activities.
    
    Id. at 327
    .
    (addressing the impact of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,
    
    128 S. Ct. 2343
     (2008), on our standard of review when a
    conflict of interest exists).      When there is a conflict of
    interest, we must apply the abuse of discretion standard and
    treat the conflict of interest as only one factor among the
    several that we examine in a reasonableness determination. 
    Id.
    11
    We   believe    that       this    case      is   substantially       similar    to
    Donovan.      In both cases, Eaton has either failed to elaborate
    on, or outright ignored, evidence favorable to the claimant.
    These    deficiencies         in    the    Plan’s      decision-making      process     are
    reflected         especially       in    its    treatment    of     White’s      FCE,   its
    failure      to     address    conflicting           explanations     of   White’s      job
    requirements,        and    its     failure      to    adequately     address      medical
    evidence supporting White’s claims.                       We address each of these
    shortcomings below.
    First, the Plan relied heavily on White’s FCE in making its
    determination        that     White       was    capable    of    performing      his   job
    requirements.          In the final determination letter provided to
    White, Eaton specifically referenced the FCE:
    The   functional  capacity    evaluation   performed  on
    October 30, 2003 specifically concluded that “physical
    abilities do match the job description of a machinist.
    Therefore, the evaluee has demonstrated the ability to
    physically   return   without    modifications.”     The
    conclusions of the functional capacity evaluation were
    based on the results of objective, physical tests.
    (J.A. at 509.)          The FCE’s conclusion that White was capable of
    meeting the job description of a machinist does not comport with
    its actual observations of White’s physical abilities.                            The FCE
    specifically concluded that White could not fulfill his job’s
    walking      requirements,         and    the    FCE’s     subsequent      determination
    that     White      could     fulfill      the       requirements    of    his    job   is
    12
    irreconcilable with this observation.                   The Plan made no mention
    of this fact in its final determination.
    The     Plan’s      failure      to         account     for    the      internal
    inconsistencies in the FCE is especially problematic due to the
    reliance     placed    on   the    FCE      by    the    medical    reviewers      who
    evaluated    White’s     claim.       The     in-house      peer   reviews    by   Dr.
    Goldman    and   Dr.   Ennis   both      referenced        the   FCE’s   conclusions
    regarding White’s ability to return to work.                        In his review,
    Dr. Goldman remarked:
    The result of [the FCE] suggested that the claimant
    gave a reliable effort.       His functional abilities
    demonstrated that his abilities met specific job
    demands in the following categories:    High lift, mid
    lift, low lift, carry up to 20 pounds, push cart up to
    40 pounds, pull cart up to 40 pounds and standing. . .
    . The conclusion was that his physical abilities did
    match the job description of a machinist; therefore
    the claimant had demonstrated the physical ability to
    return without modifications. 3
    (J.A. at 612.)         Dr. Ennis remarked that the FCE “indicate[d]
    that the claimant was able to perform work activities, which
    were consistent with his job description as a machinist . . .”
    (J.A. at 623.)        Finally, the opinion provided by the independent
    medical reviewer appears to have given the FCE great weight.                        It
    explained:       “Most importantly, the FCE – the best test of his
    3
    We note that Dr. Goldman did not mention that the FCE
    demonstrated that White’s abilities did not meet the specific
    job demands in the walking category.
    13
    functional       abilities    –   demonstrates       that    he   is    capable      of
    performing his regular work.”                (J.A. at 512.)          None of these
    doctors noted the discrepancies in the FCE or suggested that
    such discrepancies were accounted for in how they incorporated
    the   FCE    into   their    ultimate   conclusions.          And,     there    is    no
    indication that the Plan considered the reviewers’ failure to
    account for the inconsistencies in the FCE when the Plan relied
    on the reviewers’ conclusions in denying White’s claim.
    Second, Eaton’s final determination also failed to address
    conflicting explanations of White’s job requirements.                          White’s
    FCE showed that White was capable of lifting one to ten pounds
    constantly, eleven to twenty-five pounds frequently, and twenty-
    one   to    fifty   pounds   occasionally.          A    worksheet     completed      by
    Eaton’s     human    resources     department       stated    that     White’s       job
    required that he lift up to 100 pounds.                     But, on November 6,
    2003 – less than one week after White’s FCE limited his lifting
    ability     to   fifty   pounds    or   less    –       Eaton’s   human    resources
    department sent an e-mail clarifying that White “in reality”
    never lifted more than fifty pounds.                (J.A. at 553.)        The e-mail
    was sent by Susan Watts, the same Eaton employee who signed off
    on the original worksheet indicating that White did in fact have
    to lift more than fifty pounds.              The final determination recites
    these   different     descriptions      of    White’s      lifting     requirements,
    14
    but fails to acknowledge the clear inconsistency between the
    two.
    The final determination also failed to even mention White’s
    affidavit, which described his job duties.                Specifically, White
    averred:
    As a machinist and production worker I was required to
    set up wheel changes on machine production runs.    My
    job entailed was that I was required to lift the
    wheels which weighed up to 100 lbs. with a crane which
    meant I had to climb into the machine, hook the wheel
    up to the crane, and operate the crane to pull the
    wheels out.    I was also required to climb up onto
    tables which were approximately four and a half (4
    1/2) feet tall.    I was also required to climb onto
    machines that were approximately five (5) feet tall in
    order to get into the machine to change the wheels. I
    was also required to run a machine which required that
    I load the feeder then once the parts move through the
    machine they were then placed in a bin at the end of
    the machine. I was then required to lift that bin and
    place the parts in a drier. Once the parts were dried
    I had to remove them from the drier and put them in a
    bin and move the parts to the next part of production.
    In that job I was required to lift from 50 to 100 lbs.
    and sometimes over 100 lbs.
    (J.A.    at    564-65.)      The   affidavit    testimony     and   the   human
    resources worksheet are consistent and clear:              White did have to
    lift    over    50   lbs.   as   part   of   his   job.      Yet,   the   final
    determination letter did not mention the affidavit or address
    its impact on the Plan’s decision to credit the November 6 e-
    mail as the authoritative description of White’s lifting duties.
    The Plan’s failure to explain why it credited the November 6 e-
    mail instead of the original worksheet is a glaring omission
    15
    considering that, based on his FCE, White would be able to meet
    one of these sets of lifting requirements, but not the other.
    Third,     the    Plan’s         final     determination            letter      failed
    adequately to address medical evidence in White’s favor.                               First,
    the final determination contained absolutely no discussion of
    the fact that White had undergone serious back surgery in 2002.
    Cf. Evans v. Eaton Corp., 
    514 F.3d 315
    , 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (no
    abuse    of    discretion       in   a    case    where    Eaton’s         reports     used   a
    “measured        tone,   which       acknowledges         Evans’s          serious     medical
    problems without a hint of dismissiveness”).                           It also credited
    the independent reviewer’s opinion that White’s MRI findings are
    “unimpressive,” despite the fact that the MRI clearly evidenced
    abnormalities,       including           “degeneration,”         a    “very     small    left
    posterolateral disc protrusion with no nerve root impingement”
    of the L4-5, and an “asymmetric left posterolateral disc bulge
    or broad-based disc protrusion” of the L5-S1.                               (J.A. at 604.)
    Finally, and significantly, the Plan discounted the affidavit of
    Dr. Kopera.         It concluded that “the Affidavit . . . did not
    provide any objective findings of disability.”                              (J.A. at 509.)
    Dr.   Kopera’s      affidavit,       however,       included         his    diagnosis     that
    White     “suffers       from    a       number    of     back       problems        including
    degenerative disc disease, left lumbar radiculopathy, and severe
    and chronic back pain.”                  (J.A. at 569.)              He also provided a
    rundown       of   White’s      numerous         prescription         drug     medications.
    16
    Eaton’s dismissal of Dr. Kopera’s affidavit cannot be reconciled
    with the Plan’s own medical information requirements.                    Medical
    diagnoses and medications are objective findings under the terms
    of the Plan. 4
    C.
    In sum, the Plan failed to address evidence favorable to
    White “thoughtfully and at length.”                   Evans, 
    514 F.3d at 326
    .
    It relied on a fundamentally flawed FCE, based its determination
    on a description of White’s lifting duties that was contradicted
    by   evidence    in       the   record    and    disregarded   medical   evidence
    favorable to White, even though the evidence met the Plan’s own
    definition      of    “objective     findings.”           Eaton’s   failure    to
    seriously engage in a discussion of White’s favorable evidence
    suggests that, as in Donovan, Eaton abused its discretion by
    denying White benefits.             See Donovan, 
    462 F.3d at 329
     (finding
    an abuse of discretion where there was a “wholesale disregard”
    of evidence in the claimant’s favor); Glenn v. Metropolitan Life
    Ins. Co., 
    461 F.3d 660
    , 672 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding an abuse of
    discretion      in    a    case   where    the    administrator     “offered   no
    4
    The plan lists the following as examples of objective
    findings:       “physical   examination    findings (functional
    impairments/capacity); diagnostic test results/imaging studies;
    diagnosis;    X-ray   results;    observation    of anatomical,
    physiological or psychological abnormalities; and medications
    and/or treatment plan.” (J.A. at 488.)
    17
    explanation      for     its       resolution      of     [an   inconsistency       in     the
    evidence]       or,    for        that   matter,        whether   it    was      given    any
    consideration at all”), aff’d, 
    128 S. Ct. 2343
     (2008). 5
    III.
    For    the       above        reasons,     the       district     court’s     decision
    finding    an    abuse       of    discretion        by   Eaton   and    granting        White
    benefits is hereby
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    We also note that the final Booth factor – the existence
    of a conflict of interest – weighs in White’s favor because
    Eaton both funds and administers the Plan. See Booth v. Walmart
    Stores, Inc., 
    201 F.3d 335
    , 343 (4th Cir. 2000).     “In such a
    circumstance, ‘every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar
    spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a
    dollar in [the employer’s] pocket’.” Glenn, 
    128 S. Ct. at 2348
    (quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
    828 F.2d 134
    , 144
    (3d Cir. 1987)). Thus, Eaton was operating under a conflict of
    interest when it denied White’s benefits claim.
    A conflict of interest “should prove more important
    (perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a
    higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision,
    including, but not limited to, cases where an . . .
    administrator has a history of biased claims administration.”
    Glenn, 
    128 S. Ct. at 2351
    . White argues that Eaton has shown a
    history of biased claims administration and that Eaton’s
    conflict of interest should therefore weigh heavily in our
    balancing of the Booth factors.      Because we do not consider
    Eaton’s conflict of interest central to our conclusion that it
    abused its discretion in denying White’s benefits, we decline to
    address how much importance to give the conflict in this case.
    18