United States v. Jamar Woody , 588 F. App'x 288 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4365
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR BERNARD WOODY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:05-cr-00110-GEC-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2014 Decided: December 22, 2014
Before SHEDD, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Fay F. Spence,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, R. Andrew
Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamar Bernard Woody appeals the twenty-seven-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised
release. Finding no error, we affirm.
Woody first contends that the district court erred by
finding that he possessed a controlled substance without the
admission of a lab report or the testimony of a chemist, and
without affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the
chemist. However, Woody admitted that the substance was his and
that it was cocaine base. In light of Woody’s admission, there
was no need for testimony or cross-examination as to this
uncontested fact. * Rather, in view of Woody’s admission,
counsel’s statements, and evidence of the positive field test,
the district court appropriately, and without objection,
concluded that Woody violated the terms of his supervision by
possessing crack cocaine.
Woody also challenges the reasonableness of the
sentence. In determining the sentence to impose upon revocation
*
Woody’s reliance on United States v. Ferguson, 752 F.3d
613 (4th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526,
529 (4th Cir. 2012) for the proposition that a laboratory
certificate of analysis is insufficient to prove the nature of a
substance unless the lab chemist is available to testify and is
available for cross-examination is misplaced. In contrast to
Woody’s case, the defendants in those cases did not admit to the
nature of the substance.
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of Woody’s supervised release, the district court considered the
Chapter Seven policy statements in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, the statutory requirements, and the relevant
factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2012). The court also considered Woody’s
request for a sentence at the low end of the range and the
government’s argument for a sentence at the high end. Noting
Woody’s numerous violations and the short time between his
release from prison and his violations, the court imposed a
revocation sentence of twenty-seven months. This sentence is
within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly
unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39
(4th Cir. 2006).
We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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