Olin Corp. v. P.H. Glatfelter Co. ( 2010 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-2252
    OLIN CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    P.H. GLATFELTER COMPANY, a/k/a Glatfelter, d/b/a Glatfelter
    Company,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Asheville.  Lacy H. Thornburg,
    District Judge. (1:06-cv-00367-LHT)
    Argued:   December 2, 2009                     Decided:    March 5, 2010
    Before TRAXLER,     Chief   Judge,   and   SHEDD   and   DAVIS,   Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Adam Howard Charnes, KILPATRICK & STOCKTON, LLP,
    Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.    Craig C. Martin,
    JENNER & BLOCK, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.        ON BRIEF:
    Betsy Cooke, Stephen R. Berlin, KILPATRICK & STOCKTON, LLP,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.      Philip S. Anderson,
    LONG, PARKER, WARREN, ANDERSON & PAYNE, PA, Asheville, North
    Carolina; Barry Levenstam, Amanda S. Amert, Melissa L. Dickey,
    JENNER & BLOCK, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment/breach of
    contract     action        with     respect        to   a     contractual       indemnity
    provision. We affirm.
    Appellee      Olin     Corporation          (“Olin”)    purchased       the   Ecusta
    Paper Mill in Pisgah Forest, North Carolina in 1949. Over the
    years    thereafter,        Olin    disposed       of   waste      products    containing
    mercury,     which     resulted       from        certain     of    its     manufacturing
    processes,     both    on-site       and     in    wastewater        that    flowed     onto
    nearby property. In 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency
    pressed regulatory actions intended to require Olin to address
    and/or reduce its discharge of mercury. In part as a result,
    Olin ceased the extant manufacturing processes and substituted
    purchased chemicals.
    In    1985,     senior       officers        of   Olin’s       Ecusta     Division,
    including     Garza     Baldwin       (President),          Robert    Cunningham,       Jr.
    (Chief Legal Officer and Vice President of Human Resources and
    Public     Affairs),    and       Robert    Gussman     (Environmental         Director),
    together with several investors, purchased the Ecusta Mill from
    Olin, forming Ecusta Corporation. Olin acquired an interest in
    the     newly-formed        entity     but        did   not        involve     itself    in
    operations.         Baldwin,         Cunningham,            and      Gussman        assumed
    substantially         the     same         leadership        positions        in    Ecusta
    Corporation as they had held in the Ecusta Division of Olin. In
    3
    1987, Appellant P.H. Glatfelter Company (“Glatfelter”) acquired
    the Ecusta Corporation through a stock purchase transaction, in
    which     Glatfelter        assumed    certain          of    Ecusta       Corporation’s
    liabilities.        Baldwin      remained   involved          in    the    business       and
    served      on    Glatfelter’s      Board       of   Directors.        Cunningham         and
    Gussman     remained       involved   as    well,       and    served      in    the    same
    capacities in which they served for Ecusta Division and Ecusta
    Corporation.
    The        contractual      rights    and      obligations          of     Olin     and
    Glatfelter are governed by a July 24, 1985, Purchase Agreement
    (“the Agreement”). The Agreement provides that Glatfelter (as
    successor-in-interest to Ecusta Corporation) must indemnify Olin
    for      certain      environmental         liabilities            under        prescribed
    circumstances.        As    constituent         parts    of    the     Agreement,         the
    representations and warranties of Olin’s officers, and the so-
    called      Environmental        Disclosure      Statement         (“EDS”)      underscore
    Olin’s    obligations       in    divulging      the    existence         of    mercury    at
    Ecusta Mill to Glatfelter. (The mill property has changed hands
    several times in the last decade.)
    On or about January 23, 2006, the North Carolina Department
    of Environment and Natural Resources (“NCDENR”) notified Olin
    and Glatfelter (among others) that it planned to take action
    concerning        Ecusta   Mill    under    the      Comprehensive         Environmental
    Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 9601
    , et
    4
    seq. (“CERCLA”). The NCDENR notice identified five Recognized
    Environmental        Concerns      (“RECs”)         at     Ecusta      Mill    that       would
    require clean-up. Pursuant to the Agreement, Glatfelter agreed
    to indemnify Olin with respect to four of the five RECs. It
    refused to indemnify Olin for the costs related to remediation
    of    mercury   contamination            released          from     the     Ecusta    Mill’s
    Electro-Chemical Building.
    Thereafter,      Olin       sued    Glatfelter         in     the     United    States
    District     Court    for   the     Western         District      of      North    Carolina.
    After several preliminary matters had been attended to by the
    court and the completion of discovery, Olin moved for summary
    judgment.
    The district court issued a carefully-reasoned memorandum
    opinion in which it granted summary judgment to Olin. Olin Corp.
    v.    P.H.   Glatfelter       Co.,       No.       1:06CV367,        
    2008 WL 4596262
    ,
    (W.D.N.C.    Oct.     14,   2008).       The       court    first      determined,        inter
    alia, that, as to Olin’s request for a declaratory judgment, the
    EDS    specifically         and     unambiguously             “refer[red]”           to     the
    “disposition” of mercury. 
    Id. at *6-8
    .                      Moreover, “the Agreement
    with its accompanying EDS obligated [Glatfelter] to indemnify
    Olin for the costs of cleanup described in RECs 1 and 5.”                                   
    Id. at *8-10
    .    Second,         the      district           court      determined          that
    Glatfelter’s           counterclaims                 for          fraud,           negligent
    5
    misrepresentation, and unfair and deceptive trade practices were
    time-barred.       
    Id. at *10-11
    .
    Glatfelter noted its timely appeal to this court. We review
    the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.                             Meson
    v. GATX Tech. Servs. Corp., 
    507 F.3d 803
    , 806 (4th Cir. 2007)
    (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper only where “there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving
    party    is   “entitled      to   judgment     as    a     matter    of    law.”        
    Id.
    (citation omitted).
    By   its      terms,   the    Agreement     would      “be    governed       by,   and
    construed     in    accordance     with,   the      laws    of     the    State   of    New
    York.”    (J.A. 688). We discern no error by the district court in
    its summary judgment order.
    First,        “[i]t    is    the   primary      rule     of    construction         of
    contracts . . . that when the terms of a written contract are
    clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found
    therein.”     Mazzola v. County of Suffolk, 
    533 N.Y.S.2d 297
    , 297
    (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).     “The words and phrases used in an agreement must be
    given their plain meaning so as to define the rights of the
    parties.”       
    Id.
     (citation omitted).              Here, the terms “referred
    to” and “disposition” have plain and unambiguous meanings, and
    the disposition of mercury is referred to throughout the EDS.
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    Second, under New York's policy of strict interpretation of
    indemnification          clauses,     a     court      must     examine           whether
    Glatfelter’s intention to indemnify “can be clearly implied from
    the    language    and     purpose    of    the     entire    agreement       and       the
    surrounding facts and circumstances.” Hooper Assocs., Ltd. v.
    AGS Computers, Inc., 
    74 N.Y.2d 487
    , 491-92 (1989). That test is
    satisfied here. For example, Baldwin, Cunningham, and Gussman
    were     aware     of     issues     regarding        Ecusta        Mill’s        mercury
    contamination. Accordingly, their subsequent employers, Ecusta
    Corporation and then Glatfelter, of which they were high-ranking
    officers, are charged with such knowledge and thus also were
    aware that the EDS “referred to” the disposition of mercury.
    J.A.   2642-43.     Accordingly,      Glatfelter       was     on    notice       of    the
    mercury disposal.         Cf. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics
    Corp.,    
    850 F.Supp. 993
    ,     1059       (W.D.N.Y.    1994)    (noting          that
    “[e]ven for latent defects, the seller’s duty terminated when a
    new owner discovered or should reasonably have discovered and
    had a reasonable opportunity to abate the condition”).
    Third,     under     North     Carolina       law,      Glatfelter’s            tort
    counterclaims are time-barred because it reasonably should have
    been aware of the disposition of the mercury years before it
    decided   to     bring    its   claims.     See,    e.g.,     Sullivan       v.   Mebane
    Packaging Group, Inc., 
    158 N.C. App. 19
    , 28 (2003) (noting that
    we have held that knowledge of information should be imputed to
    7
    investors   who   possess      documents   apprising   them     of   the   risks
    associated with the investments).
    In   sum,    upon   our    careful    consideration   of    the   record,
    briefs, oral argument by the parties, and applicable law, we
    affirm on the basis of the opinion of the district court. Olin
    Corp. v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., No. 1:06CV367, 
    2008 WL 4596262
    ,
    (W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2008).
    AFFIRMED
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-2252

Judges: Traxler, Shedd, Davis

Filed Date: 3/5/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024