United States v. Brewington ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                  No. 95-5811
    BILLY ARON BREWINGTON, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem.
    Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge.
    (CR-95-78)
    Submitted: April 15, 1996
    Decided: April 29, 1996
    Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY, NEWELL & JOHNSON, L.L.P.,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr.,
    United States Attorney, Loretta C. Biggs, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Billy Aron Brewington, Jr., pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
    crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.A.§ 841 (West 1981
    & Supp. 1995). He appeals his 164-month sentence, challenging the
    district court's determination of the amount of crack attributable to
    him under the sentencing guidelines, USSG § 2D1.1,* as well as the
    constitutionality of the guidelines. We affirm.
    Between 1992 and 1995, Brewington traveled to New York numer-
    ous times with various co-conspirators who pooled their resources to
    obtain crack and powder cocaine for sale in North Carolina. Brewing-
    ton was the one who knew a source for cocaine in New York; later
    he found a second one. He often had others transport the cocaine back
    to North Carolina for him. When powder cocaine was purchased,
    Brewington cooked it into crack on his return to North Carolina and
    divided it among the purchasers. The probation officer recommended
    that Brewington be held responsible for 2.8 kilograms of crack, the
    entire amount of crack he obtained in concert with the other conspira-
    tors. Brewington argued at sentencing that only the amounts pur-
    chased with money he contributed (approximately half of the total)
    should be attributed to him because that was the limit of his agree-
    ment. The district court found him responsible for the whole 2.8 kilo-
    grams.
    A defendant who has engaged in a conspiracy is responsible for
    "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance
    of the jointly undertaken criminal activity." USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
    Conduct of others which is not in furtherance of the criminal activity
    jointly undertaken by the defendant is not relevant conduct. USSG
    _________________________________________________________________
    *United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
    1994).
    2
    § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2); see United States v. Gilliam, 
    987 F.2d 1009
    ,
    1012-13 (4th Cir. 1993). It is readily apparent that all the crack
    obtained by Brewington and his co-conspirators was in furtherance of
    the conspiracy which Brewington had entered into and was within the
    scope of the agreement he made. The district court did not err in attri-
    buting the entire 2.8 kilograms to him.
    Brewington also argues that the disparity between penalties for
    crack offenses and for cocaine offenses in § 841 and USSG § 2D1.1
    violates due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment.
    He acknowledged that prior decisions of this court have held other-
    wise, and we find no merit in his contention. See, e.g., United States
    v. Fisher, 
    58 F.3d 96
    , 98-100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    64 U.S.L.W. 3270
     (U.S. Oct. 10, 1995); United States v. Thomas, 
    900 F.2d 37
    , 39-
    40 (4th Cir. 1990).
    The sentence imposed by the district court is therefore affirmed.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3