Riley v. Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. , 323 F. App'x 276 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1686
DEBORAH RILEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HONEYWELL TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District
Judge. (1:05-cv-02426-BEL)
Submitted: April 16, 2009 Decided: April 20, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard E. Patrick, Anjuma Goswami, PATRICK HENRY LLP,
Annandale, Virginia, for Appellant. Rafael E. Morell, OGLETREE,
DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Deborah Riley, an African-American female, appeals the
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. (“HTSI”) and dismissing her
civil action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2000) (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). Riley, a
financial manager employed by HTSI from August 2001 until her
resignation in March 2004, alleged that HTSI unlawfully
discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of race
when she was not promoted in 2003 to a position as a Business
Manager, and with respect to her wages. 1
Our review of the record and the district court's
opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit. The
familiar burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Riley’s claims.
We find the district court properly determined that Riley failed
to establish pretext for HTSI’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for selecting Lisa Heins, a Caucasian female, for the
position at issue. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
1
As Riley has not appealed the additional bases for the
district court’s dismissal of these and other claims raised in
her civil action, those claims are not properly before this
court for review.
2
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Conkwright v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991).
Specifically, while Riley admitted under oath that she had no
experience dealing with customers, HTSI established that such
experience was “critical” to the position, and that Heins
possessed this experience. Moreover, the purported
“inconsistencies” alleged by Riley in HTSI’s selection process
were insufficient to establish pretext, both because there was
utterly no evidence of racial animus in the selection process or
hiring decision, and because such “inconsistencies,” even
assuming they existed, do not undercut the fact that Heins was
the best qualified for the position. 2 See Evans v. Technologies
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258-59). We find that there is no
evidence that those who selected and/or hired Heins were
motivated by any desire other than to select the candidate they
felt was the best suited for the position. Because Riley failed
2
Riley’s self-serving contentions that there were
differences in evaluation, inconsistencies in the identity of
the hiring individual, and that Heins was preselected, were
properly discounted by the district court as having no viable
evidentiary support and as being insufficient as a matter of law
to establish pretext. See e.g., Smith v. University of N.
Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 346 (4th Cir. 1980).
3
to establish pretext, we find that the district court did not
improvidently grant summary judgment to HTSI. 3
Riley’s final claim on appeal is that the district
court erred in dismissing her wage discrimination claim. We
find that, after fully considering the evidence Riley submitted,
the court properly determined that the differences in job
responsibilities, duties, and experience between Riley and Heins
plainly were adequate to justify the minimal difference in their
wages.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting HTSI’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
Riley’s retaliation claims regarding her 2002 bonus and
the 2003 failure to promote also were properly rejected by the
district court on the grounds of temporal proximity, the absence
of other evidence of retaliatory animus, see e.g., Causey v.
Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998), and because HTSI had
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotion
decision.
4