United States v. Jarvis Sessoms , 624 F. App'x 117 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4213
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JARVIS DEVAIL SESSOMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Louise W.
Flanagan, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00001-FL-1)
Submitted: December 15, 2015 Decided: December 17, 2015
Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jarvis Devail Sessoms pled guilty to knowingly possessing a
firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2012). The district court imposed a within-Guidelines 50-month
sentence, to be served consecutively to Sessoms’ undischarged
state sentence on an unrelated offense. He appeals, claiming
that the district court’s refusal to run the sentence
concurrently to Sessoms’ state sentence renders the sentence
substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review entails appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In assessing
procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district
court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for
an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51. If there are no procedural
errors, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence, evaluating “the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
at 51. A sentence is presumptively reasonable if it is within
the Guidelines range, and this “presumption can only be rebutted
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by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
421 (2014).
We find (and Sessoms concedes) that his sentence is
procedurally reasonable. He argues, however, that the sentence
as imposed is substantively unreasonable because it should run
concurrently with, rather than consecutive to, his undischarged
state sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (2012), a district court
retains the discretion to run a federal sentence concurrently or
consecutively to an unimposed state sentence. Sester v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 229 (2012). In deciding whether to run a
sentence concurrently or consecutively to another sentence, the
court must consider the factors in § 3553(a) (2012). 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(b). Moreover, the Guidelines express a policy concern
that the court should determine whether to run a sentence
concurrently or consecutively to another sentence to achieve a
reasonable sentence and, with “an undischarged term of
imprisonment that resulted from conduct only partially within
the relevant conduct for the instant offense,” it may be
reasonable for a court to downwardly depart to achieve that
goal. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 App. n.3(E)
(2014).
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Here, the district court properly recognized its authority
to run the federal sentence concurrently, consecutively, or
partially concurrently with the undischarged state sentence.
The court further addressed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) as well as the policy considerations identified in
USSG § 5G1.3. Accordingly, we find that Sessoms has failed to
overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded his within-
Guidelines sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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