United States v. D'Quel Washington , 632 F. App'x 106 ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-4268
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    D’QUEL NAJAE WASHINGTON, a/k/a Problem,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.     Louise W.
    Flanagan, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00013-FL-1)
    Submitted:   November 24, 2015            Decided:   December 3, 2015
    Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.    Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    D’Quel Najae Washington pled guilty, pursuant to a written
    plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the
    intent   to    distribute         28   grams     or     more       of   cocaine      base,      in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846 (2012) (Count 1), use
    and   carry    of     a    firearm      during     and    in       relation        to    a   drug
    trafficking     crime,       in     violation      of    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)
    (2012)   (Count       13),    and      possession       of     a    stolen      firearm,        in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (j), 924 (2012) (Count 15).                                       The
    district      court       imposed      concurrent        105-month        low-end-of-the-
    Guidelines-range          sentences     on   Counts       1    and      15,   to    be    served
    consecutive     to    a    mandatory      minimum       sentence        of    60    months      on
    Count 13.
    On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), concluding that there are no
    meritorious issues that are reviewable in light of Washington’s
    appellate waiver, but arguing that the district court clearly
    erred in its drug quantity determination at sentencing.                                        The
    Government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
    that Washington knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
    appeal his conviction and sentence.                      Washington’s counsel filed
    a   response    in    opposition        to   the      motion,       citing     our      duty    to
    review the record under Anders.                  Although informed of his right
    to file a pro se brief, Washington has not done so.                                     We grant
    2
    the Government’s motion to dismiss in part with respect to all
    issues    falling      within    Washington’s           appellate       waiver.          As    to
    those    issues    beyond     the     scope       of   the     waiver      and   subject       to
    review     pursuant      to     our     duty       under       Anders,      we     deny       the
    Government’s motion but affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We review de novo a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights.
    United States v. Copeland, 
    707 F.3d 522
    , 528 (4th Cir. 2013).                                   A
    defendant may waive the right to appeal as part of a valid plea
    agreement.        United States v. Manigan, 
    592 F.3d 621
    , 627 (4th
    Cir. 2010).        In assessing whether an appellate waiver bars a
    defendant’s appeal, we analyze both the validity and the scope
    of the waiver.          United States v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    , 171 n.10
    (4th Cir. 2005).         To determine whether Washington knowingly and
    intelligently       waived      his    appellate            rights,   we    look    “to       the
    totality    of    the    circumstances,           including       the      experience         and
    conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s educational
    background       and    familiarity         with        the     terms       of     the     plea
    agreement.”       United States v. General, 
    278 F.3d 389
    , 400 (4th
    Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).                          “Generally, if a
    district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of
    appellate    rights      during       the   Rule       11    colloquy      and   the     record
    indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of
    the waiver, the waiver is valid.”                       Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    3
    Here,      the   terms    of   the    waiver    were     clear    and    in    plain
    English,       informing     Washington      that     he   waived      “the    right   to
    appeal     the    conviction         and   whatever        sentence     is    imposed,”
    including “any issues that relate to the establishment of the
    advisory Guideline range.”                 At his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea
    colloquy, Washington confirmed that he read and understood the
    plea agreement and its terms and that he had an opportunity to
    discuss the terms of the agreement with counsel.                         Furthermore,
    the   district      court      questioned       Washington     regarding       the   plea
    waiver and Washington indicated that he understood the provision
    limited his ability to appeal his sentence.
    Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances,
    we conclude that Washington knowingly and intelligently agreed
    to the appellate waiver.              Therefore, we grant the Government’s
    motion to dismiss with respect to all waivable issues, including
    whether the district court clearly erred in its drug quantity
    determination.
    Nonetheless, because a valid appellate waiver provision in
    a plea agreement does not foreclose review of every issue that
    might be raised on appeal, we review the record, pursuant to
    Anders,    for     any   nonwaivable        issues.        See   United       States    v.
    Johnson, 
    410 F.3d 137
    , 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (listing issues not
    waived    by     appellate     waiver).         Our   review     of    the    record   in
    4
    accordance    with     Anders   does    not      reveal    the    existence     of   any
    nonwaivable, meritorious issue.
    We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in
    part and dismiss the appeal as to any issues for which waiver is
    legally permissible.       We deny in part the Government’s motion to
    dismiss with respect to any nonwaivable issues but affirm the
    district court’s judgment as to any ground not encompassed by
    Washington’s knowing and intelligent appellate waiver.
    This    court     requires      that       counsel    inform    Washington,      in
    writing,    of   the   right    to   petition       the    Supreme     Court    of   the
    United States for further review.                 If Washington requests that a
    petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    leave to withdraw from representation.                     Counsel’s motion must
    state that a copy thereof was served on Washington.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions      are   adequately      presented      in    the     materials   before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    DISMISSED IN PART;
    AFFIRMED IN PART
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-4268

Citation Numbers: 632 F. App'x 106

Judges: Motz, Per Curiam, Shedd, Wynn

Filed Date: 12/3/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024