United States v. Cornelius Woods ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-4285
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CORNELIUS RAY WOODS, a/k/a Jimmy Corn,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
    Senior District Judge. (1:98-cr-00287-JAB-1)
    Submitted:   January 14, 2016             Decided:   January 19, 2016
    Before AGEE, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, First
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Eric L. Iverson,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cornelius Ray Woods appeals the district court’s judgment
    revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 60 months’
    imprisonment.    On appeal, Woods contends that the district court
    clearly erred by finding that he committed a Grade A violation of
    the terms of his supervised release and that the 60-month term of
    imprisonment was plainly unreasonable.    We affirm.
    To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find
    a violation of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance
    of the evidence.    
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3) (2012); United States v.
    Copley, 
    978 F.2d 829
    , 831 (4th Cir. 1992).     This standard is met
    when the court “believe[s] that the existence of a fact is more
    probable than its nonexistence.”      United States v. Manigan, 
    592 F.3d 621
    , 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    “[W]e review a district court’s factual findings underlying a
    revocation for clear error.”     United States v. Padgett, 
    788 F.3d 370
    , 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,         S. Ct.      , 
    84 U.S.L.W. 3258
     (2015).    There is clear error if, after reviewing the record,
    we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
    has been committed.”     United States v. Stevenson, 
    396 F.3d 538
    ,
    542 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
    finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Woods committed a
    Grade A violation of supervised release by committing a violent
    2
    felony.      The court heard testimony from several witnesses that
    Woods lured the victim to a hotel room and, when the victim
    entered, Woods aimed a firearm at the victim.             The victim tried to
    knock the gun from Woods’ hand and the gun discharged, shooting
    the victim in the thigh.           Video footage from the hotel showed the
    victim retreating from the room and running down the hall and
    Woods, armed with a firearm, chasing the victim.                Although Woods
    denied possessing a firearm and challenged the credibility of the
    witnesses, we defer to the district court’s decision to credit the
    victims’ testimony over Woods’.            See United States v. McInnis, 474
    F.   App’x    917,    919   (4th    Cir.   2012)   (holding   that   credibility
    determinations made by district court at revocation hearings are
    rarely reviewable on appeal) (citing United States v. Cates, 
    613 F.3d 856
    , 858 (8th Cir. 2010)).
    “A     district   court      has   broad   discretion   when   imposing   a
    sentence upon revocation of supervised release.”              United States v.
    Webb, 
    738 F.3d 638
    , 640 (4th Cir. 2013).                  We will affirm the
    sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and not plainly
    unreasonable.        United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 439-40 (4th
    Cir. 2006).     Only if we conclude that the sentence is unreasonable
    must we decide whether it is plainly so.             United States v. Moulden,
    
    478 F.3d 652
    , 657 (4th Cir. 2007).                 We presume that a sentence
    within the Chapter Seven policy statement range is reasonable.
    Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
    3
    We have reviewed the record and conclude that Woods’ sentence
    is both within the statutory maximum and the policy statement range
    for a Grade A violation, and he fails to rebut the presumption
    that it is reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment.   We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-4285

Judges: Agee, Wynn, Floyd

Filed Date: 1/19/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024