United States v. Tavaris Battle ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4904
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TAVARIS DELINO BATTLE, a/k/a Skeeter,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00237-D-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2015 Decided: May 29, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
John Keating Wiles, CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER & BRYAN, PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tavaris Battle pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiring to distribute and possess with the
intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (2012), and using
and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), 2 (2012). The court ultimately sentenced
Battle to life imprisonment. Battle’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court imposed an unreasonable
sentence. Battle filed a pro se supplemental brief, asserting
that his guilty plea was involuntary and he suffered ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal, contending
that Battle waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement.
We grant the motion in part and dismiss the appeal in part. As
to those claims beyond the scope of the waiver, we affirm.
We review Battle’s claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary for plain error because he did not move to withdraw
his guilty plea in the district court. United States v.
Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 461-62 (4th Cir. 2006). Under that
standard, Battle must demonstrate that an error (1) occurred,
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(2) was plain, and (3) affected his substantial rights. United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Even then, we may
exercise our discretion to correct the error only if it
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted).
“In order for a guilty plea to be valid, the Constitution
imposes the minimum requirement that the plea be the voluntary
expression of the defendant’s own choice.” United States v.
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). It “must also be entered knowingly
and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Id.; see Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11. Ultimately, a guilty plea’s validity rests on “the
totality of the circumstances surrounding [it], granting the
defendant’s solemn declaration of guilt a presumption of
truthfulness.” Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 462 (4th Cir.
2003) (internal citation omitted).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Battle’s
guilty plea was valid. The district court fully complied with
Rule 11 in accepting Battle’s guilty plea after a thorough
hearing. In sum, Battle’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, and, consequently, final and binding. See United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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Next, in determining whether Battle validly waived his
right to appeal, our review is de novo. United States v.
Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). A defendant may
waive his appellate rights, and we “will enforce the waiver if
it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir.
2012). “Generally, if a district court questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11
colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood
the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.”
United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012).
Here, the record establishes that Battle knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to appeal. During the plea
colloquy, Battle specifically affirmed that he waived his right
to appeal after a lengthy discussion about the waiver with the
district court. That being said, a valid waiver only precludes
appeal of those issues within the scope of the waiver, subject
to exceptions not relevant here. Id. at 539. Here, Battle’s
challenge to his sentence falls within the scope of his waiver,
while his ineffective assistance claim survives it.
Ineffective assistance claims, however, are not generally
addressed on direct appeal, unless an attorney’s ineffectiveness
conclusively appears on the face of the record. United States
v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Instead, such
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claims should be raised in a motion brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit sufficient development
of the record. United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1
(4th Cir. 2010). Because the record does not conclusively
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Battle’s claim
should be raised, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. To
the extent Battle’s and his counsel’s claims are within the
scope of his valid appellate waiver, we grant the Government’s
motion to dismiss his appeal. We otherwise affirm the district
court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform
Battle, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Battle requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Battle. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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