United States v. Marcus Baskerville , 605 F. App'x 188 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4941
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARCUS STEVE BASKERVILLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, Chief District
Judge. (1:02-cr-00410-CCB-4)
Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: June 1, 2015
Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Joanna Silver, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Andrea L. Smith,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In the proceedings below, the district court found that
Marcus Baskerville violated certain conditions of his supervised
release, revoked his release, and sentenced him to thirty months
of imprisonment. On appeal, Baskerville claims that the
sentence imposed by the district court was plainly unreasonable
because the court did not adequately consider the applicable
policy statement range in Chapter Seven of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual. We find no merit in this
contention and we therefore affirm.
We review “whether or not sentences imposed upon revocation
of supervised release are within the prescribed statutory range
and are not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Thompson,
595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, for us to reverse, any error by the district
court must not only be unreasonable, “it must run afoul of
clearly settled law.” Id. at 548.
In reviewing a revocation sentence for reasonableness, we
take “a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court “need not be as detailed or specific when
2
imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
At the same time, “the district court’s obligation to
provide some basis for appellate review when imposing a
revocation sentence, however minimal that basis may be,” is
settled. Id. at 548. In that vein, “the sentencing court must
consider the policy statements contained in Chapter 7, including
the policy statement range, as helpful assistance.” Moulden,
478 F.3d at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “the
court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Baskerville’s
sentence was neither plainly nor otherwise unreasonable. While
the district court did not resolve a disputed question about the
applicable policy statement range, it clearly and extensively
considered the two potentially applicable policy statement
ranges (as well as the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553
(2012)), in fashioning a sentence beneath the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, we affirm.
3
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4