United States v. Marvin Garrett ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4137
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARVIN GARRETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:12-cr-00030-1)
Submitted: May 27, 2015 Decided: June 10, 2015
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John A. Carr, JOHN A. CARR, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United
States Attorney, Joshua C. Hanks, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marvin Garrett appeals his conviction and 262-month
sentence for distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). Garrett argues that the district
court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on the
Government’s failure to disclose the drug history of a
confidential informant (“C.I.”) who testified against him and by
imposing a sentence that was substantively unreasonable. We
affirm.
The Government has a responsibility to disclose material
evidence favorable to the accused, including potential
impeachment evidence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
153-55 (1972). “Undisclosed evidence is material when its
cumulative effect is such that there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v.
Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 511 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014). On
appeal, the defendant has the burden of proving a Giglio
violation, and “we review [the district court’s] legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”
United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 701-02 (4th Cir. 2011).
The district court found that the Government improperly
failed to disclose the C.I.’s drug history and that this
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information was favorable to Garrett. The court also concluded,
however, that this evidence was not material because the C.I.
was effectively impeached when she admitted her drug history and
mental conditions at trial and because the other evidence
against Garrett was strong. The Government’s evidence included
a recording of a telephone conversation in which the C.I.
ordered cocaine base from a man whom a detective identified as
Garrett, testimony from multiple officers that they saw Garrett
meet the C.I. at the agreed place of delivery, testimony from a
detective that he saw Garrett give the C.I. something in
exchange for money, and evidence that the object provided by the
C.I. proved to be cocaine base. In light of the overwhelming
evidence against Garrett, we conclude that the district court
did not err in finding no reasonable probability that prior
disclosure of the C.I.’s drug history would have affected the
outcome of the case. See Sterling, 724 F.3d at 511.
Garrett also challenges the substantive reasonableness of
his sentence. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable,” and
this “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295,
306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014); see Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding appellate
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presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence).
Having reviewed the record and Garrett’s arguments, we conclude
that Garrett has failed to rebut this presumption.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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