United States v. Steven Wiggins ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4676
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVEN BRYAN WIGGINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00053-CCE-4)
Submitted: April 17, 2018 Decided: April 19, 2018
Before WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James E. Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Bryan Wiggins appeals his conviction and 151-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2012). On appeal, counsel for Wiggins filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning the validity of Wiggins’ guilty plea and the reasonableness of his
sentence. Wiggins did not file a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government elected
not to respond to the Anders brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a colloquy in which
it informs the defendant of, and determines that he understands, the nature of the charges
to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum penalty
he faces, and the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure
that the defendant’s plea is voluntary and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Because Wiggins did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or
otherwise preserve any error in the plea proceedings, we review the adequacy of the plea
colloquy for plain error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009).
Our review of the Rule 11 hearing confirms that Wiggins’ plea was knowing, voluntary,
and supported by an independent basis in fact, and that the district court therefore
committed no error in accepting Wiggins’ valid guilty plea.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007). We “must first
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ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” such as
improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, or inadequately explaining the sentence imposed.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52. If we find no procedural error, we examine the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. The
sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals
of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume on appeal that a within-Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014). The defendant can rebut that presumption only “by showing that the sentence
is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
We discern no procedural or substantive sentencing error by the district court,
which correctly calculated Wiggins’ offense level, criminal history, and advisory
Guidelines range. The court also addressed Wiggins’ arguments for a below-Guidelines
sentence and amply explained its decision to impose a sentence at the low end of
Wiggins’ Guidelines range. Furthermore, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption
that Wiggins’ sentence is substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Wiggins, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Wiggins requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
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counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Wiggins.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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