United States v. Carlos Medina-Castellanos , 623 F. App'x 611 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6408
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARLOS JAVIER MEDINA-CASTELLANOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00155-F-1; 5:11-cv-00221-F)
Submitted: September 30, 2015 Decided: December 2, 2015
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew McGavock Robinson, ROBINSON & BRANDT, PSC, Covington,
Kentucky, for Appellant. John Samuel Bowler, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Javier Medina-Castellanos seeks to appeal the
district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255(2012) motion. The district court’s order is not appealable
unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate
of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
(2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a
prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that
reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court
denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must
demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is
debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the
denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85.
Medina-Castellanos’ § 2255 motion claims that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a violation of
Medina-Castellanos’ rights under the Speedy Trial Act, and for
giving Medina-Castellanos misadvice that caused him to plead not
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guilty. * To demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel, a convicted defendant must prove both deficient
performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Performance is deficient if “counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Id.; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. To demonstrate prejudice, a
movant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id.We agree with the district court that Medina-Castellanos’
first ineffectiveness claim fails because no Speedy Trial Act
violation occurred. As relevant here, the Speedy Trial Act
requires the trial of a defendant charged in an indictment to
begin within 70 days of the indictment’s filing, subject to
certain excludable delays. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h) (2012).
The pretrial delays in Medina-Castellanos’ case, which resulted
*
Medina-Castellanos also claims, for the first time on
appeal, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge the district court’s refusal to allow his trial
counsel to withdraw. Because Medina-Castellanos did not raise
this claim in his § 2255 motion, we decline to consider it. See
Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
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from the joinder of a codefendant, the codefendant’s filing of
several motions, and the court’s grant of a continuance in the
interests of justice, were all properly excludable in computing
the 70-day period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), (6), (7)(A).
Therefore, Medina-Castellanos’ rights under the Speedy Trial Act
were not affected by these delays, and his trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise this issue.
We further agree with the district court that Medina-
Castellanos failed to establish ineffective assistance regarding
his plea. It is clear from the record that Medina-Castellanos
was persistently unwilling to admit he was guilty of any of the
charged offenses. Thus, regardless of counsel’s advice,
pleading not guilty was Medina-Castellanos’ only feasible
option. Moreover, there is ample support for the district
court’s finding that Medina-Castellanos fully understood the
significance of his plea and the penalties he faced if
convicted. Without any evidence that different advice from
counsel would have persuaded him to plead guilty, Medina-
Castellanos cannot demonstrate prejudice, and his claim of
ineffectiveness fails.
For these reasons, we conclude that Medina-Castellanos has
not shown that reasonable jurists would find debatable the
district court’s assessment of his ineffective-assistance
claims. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and
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dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
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