Richard Martin v. Maryland Courts , 626 F. App'x 51 ( 2015 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-2142
    RICHARD MARTIN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    MARYLAND COURTS; ASSOCIATE JUDGE GARY G. EVERNGAM; ASSOCIATE
    JUDGE MICHAEL CONROY; ASSOCIATE JUDGE TERRENCE J. MCGANN,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.    George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge.
    (8:15-cv-02432-GJH)
    Submitted:   December 15, 2015              Decided:    December 17, 2015
    Before GREGORY     and   FLOYD,   Circuit   Judges,    and   DAVIS,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Richard Martin, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Richard             Martin    appeals          the    district        court’s        order
    dismissing his civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
    (2012).    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    On        appeal,        Martin      challenges         the        district      court’s
    conclusion that his claims were untimely and barred by judicial
    immunity.          As the district court properly concluded, however,
    the judges Martin named as defendants enjoyed absolute immunity
    from Martin’s claims against them based on actions taken within
    their judicial capacities.                See Stump v. Sparkman, 
    435 U.S. 349
    ,
    356-57 (1978).
    The district court also properly concluded that Martin’s
    action was untimely.               Martin’s claims, whether brought under
    state   law        or    42   U.S.C.     § 1983      (2012),     were     subject     to,   at
    longest,       a   three-year      statute      of    limitations.           See    Md.    Code
    Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2013) (general civil statute of
    limitations); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.                              § 5-105 (2013)
    (actions       for       assault   and     defamation);          Owens     v.     Balt.   City
    State’s    Attorneys          Office,     
    767 F.3d 379
    ,    388     (4th    Cir.    2014)
    (§ 1983 claims), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 1893
    (2015).                                    While
    Martin’s malicious prosecution claim has not yet accrued, this
    claim     is       barred     by   his     inability        to     meet     the     favorable
    termination requirement.                See Heron v. Strader, 
    761 A.2d 56
    , 59
    (Md. 2000).             Contrary to Martin’s assertions, the facts alleged
    2
    in the complaint demonstrate that his remaining claims accrued,
    at the latest, by the time he was released from prison, and the
    limitations period was not subject to tolling.                    See A Soc’y
    Without a Name v. Virginia, 
    655 F.3d 342
    , 348 (4th Cir. 2011)
    (accrual under § 1983); Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 
    43 A.3d 1029
    , 1034-34, 1039-41 (Md. 2012) (discussing accrual and
    tolling under state law); see also Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Raleigh,
    
    947 F.2d 1158
    , 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1991) (describing continuing
    violations   doctrine).        Finally,     because    Martin’s   claims      were
    properly dismissed, the district court committed no error in
    denying as moot Martin’s request to file electronically.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.                   We
    deny Martin’s motions to seal and to compel.                  We dispense with
    oral   argument   because      the    facts   and     legal   contentions     are
    adequately   presented    in    the    materials    before     this   court   and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-2142

Citation Numbers: 626 F. App'x 51

Judges: Gregory, Floyd, Davis

Filed Date: 12/17/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024