United States v. Mark Lincoln , 623 F. App'x 606 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7125
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARK ANTHONY LINCOLN, a/k/a Johnson Harper, a/k/a Kirk
Johnson, a/k/a Ben Lewis, a/k/a Kirk Lincoln, a/k/a Quinton
Harper, a/k/a Christoper Jacob, a/k/a Kirk Williams, a/k/a
Christopher Jenkins,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:03-cr-00751-TLW-1)
Submitted: November 6, 2015 Decided: December 1, 2015
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark Anthony Lincoln, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mark Anthony Lincoln seeks to appeal the district court’s
order denying relief on his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion
for a sentence reduction. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
A district court may reduce the sentence of a defendant
whose Sentencing Guidelines sentencing range has been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission. United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d
193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013). Whether to grant such a reduction is
within the district court’s discretion, so long as it considers
the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) to the extent
applicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Smalls, 720 F.3d at
195. We review a district court’s decision whether to grant a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir. 2010). In so doing, we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the district court, but
instead consider whether the court’s exercise of discretion was
arbitrary or capricious. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286,
1289 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Jeffery, 631
F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that district court’s
discretion is extremely broad).
Our review of the record demonstrates that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Lincoln’s motion. The court
clearly understood its authority to reduce Lincoln’s sentence
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pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines’ amendment but declined to
do so based on its review of Lincoln’s circumstances. While the
court was entitled to consider Lincoln’s post-conviction
conduct, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion
in determining that Lincoln’s extensive criminal history, the
seriousness of the offense of conviction, and Lincoln’s
documented disciplinary conviction justified his current
sentence, even in light of the revised Guidelines range and
Lincoln’s commitment to rehabilitation. Moreover, Lincoln
raised certain issues for the first time on appeal, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to
consider them sua sponte.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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