United States v. Alvis Williams , 629 F. App'x 547 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4502
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALVIS DAMON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00758-JFA-1)
Argued: September 17, 2015 Decided: December 3, 2015
Before WYNN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST,
LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Julius Ness
Richardson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alvis Damon Williams was indicted on charges of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and related firearms offenses.
Although represented by a public defender during most of the
pretrial proceedings, Williams elected to represent himself at
his trial. A jury convicted Williams on all counts.
On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred by
permitting him to represent himself. Williams also assigns
error to several of the district court’s trial management
decisions. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I.
A.
On June 26, 2013, a Sumter County Sheriff’s Office employee
pulled over a black Chevrolet Impala driven by Williams. The
ostensible reason for the stop was that the windows on the
Impala appeared to be overly-tinted in violation of South
Carolina state law.1 The officer asked Williams, the lone
occupant of the car, for his license and registration. Noting a
strong smell of marijuana, the officer asked Williams to step
1 In fact, the Sheriff’s Office had been alerted by Sumter
County narcotics officers that Williams had just sold drugs to a
confidential informant as part of a controlled drug buy. The
narcotics officers requested that the traffic stop be based, if
possible, on probable cause independent of the controlled drug
buy so as to protect the identity of the confidential informant.
2
out of the car. Williams consented to a search of his person,
which turned up approximately $1,600 in cash in Williams’s
pockets. The officer then conducted a probable cause search of
the car. The search revealed a handgun between the driver’s
seat and center console and plastic bags with crack and powder
cocaine, marijuana, and assorted paraphernalia on the passenger-
side floor.
A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Williams for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking.2 In September 2013 the district
court appointed a federal public defender to represent Williams,
and Williams entered a plea of not guilty. Williams’s appointed
counsel represented him in various pretrial proceedings,
including an unsuccessful suppression hearing in October 2013.
B.
In December 2013, Williams filed a pro se motion that
stated his desire to represent himself and requested that the
court replace his appointed counsel. Construing the motion
principally as a request for new counsel, the district court
2 The grand jury also indicted Williams for possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, but the government moved to
dismiss that count prior to the completion of the jury trial.
3
denied Williams’s request for alternate representation. The
district court noted that Williams would be allowed to represent
himself if he so desired. During jury selection on January 7,
2014, Williams made an oral motion to appoint new counsel. The
district court again denied his motion and set trial for
February 11, 2014.
On January 30, 2014, Williams again filed a pro se motion
to relieve his appointed counsel, and on February 4, 2014,
Williams’s appointed counsel filed a motion for self-
representation on Williams’s behalf. The district court
addressed Williams’s representation at a pretrial conference on
February 6, 2014.
After confirming Williams’s desire to represent himself,
the district court proceeded to ask Williams a number of
questions about his legal experience and his understanding of
the charges against him and his potential sentence. The
district court told Williams it thought his appointed counsel
was “a very competent, capable attorney” and strongly urged
Williams not to try to represent himself. J.A. 91-92. Williams
re-confirmed his desire to proceed pro se, telling the district
court that his appointed counsel had refused to subpoena two
witnesses that Williams thought should be called at trial. At
the request of the government, the district court informed
Williams that he might be shackled at trial based on his
4
criminal record and the charges against him, and if the jury
realized he was shackled it would likely hurt his case.
The district court then asked the government attorneys to
step out of the courtroom, and enquired into the witnesses
Williams wished to subpoena and the source of Williams’s
discontent with appointed counsel. Williams and his appointed
counsel informed the district court of a number of strategic
disagreements and communication problems between the pair. The
district court then recalled the government attorneys, and,
after opining that Williams was making “a huge mistake,” granted
Williams’s request to represent himself. J.A. 98-99.
C.
Trial commenced on February 11, 2014. In light of
Williams’s past criminal record and potential sentence, the U.S.
Marshals Service recommended that Williams be shackled and wear
an electronic stun device on his leg. Williams wore street
clothes during his trial, along with padded shackles and the
stun device.
After opening statements, the government called the Sumter
County officer who had conducted the traffic stop. On direct
examination, the government did not elicit testimony concerning
the controlled drug buy, instead presenting the pretextual
window-tint violation as the lone impetus for stopping the car
5
Williams had been driving. On cross-examination, however,
Williams immediately asked the officer about the earlier drug
transaction. The government’s remaining witnesses were experts
on drugs and firearms.
At the beginning of the second day of trial, the district
court asked Williams if he had had any second thoughts about
representing himself. Williams confirmed that he wished to
continue to do so, and the trial continued with the balance of
the government’s case-in-chief. When the government rested,
Williams sought to recall the Sumter County officer to the
stand. Noting that Williams had had an opportunity to cross-
examine the officer already, the district court denied the
request.
Williams called no other witnesses, but chose to testify on
his own behalf. The district court had Williams take and leave
the stand with the jury out of the courtroom so that the jury
would not observe Williams’s shackles. During his testimony,
Williams asked (himself) “did I carry guns when I was out?” and
answered “[n]o, I didn’t carry no gun because I know I was a
convicted felon and I know what could happen to me.” J.A. 273.
The government argued successfully that this “broad denial” of
firearm possession opened the door to introduce evidence of
Williams’s prior firearm possessions, and the government
proceeded to question Williams about them. J.A. 275.
6
Williams also testified on re-direct that he had not been
involved in any drug transaction shortly before he had been
pulled over. After Williams rested, the government called a
rebuttal witness, a Sumter County narcotics officer, to testify
about the controlled drug buy. The government elicited
testimony that some of the cash recovered from Williams’s
pockets during the traffic stop was the same marked cash that
had been provided to the confidential informant to purchase
cocaine from Williams during the controlled buy.
The jury deliberated for less than an hour, returning a
verdict of guilty on all counts. On June 20, 2014, the district
court sentenced Williams to the statutory mandatory minimum term
of 15 years in prison. This appeal followed, with Williams
represented by appointed appellate counsel.
II.
We review arguments raised for the first time on appeal for
plain error. United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th
Cir. 2013).
To establish plain error, [the appellant] must show
that the district court erred, that the error was
plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.
With regard to the third element of that standard,
[the appellant] must show that the alleged error
actually “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.”
7
Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). We review a district court’s
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1996).
III.
Williams argues that the district court erred by permitting
him to represent himself. It is “fundamental” that “a criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.”
Bernard, 708 F.3d at 588 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 819, 821 (1975)). However, a defendant’s request to waive
the right to counsel and proceed pro se must be “(1) clear and
unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3)
timely.” Id.The record makes plain that Williams’s request was “clear
and unequivocal” and “timely,” such that only his competency to
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to
counsel is at issue. Williams’s overarching argument is that
had the district court asked more about his educational
background, it would have learned facts establishing that he was
not competent to represent himself. These facts include that
Williams had a history of being in learning-disabled classes,
had failed in his first attempt to secure a GED, and that
8
Williams had stated that as a child he had threatened to kill
himself to avoid being beaten by his mother.3
Williams’s argument misapprehends the Faretta competency
standard. “[T]he competence that is required of a defendant
seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive
the right, not the competence to represent himself.” Bernard,
708 F.3d at 589 (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399
(1993)). As we explained in Bernard, “it is constitutional for
a state to allow a defendant to conduct trial proceedings on his
own behalf when he has been found competent to stand trial.”
708 F.3d at 589 (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172-73
(2008)). There is no suggestion that Williams was incompetent
to stand trial, and Williams does not argue otherwise on appeal.
Nor does Williams point to any authority requiring a
district court to elicit particular educational or background
information from a defendant seeking to represent themselves.
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has “prescribed any
formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he
elects to proceed without counsel.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,
88 (2004); accord Spates v. Clarke, 547 F. App’x 289, 293 (4th
3 Other facts cut against Williams’s argument, including
that an IQ test placed his overall intellectual functioning in
the average range, that he eventually earned his GED (apparently
on the second attempt), and that he was taking classes in auto
mechanics at a state technical college.
9
Cir. 2013). The defendant must only “be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” such that “he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 183 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835); see
also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 576 F. App’x 157, 162 (4th
Cir. 2014).
The record makes clear that the district court went out of
its way to make Williams aware of the “dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation,” including repeatedly advising Williams
that the court thought his interests would be better served by
not attempting to represent himself. In other words, the
district court made sure Williams’s choice was made with “eyes
open.” We affirm the district court’s decision to allow
Williams to represent himself.
IV.
Williams also contends that the district court erred by not
reinstating appointed counsel after observing Williams’s trial
performance. The gist of Williams’s argument is that certain
mistakes he made during trial, such as opening the door to
evidence of his prior firearms offenses, should have led the
district court to conclude that he was incompetent to continue
representing himself. This argument again misapprehends the
appropriate competency standard.
10
It is true that competency can change over time. For
example, a mentally-ill defendant may be rendered competent to
stand trial through medication, but become incompetent during
the trial if the medication ceases to be effective. Cf.
Bernard, 708 F.3d at 586-87. But the competency standard does
not change over the course of the trial. Williams’s missteps at
trial simply do not call into question his mental competency to
stand trial or to choose self-representation. “‘[I]t is
undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could
better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own
unskilled efforts,’ [but] a criminal defendant’s ability to
represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose
self-representation.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 (quoting
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834); see also, e.g., Bernard, 708 F.3d at
593 (“[Defendant’s] failure to object during the Government’s
case-in-chief, question two of the witnesses, call witnesses on
his own behalf, or otherwise ‘think like a lawyer’ did not
render him mentally incompetent.”). We therefore affirm the
district court’s decision to allow Williams to continue to
represent himself.
V.
Finally, Williams assigns error to a number of the district
court’s trial management decisions. Specifically, Williams
11
argues that the district court erred by: (1) ordering that he be
shackled during trial; (2) denying his request to take certain
discovery materials with him to the detention center prior to
trial; (3) suggesting that he could not subpoena witnesses
unless he could personally pay the witness fee; and (4) denying
his request to recall a government witness to the stand. We
find each of these contentions to be without merit.
A.
Williams argues that the district court’s shackling order
was unjustified and impermissibly impeded his ability to
exercise his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.
Williams relies primarily on Deck v. Missouri, which established
that “where a court, without adequate justification, orders the
defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the
defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice” but instead
“[t]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[shackling] . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (final alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, Williams’s
premise, that the district court ordered him shackled without
adequate justification, is not supported by the record. The
district court had a shackling recommendation from the U.S.
Marshals Service, a recommendation based on, among other things,
12
Williams’s extensive criminal record and the seriousness of the
current charges. Further, the district court (and the
government), took reasonable measures to minimize the impact of
the shackles and stun device. See, e.g., J.A. 114 (indicating
Williams was provided street clothing and that shackles were
padded to prevent noise that might alert the jury); J.A. 219
(indicating the government questioned witnesses from its counsel
desk to be consistent with Williams); J.A. 281-82 (indicating
Williams took the stand and stood down outside the presence of
the jury). We find no error in the district court’s shackling
decision.
B.
Williams also contends that he could not effectively
represent himself because he did not have access to certain
restricted discovery materials at the detention center. We
disagree. The record indicates that the material was restricted
because of potentially identifying information about a
confidential informant, and a standing discovery order
reasonably barred such material from the detention center.
Williams was fully aware of the information contained in the
material, as his appointed counsel had previously discussed it
with him. Williams also had access to the material while at the
courthouse. Williams does not point to any discovery material
13
that would have been relevant to his defense and has made no
showing “that the alleged error actually ‘affected the outcome
of the district court proceedings.’” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 588
(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).
C.
Williams further contends that the district court impeded
his ability to represent himself by requiring him, an indigent
defendant, to pay the witness fees for any witnesses he wished
to subpoena. Again, this contention is not supported by the
record. Williams’s motion to proceed pro se stemmed from his
desire to subpoena certain witnesses that his appointed counsel
had refused to subpoena. As part of the Faretta colloquy, the
district court asked Williams about his knowledge of subpoena
procedures, including the ordinary need to pay a witness fee.
This appears to us plainly part of the district court’s effort
to make Williams “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Immediately
after the district court’s discussion of subpoena procedures,
the government clarified that the witness fee would not be an
issue. In any event, at the time the exchange took place,
Williams was still represented by counsel, and his counsel did
not object at any point. There is simply no indication from the
14
record that the district court in fact placed any financial
impediment in the way of Williams’s self-representation.
D.
Finally, Williams argues that the district court erred by
not allowing him to recall the officer who searched his car to
the stand. We disagree. The district court recognized that it
had the authority to allow the officer to be recalled, but
reasoned that Williams had already had a chance to thoroughly
cross-examine the witness, and exercised its discretion to
refuse Williams’s request. We find no abuse of discretion here.
Cf. Ford, 88 F.3d at 1362 (finding no abuse of discretion where
district court refused to allow recall of a cross-examined
witness where defendant could make proposed point to jury via
closing arguments).
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
15