Adebowale Ojo v. Loretta Lynch , 813 F.3d 533 ( 2016 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1138
ADEBOWALE OLOYEDE OJO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: February 16, 2016
Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published
opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and
Judge Keenan joined.
ARGUED: Henry Caleb Griffin, GRIFFIN AND GRIFFIN, Annapolis,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Stefanie A. Svoren-Jay, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON
BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, John S. Hogan, Assistant Director,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
KING, Circuit Judge:
Adebowale Oloyede Ojo, a native of Nigeria and the adopted
son of a United States citizen, petitions for review of the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) denying
a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so ruling, the
BIA relied on its administrative interpretation of a provision
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”) relating to
adopted children, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). That
provision is not ambiguous in the way asserted by the BIA,
however, and thus does not contain a gap that Congress has left
for the BIA to fill. Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation — which
summarily disregards facially valid state court orders — is
contrary to law. We therefore grant the petition for review,
vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
A.
Before addressing the particulars of Ojo’s case, we briefly
sketch the relevant statutory framework governing citizenship
for foreign-born children. Section 1431(a) of Title 8 provides
that “[a] child born outside of the United States automatically
becomes a citizen of the United States when [three] conditions”
are satisfied:
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• First, “[a]t least one parent of the child is a
citizen of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization”;
• Second, “[t]he child is under the age of eighteen
years”; and
• Finally, “[t]he child is residing in the United
States in the legal and physical custody of the
citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for
permanent residence.”
An adopted child qualifies as a “child” for purposes of
§ 1431(a) if he was “adopted by a United States citizen parent”
and satisfies the relevant requirements of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1). See § 1431(b).
Section 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), in turn, defines a child as “an
unmarried person under twenty-one years of age,” who was
“adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has
been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting
parent or parents for at least two years.” The INA does not
provide its own definition of the term “adopted,” specify any
requirements for a proper adoption, or contemplate the BIA’s
involvement in any adoption proceedings.
A foreign-born child who fails to obtain citizenship
remains an alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The Department of
Homeland Security (the “DHS”) — acting on behalf of the Attorney
General — has the power to order certain aliens removed from the
United States, including any alien who has committed an
“aggravated felony.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). For
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purposes of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an “aggravated felony” is
defined in § 1101(a)(43).
B.
1.
The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute. Ojo
was born in Nigeria on August 28, 1983, and he lawfully entered
the United States in August 1989. Two weeks later, on September
14, 1989, when Ojo was just six years old, his uncle — a United
States citizen — became Ojo’s legal guardian. More than ten
years later, on June 19, 2000, when Ojo was sixteen, Ojo’s uncle
and the uncle’s wife filed a petition to adopt Ojo. On January
24, 2001, after Ojo had turned seventeen, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland (the “Maryland state court”),
entered a judgment of adoption.
Between 2009 and 2012, Ojo was convicted of two drug-
related offenses, either of which qualifies as an “aggravated
felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). On May 6, 2013, in
light of Ojo’s convictions, and alleging that Ojo had not
derived citizenship as an adopted child under 8 U.S.C. § 1431and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E), the DHS charged him with
removability from the United States under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
On May 15, 2014, an immigration judge (the “IJ”) determined
that Ojo was removable from this country by clear and convincing
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evidence. The IJ explained that, because Ojo turned sixteen on
August 28, 1999, and was not adopted by his citizen uncle until
he was already seventeen years old, he did not qualify as an
adopted child under § 1101(b)(1)(E). As a result, Ojo had not
derived citizenship from his adoptive father (his biological
uncle) pursuant to § 1431.
On June 25, 2014, the BIA received Ojo’s notice of appeal
of the IJ’s decision. On September 10, 2014, in support of a
request for a remand to the IJ, Ojo advised the BIA that his
adoptive father would seek a nunc pro tunc order from the
Maryland state court specifying that Ojo’s adoption became
effective before he turned sixteen. 1 Ojo asserted that the court
would likely grant such an order because — between the time Ojo
entered the United States at age six in 1989 and the approval of
his adoption in 2001 — he had lived continuously as the child of
his adoptive father.
On October 31, 2014, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Ojo
was removable, recognizing that Ojo had the burden of proving
his citizenship claim and showing that his adoption occurred
before his sixteenth birthday. Relying on the judgment of
1 The Latin phrase “nunc pro tunc” translates literally as
“now for then.” See John Gray, Lawyer’s Latin 100 (2002). An
order entered nunc pro tunc has “retroactive legal effect
through a court’s inherent power.” See Black’s Law Dictionary
1237 (10th ed. 2014).
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adoption of January 24, 2001, the BIA ruled that Ojo was
seventeen when adopted. Accordingly, the BIA decided that he
did not qualify as an adopted child under § 1101(b)(1)(E) for
purposes of derivative citizenship under § 1431. The BIA also
concluded that Ojo’s representation that his adoptive father
would seek an order from the Maryland state court making Ojo’s
adoption effective nunc pro tunc to a date before he turned
sixteen did not warrant a remand to the IJ. Consequently, the
BIA dismissed Ojo’s appeal.
On November 24, 2014, Ojo filed a timely motion to reopen
his removal proceedings, supported by a nunc pro tunc order
entered on October 29, 2014, by the Maryland state court. That
order made Ojo’s adoption effective on August 27, 1999, the day
before he turned sixteen. By a decision of January 12, 2015,
the BIA denied Ojo’s motion to reopen, observing that it “does
not recognize nunc pro tunc adoption decrees after a child
reaches the age limit for both the filing of the adoption
petition and decree.” For that principle, the BIA relied on its
prior decisions in Matter of Cariaga, 15 I. & N. Dec. 716 (BIA
1976), and Matter of Drigo, 18 I. & N. Dec. 223 (BIA 1982).
2.
In its Matter of Cariaga decision, the BIA had established
a blanket rule that “[t]he act of adoption must occur before the
child attains the age [specified in the INA],” thereby
6
precluding any consideration of a nunc pro tunc order entered
after the relevant birthday but made effective before that date.
See 15 I. & N. Dec. at 717. According to the BIA, “[t]hrough
the imposition of an age restriction on the creation of the
adoptive relationship, Congress has attempted to distinguish
between bona fide adoptions, in which a child has been made a
part of a family unit, and spurious adoptions, effected in order
to circumvent statutory restrictions.” Id. Thereafter, in
Matter of Drigo, the BIA relied on its Cariaga decision and
rejected the contention that “a decree of adoption is fully
effective as of the date entered nunc pro tunc and is entitled
to recognition for immigration purposes.” See 18 I. & N. Dec.
at 224. The BIA’s Drigo decision emphasized that “[i]t was
Congress’ intent that the age restriction in [8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)] be construed strictly.” Id. 2
In other words, on the premise that its decisions in
Cariaga and Drigo would deter fraudulent and spurious adoptions,
the BIA embraced an interpretation of § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) that
flouted the effective dates of adoptions set forth in facially
2The version of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) applicable in
Cariaga and Drigo required that the putative child be adopted
before turning fourteen. In 1981, Congress amended that
provision and changed age fourteen to age sixteen. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1981, Pub L. No. 97–116,
§ 2(b), 95 Stat. 1611, 1611 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)).
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valid nunc pro tunc orders entered by the various state courts
of this country. Multiple federal courts thereafter cast
substantial doubt on the BIA’s Cariaga/Drigo rule. See, e.g.,
Cantwell v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Hong v.
Napolitano, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (D. Haw. 2011); Gonzalez-
Martinez v. DHS, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Utah 2009).
Only one of our sister courts of appeals has heretofore
addressed the viability of the Cariaga/Drigo rule in a published
opinion. In Amponsah v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit concluded
“that the BIA’s blanket rule against recognizing nunc pro tunc
adoption decrees constitutes an impermissible construction of
§ 1101(b)(1) and that case-by-case consideration of nunc pro
tunc adoption decrees is required.” See 709 F.3d 1318, 1326
(9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit withdrew its Amponsah
opinion a few months later, in September 2013, after the BIA
advised the court that it was considering whether to overrule or
modify the Cariaga/Drigo rule. See Amponsah v. Holder, 736 F.3d
1172 (9th Cir. 2013).
3.
In support of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings,
Ojo invoked several of the federal court decisions discrediting
the Cariaga/Drigo rule. The BIA, however, rejected those
decisions across-the-board as “not binding.” Specifically
addressing the Ninth Circuit’s Amponsah opinion, the BIA
8
observed that Ojo’s “reliance on [Amponsah] is misplaced as this
decision was withdrawn.” The BIA did not acknowledge that the
Ninth Circuit withdrew its Amponsah opinion because of the BIA’s
assurance to that court in 2013 that it was revisiting the
Cariaga/Drigo rule — the very rule on which the BIA then relied
in January 2015 to refuse to reopen Ojo’s removal proceedings.
On February 10, 2015, Ojo filed a timely petition for
review of the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen. We
possess jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
4.
On July 8, 2015, during the pendency of this proceeding,
the BIA modified the Cariaga/Drigo rule in its precedential
decision in Matter of Huang, 26 I. & N. Dec. 627 (BIA 2015).
The Huang decision related that Congress imposed an age
restriction in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) because it was
concerned about “fraudulent adoptions that have no factual basis
for the underlying relationship,” as well as adoptions that,
“despite having the appearance of validity, are actually
motivated by a desire to circumvent the immigration laws.” See
id. at 629-30. Huang also explained, however, that “the blanket
rule [from Cariaga and Drigo] we have applied for many years is
too limiting in that it does not allow us to adequately consider
the interests of family unity.” Id. at 631.
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Pursuant to the new Huang rule, the BIA will recognize a
nunc pro tunc order relating to an adoption “where the adoption
petition was filed before the beneficiary’s 16th birthday, the
State in which the adoption was entered expressly permits an
adoption decree to be dated retroactively, and the State court
entered such a decree consistent with that authority.” See 26
I. & N. Dec. at 631. On July 22, 2015, pursuant to Rule 28(j)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Attorney
General notified our Court of the Huang decision and asserted
that, “under the new framework set forth in [Huang], Petitioner
[Ojo] still did not derive citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1431.” 3
II.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen removal
proceedings for abuse of discretion. See Lin v. Holder, 771
F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2014). For our Court to grant a
petition for review, the BIA’s decision must be “arbitrary,
3At oral argument, the Attorney General’s counsel
maintained that her client would be entitled to press an
additional contention if this matter were remanded: that Ojo
cannot qualify for citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) because
he did not become a legal permanent resident (an “LPR”) prior to
turning eighteen. The LPR issue was an alternative ground for
the IJ’s ruling that Ojo is a non-citizen removable from this
country. The BIA did not reach the LPR issue, so it is not ripe
for our review in this proceeding. See Mulyani v. Holder, 771
F.3d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[R]eview of an IJ decision is
permissible only to the extent that the BIA adopted it.”).
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capricious, or contrary to law.” See Nken v. Holder, 585 F.3d
818, 821 (4th Cir. 2009).
III.
The dispute presented here between Ojo and the Attorney
General centers on the statutory phrase, “adopted while under
the age of sixteen years.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i).
More specifically, we must determine whether the term “adopted”
plainly denotes the effective date of an adoption, or whether
that term is ambiguous and could instead signify the date that
the act of adoption occurred. Only if the term “adopted” is
ambiguous may we accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s policy of
summarily disregarding nunc pro tunc orders relating to
adoptions conducted in the various state courts of this country
— a policy engendered in the Cariaga/Drigo rule and recently
modified in Huang. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
A.
Congress has charged the Attorney General, and in turn the
BIA, with administering significant portions of the INA. See
Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2007).
Thus, we generally evaluate the BIA’s interpretations of the
INA’s provisions by following the two-step approach announced by
the Supreme Court in Chevron. See Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d
11349, 354 (4th Cir. 2012). At Chevron’s first step, we “examine
the statute’s plain language; if Congress has spoken clearly on
the precise question at issue, the statutory language controls.”
Barahona, 691 F.3d at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If Congress has not so spoken, in that “the statute is silent or
ambiguous, we defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is
reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To resolve the initial inquiry under Chevron’s first step,
we focus “purely on statutory construction without according any
weight to the agency’s position.” See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v.
FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 2006). That is so “because
‘[t]he traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation
is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of
Congress.’” Id. at 274 (quoting Bd. of Governors, FRS v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986)).
Preparing to handle the tools of statutory construction
prompts us to emphasize, as we have frequently, that “the plain
language of the statute is . . . the most reliable indicator of
Congressional intent.” See, e.g., Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d
276, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2005). If Congress’s intent is clear from
the plain text, “then, this first canon is also the last:
judicial inquiry is complete.” See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, however, “the meaning
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— or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become
evident when placed in context.” See King v. Burwell, 135 S.
Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
therefore must “read the words in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
B.
1.
We begin with the text of the relevant statute. To be
considered a “child” for purposes of derivative citizenship
under 8 U.S.C. § 1431, an adopted child must, in pertinent part,
be “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.” See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). A child is “adopted,” of course, through an
“adoption.”
An adoption is “[t]he creation by judicial order of a
parent-child relationship between two parties.” See Black’s Law
Dictionary 58 (10th ed. 2014); see also Black’s Law Dictionary
49 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “adoption” as the “[l]egal process
pursuant to state statute in which a child’s legal rights and
duties toward his natural parents are terminated and similar
rights and duties toward his adoptive parents are substituted”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 63 (3d ed., rev. 1944) (similar). The
formal legal act of adoption “creates a parent-child
relationship between the adopted child and the adoptive parents
13
with all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities that
attach to that relationship.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 58
(10th ed. 2014).
In short, an “adoption,” as defined and commonly used,
contemplates a formal judicial act. Furthermore, it is well
understood that, in the United States, our various state courts
exercise full authority over the judicial act of adoption. See
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that “[a]doption proceedings
are adjudicated in state family courts across the country every
day, and domestic relations is an area that has long been
regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
With those principles in mind, we discern no indication
from the text of § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) — or from any other aspect
of the statutory scheme created in the INA — that Congress
intended to alter or displace the plain meaning of “adopted.”
The term “adopted” thus carries with it the understanding that
adoption proceedings in this country are conducted by various
state courts pursuant to state law. Plainly, therefore, a child
is “adopted” for purposes of § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) on the date that
a state court rules the adoption effective, without regard to
the date on which the act of adoption occurred.
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2.
Viewing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) in the broader context
within which Congress legislates confirms our plain reading of
the statute. Although the Constitution commits to the federal
legislature the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,” see Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Johnson v.
Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 130 (4th Cir. 2011), it has long been a
hallmark of our federalism principles that full authority over
domestic-relations matters resides not in the national
government, but in the several States. See Ex parte Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”).
To that end, “the Federal Government, through our history,
has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to
domestic relations.” See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2691 (2013) (relying on De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 580 (1956), wherein the Supreme Court itself observed that,
“[t]o determine whether a child has been legally adopted, for
example, requires a reference to state law”); see also Full
Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (codifying federal policy
of deference to state court orders). It is not surprising,
then, that the federal courts might look suspiciously upon a
federal agency that treads on a traditional judicial domain of
15
the various States. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001)
(explaining that the courts expect a “clear indication” of
congressional intent when an “administrative interpretation
alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power”).
Here, if Congress had intended a modified definition of the
term “adopted” for purposes of federal immigration law and
sought to place the interpretation thereof in the hands of an
administrative agency, such as the BIA, Congress would have made
that intention “unmistakably clear.” See Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(acknowledging that “the States retain substantial sovereign
powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which
Congress does not readily interfere”). Congress did not, for
example, specify requirements in the INA that, if met, would
confer upon a child the status of “adopted” for purposes of
federal immigration law. Nor did Congress explicitly
circumscribe state authority over adoptions in the immigration
context, as it has elsewhere. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct.
at 2557 (majority opinion) (observing that the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 “establishes federal standards that govern
state-court child custody proceedings involving Indian
children”). Nor did Congress expressly confer on the Attorney
16
General or the BIA any power to override the States’ traditional
control over adoptions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (outlining
powers and duties of Attorney General under INA).
Instead, in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), Congress chose the
simple phrase, “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.”
The inclusion of an age requirement in the statute — without
more — cannot be read to create some power of federal agency
review over state court adoption orders. Thus, when an
individual has been “adopted” under § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) depends
on the effective date of the adoption as set forth in the
relevant state court instruments. Cf. Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 576-78 (2010) (explaining that federal
immigration court must look to state conviction itself to
determine whether state offense is “aggravated felony” under
INA).
Put succinctly, the plain meaning of “adopted” in
§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) forecloses the BIA’s summary disregard of
facially valid nunc pro tunc orders relating to adoptions
conducted by the various state courts. Although the BIA — in
its recent Huang decision — has jettisoned the Cariaga/Drigo
rule’s absolute prohibition on giving any effect to such orders
in immigration matters, the BIA nonetheless has continued to
automatically deny recognition to some. The term “adopted” is
not ambiguous under Chevron’s first step, and the BIA’s
17
interpretations that circumscribe reliance on nunc pro tunc
orders are not entitled to deference.
In these circumstances, it was contrary to law for the BIA
not to recognize the nunc pro tunc order in Ojo’s case. As a
result, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ojo’s motion to
reopen his removal proceedings. 4
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we grant Ojo’s petition for
review and vacate the BIA’s decision denying Ojo’s motion to
reopen his removal proceedings. We remand to the BIA for such
other and further proceedings as may be appropriate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED;
VACATED AND REMANDED
4 We need not reach any issue of whether the Attorney
General or the DHS is entitled to demonstrate that a particular
state court nunc pro tunc order evinces a fraudulent or spurious
adoption. Importantly, the Attorney General conceded at oral
argument that there are no indications of fraud with respect to
the 2014 nunc pro tunc order relating to Ojo’s adoption in the
Maryland state court.
18