Eileen Hylind v. Xerox Corporation , 632 F. App'x 114 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1425
EILEEN M. HYLIND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
XEROX CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 15-1438
EILEEN M. HYLIND,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
XEROX CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:03-cv-00116-PJM)
Submitted: October 30, 2015 Decided: December 11, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eileen M. Hylind, Appellant/Cross-Appellee Pro Se. Elena D.
Marcuss, Adam Thomas Simons, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Eileen M. Hylind successfully sued Xerox Corp. (“Xerox”)
for gender discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),
2000e-3(a) (2012). In a previous appeal, we affirmed most of
the district court’s rulings, but vacated the back pay award and
remanded to the district court for it to re-assess its offset
determinations in light of Sloas v. CSX Transp., Inc., 616 F.3d
380, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2010). Hylind v. Xerox Corp., 481 F.
App’x 819, 825 (4th Cir. 2012). On remand, the district court
held that payments Xerox made to Hylind pursuant to its
disability plan did not offset Hylind’s back pay award. Xerox
appeals this ruling, and Hylind cross-appeals several elements
of the district court’s calculation of her back pay and
interest.
Xerox argues that most of Hylind’s claims are barred by the
mandate rule. We agree. When a judgment is vacated only in
part or for a limited purpose, the mandate rule “forecloses
relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the
appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by the district
court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived, for example
because they were not raised in the district court.” United
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We previously rejected Hylind’s
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claims that the district court erred in determining the number
of years of lost wages to which she was entitled and the pay
rate for those wages. Hylind, 481 F. App’x at 824-25 & n.2.
Accordingly, the mandate rule bars us from reconsidering that
decision in the present appeal. Likewise, because Hylind failed
to challenge the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest
on her compensatory damages and costs awards in her first
appeal, we cannot consider these challenges now. Finally, we
affirm the district court’s decision to deny Hylind’s motion to
alter or amend the judgment to increase the benefits amount
included in her back pay award because that motion was barred by
the mandate rule.
We turn next to Xerox’s claim that the district court erred
by denying it an offset for the payments it made to Hylind under
its disability plan. “The collateral source rule holds that
compensation from a collateral source should be disregarded in
assessing . . . damages.” Sloas, 616 F.3d at 389 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “We . . . consider a benefit to be
from a collateral source unless it results from payments made by
the employer in order to indemnify itself against liability.”
Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In determining that Xerox’s disability payments constituted
a collateral source, the district court applied the five factors
set forth in Allen v. Exxon Shipping Co., 639 F. Supp. 1545,
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1548 (D. Me. 1986). We agree with the district court’s
assessment of these factors for the reasons stated by the
district court. Moreover, viewing the evidence as a whole, it
is clear that Xerox’s disability plan was designed as an
employee benefit, and not to indemnify Xerox against liability.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s back pay award.
Hylind appeals several aspects of the district court’s
interest computations. First, Hylind argues that the district
court erred by using Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) to alter its November
8, 2013 order that postjudgment interest on Hylind’s
compensatory damages award would run from June 29, 2007. Even
if we were to conclude that the district court erred, no
corrective action is necessary. The compensatory damages award
was affirmed in all respects by our decision in the earlier
appeal of this case. Thus, the district court was without
authority to alter any aspect of the compensatory damages award.
The court’s April 23, 2014 order merely restored that award to
the state that was affirmed in our prior decision, and thus
requires no correction.
Hylind also argues that the district court erred by
assessing postjudgment interest on her back pay award from the
date of the judgment prior to remand rather than the date of the
judgment following remand. We conclude that the district court
did not err, as our prior decision vacated the back pay award to
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permit the district court to reconsider its application of the
collateral source rule—but did not affect Hylind’s entitlement
to at least the quantum of back pay awarded prior to that
appeal. Thus, the date of the prior judgment awarding back pay
was the proper date for commencement of postjudgment interest.
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
835-36 (1990).
Hylind further argues that the district court should have
amended its calculation of prejudgment interest on her back pay
award pursuant to Rule 60(a). However, the record does not
indicate that the district court’s calculations were the product
of a mathematical error rather than a deliberate decision to
estimate Hylind’s salary as accruing on September 17 of each
year. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Hylind’s Rule 60(a) motion.
Finally, Hylind challenges the district court’s order
denying her motion for an order requiring postjudgment interest
after July 31, 2014. This order stated: “The [c]ourt
reiterates that Hylind is entitled to simple postjudgment
interest at the federal legal rate from the date of judgment
until paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961. . . . Simple postjudgment
interest at the federal legal rate continues to accrue after
July 31, 2014 until paid.” Hylind correctly notes that she is
entitled to compound interest, not simple interest. 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1961(b) (2012). It appears that the district court did not
intend this language to constitute an order that simple
postjudgment interest accrue following July 31, 2014, but was
merely observing that the law already provided that postjudgment
interest would accrue after that date. Nonetheless, for
purposes of clarity, we modify the district court’s order to
clarify that compound, rather than simple, postjudgment interest
applies.
In sum, we modify the district court’s March 25, 2015 order
to state that postjudgment interest is compound interest, rather
than simple interest, and affirm that order as modified. We
affirm the district court’s rulings in all other respects. ∗ We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
∗ We deny Hylind’s request for a ruling that district
court’s calculation of her benefits amount does not have a
preclusive effect on future litigation should Xerox engage in
future illegal acts. See Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners
Ass’n, 718 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] claim is not ripe
for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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