United States v. Jonathan Savage , 580 F. App'x 240 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4153
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN W. SAVAGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00688-CMC-1)
Submitted: July 21, 2014 Decided: August 4, 2014
Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, T. DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan W. Savage pleaded guilty to one count of
making, forging and counterfeiting United States currency, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471 (2012). Savage contends that the
district court erred by not giving him credit under the
Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility. We
affirm.
The determination of whether a defendant is deserving
of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is a factual issue
and thus reviewed for clear error. United States v. Dugger, 485
F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007). “The sentencing judge is in a
unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility, and thus . . . the determination of the
sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.”
Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 761 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations and brackets omitted). We will reverse the
district court’s finding only when “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Dugger, 485
F.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines Manual provides for a
two-level reduction for a defendant who “‘clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense.’” United
States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
USSG § 3E1.1(a)). To merit this reduction, the defendant must
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establish by a preponderance of the evidence “that he has
clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal
responsibility for his criminal conduct.” United States v.
Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1996). The Guidelines note
that in considering this adjustment, the district court should
look at whether the defendant voluntarily terminated or withdrew
from criminal conduct and whether the defendant engaged in post-
offense rehabilitative efforts, among other factors. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, application notes 1(B),
(G); see also Dugger, 485 F.3d at 240 (a court may look for a
clear demonstration of acceptance of responsibility by voluntary
termination of or withdrawal from criminal conduct). Evidence
of continued drug use after indictment but before a guilty plea
may support the district court’s decision to deny an acceptance
of responsibility enhancement. See United States v. Underwood,
970 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (4th Cir. 1992). Even criminal conduct
unrelated to the charged criminal conduct may support a finding
that the defendant has not accepted responsibility. United
States v. Arellano, 291 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2002); see
also United States v. Prince, 204 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir.
2000); United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir.
1996).
We conclude that the district court’s decision not to
give Savage credit for acceptance of responsibility was not
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clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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