United States v. Reginald Lloyd , 581 F. App'x 203 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4643
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
REGINALD A. LLOYD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cr-00033-JFM-1)
Submitted: July 24, 2014 Decided: August 6, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Joanna Silver, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Sujit Raman, Chief of
Appeals, David A. O’Neil, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
David M. Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Ross B.
Goldman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Lloyd was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012), carrying and brandishing a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2012), and being a felon in possession of a
firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). He received an aggregate
sentence of 192 months. Lloyd now appeals his conviction,
arguing that the district court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress certain statements made to police following his arrest
but prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We hold that the
statements were admissible under the public safety exception to
Miranda, and we therefore affirm.
On appeal from the district court’s denial of a
suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572 (2014). When a defendant’s suppression
motion is denied, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, United States v. Black, 707 F.3d
531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013), and defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d
148, 150 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009).
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An incriminating statement made while a suspect is in
police custody will generally be admissible at trial only if the
suspect is first warned of his right against self-incrimination.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478-79. If the custodial
statement is made in response to police inquiries made to
preserve their own safety or that of the public, however, the
statement is admissible. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659
(1984). An officer’s pre-Miranda questioning is acceptable if
it relates “to an objectively reasonable need to protect the
police or the public from any immediate danger associated with
[a] weapon.” Id. at 659 n.8. “The exception . . . will be
circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.” Id. at 658.
Here, the exception clearly applied. Following the
armed robbery of a store, Officers Ward and Guerra heard a radio
broadcast describing the two suspects and the vehicle in which
they were traveling. Within minutes of the broadcast, the
officers observed a vehicle matching the description. They
initiated a traffic stop, and the suspect vehicle pulled over.
However, when Officer Guerra exited the patrol car, the vehicle
fled from the scene, leading the officers on a high-speed chase
during which the suspect vehicle drove erratically through heavy
traffic. The vehicle came to a stop only when the driver lost
control and crashed into a vehicle at another gas station.
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The officers could not see into the car because its
windows were fogged up. When no one in the car responded to
repeated commands that the occupants exit and identify
themselves, Officer Ward opened the passenger-side door, finding
Lloyd in the driver’s seat. When Lloyd did not exit the vehicle
as instructed, Officer Ward physically removed him, placed him
on the ground, and arrested him. Ward asked Lloyd where the gun
was. Lloyd responded, “It’s in the back.” Ward and Guerra
could not see into the car from their position. Ward walked to
the vehicle, looked in, and saw no one. He asked where the
second suspect was. Lloyd replied, “He got out.”
Ward testified that he asked these two questions
because the radio broadcast to which he and Officer Guerra
responded stated that there were two armed suspects. The
officers had reason to believe that there were weapons in the
vehicle and that there might be another suspect in or near the
vehicle. Because the officers reasonably were concerned about
their safety and that of citizens in the immediate area, the
questions were permissible, and the incriminating responses
admissible, under the public safety exception.
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the material before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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