Anthony Wright v. Kenneth Lassiter ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6958
ANTHONY WRIGHT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KENNETH E. LASSITER; CARLTON B. JOYNER; VAN MCCULLOUGH;
BETTY BROWN; R. SPEER; B. VINES; TERRI C. STRATTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-ct-03245-D)
Submitted: October 29, 2015 Decided: February 17, 2016
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Anthony Wright, Appellant Pro Se. Judith Maria Estevez,
Assistant Attorney General, Kimberly D. Grande, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Wright, a North Carolina inmate, filed a complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to
§ 2000cc-5 (2012) (RLUIPA), alleging that several prison
officials substantially burdened his religious exercise by
prohibiting him and other Rastafarian inmates from celebrating
certain holy days with a communal feast. The district court
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground
that Wright failed to make a prima facie showing that defendants
substantially burdened his religious exercise. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
RLUIPA analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the inmate
“bears the initial burden to demonstrate that the prison’s
policy exacts a substantial burden on religious exercise.”
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2015). “If the
inmate clears this hurdle, the burden shifts to the government
to prove its policy furthers a compelling governmental interest
by the least restrictive means.” Id.
The district court reasoned that because the prison allowed
Wright other ways of exercising his religious beliefs, including
weekly worship and private prayer, the denial of the holy feasts
did not amount to a substantial burden under RLUIPA. But
“RLUIPA’s ‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether the
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government has substantially burdened religious exercise . . .
not whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms
of religious exercise.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862
(2015). The district court’s reliance on alternative means of
worship was therefore, at least with respect to the RLUIPA
claim, in error. We accordingly vacate its judgment.
On remand, if the district court concludes that Wright has
demonstrated that the prison’s denial of his proposed holy
feasts constitutes a substantial burden under RLUIPA, then it
should consider whether that burden “is the least restrictive
means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. This is an exacting standard, Holt, 135
S. Ct. at 864, but it is not applied without some measure of
deference. “Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the
urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal
institutions.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005).
The Act’s standards are therefore to be applied with “due
deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and
procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline,
consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.”
Id.
With respect to Wright’s § 1983 First Amendment claim, we
note that while “the availability of alternative means of
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practicing religion is a relevant consideration,” Holt, 135
S. Ct. at 862, it is not the only consideration. Rather it is
one of four factors used to evaluate the constitutional
reasonableness of prison regulations. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89-91 (1987). We therefore vacate and remand the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on Wright’s
§ 1983 claim. On remand, the district court should apply
Turner’s four-factor test in the first instance.
While we vacate the district court’s judgment with respect
to these two issues, we affirm with respect to others. We affirm
to the extent that Wright seeks monetary damages from defendants
for wrongfully violating RLUIPA, Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d
182, 189 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009), and to the extent that he seeks
monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from defendants in their
official capacities. Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th
Cir. 1996). We also affirm the district court’s denial of
Wright’s motions for an audit and for an order removing
Defendant Stratton from her position pending resolution of the
case.
Our opinion does not prohibit the parties from further
developing the summary judgment record on remand. We conclude,
however, that the court improperly granted summary judgment on
the ground that Wright has not made a prima facie showing that
the prison substantially burdened his religious exercise. We
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dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
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