United States v. Jack Jenkins, Jr. ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4135
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JACK JENKINS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
(6:13-cr-00905-TMC-2)
Submitted: October 15, 2015 Decided: October 19, 2015
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Carrie Fisher Sherard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jack Jenkins, Jr., was convicted by a jury of armed bank
robbery, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), 2 (2012) (Count 1), conspiracy to use
and carry a firearm during, and in relation to, and to possess
firearms in furtherance of, a crime of violence, specifically
the armed robbery in Count 1, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o)
(2012) (Count 2), and using and carrying a firearm during and in
relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a crime
of violence, and brandishing a firearm in the commission of the
offense, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2 (2012) (Count 3). The district
court sentenced Jenkins to 171 months in prison, consisting of
concurrent 87-month prison terms on Counts 1 and 2, and a
consecutive 84 months on Count 3. Jenkins timely appealed.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
evidence was sufficient to support Jenkins’ convictions.
Although advised of his right to do so, Jenkins has not filed a
pro se supplemental brief. The Government declined to file a
brief.
We review “challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de
novo.” United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 373 (4th Cir.
2
2015). If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we conclude there is substantial evidence to
uphold the jury’s decision, we will affirm the verdict. Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); United States v. Hager,
721 F.3d 167, 179 (4th Cir. 2013). “Substantial evidence is
such evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hager, 721 F.3d at 179
(internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, we “allow the [G]overnment the
benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to
those sought to be established,” United States v. Tresvant, 677
F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982), and do not weigh the
credibility of the evidence or resolve conflicts in the
evidence, United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th
Cir. 1997). Reversal of a conviction for insufficient evidence
is limited to “cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.”
United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To prove armed bank robbery, as charged in Count 1, the
Government must establish that “(1) the defendant took . . .
money belonging to a bank . . . ; (2) by using force and
violence, or intimidation; (3) the [bank’s] deposits . . . were
federally insured; and (4) in committing . . . the offense, the
3
defendant assaulted any person, or put in jeopardy the life of
any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device.” United
States v. Davis, 437 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2006). To prove a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o), as charged in Count 2, the
Government must show: “(1) a conspiracy existed to commit the
substantive offense;[ *] (2) [the defendant] knew of the
conspiracy; and (3) [the defendant], with knowledge, voluntarily
joined it.” United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278, 1307 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 161 (2014), and cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 233 (2014). Finally, to sustain a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for using, carrying, possessing, and
brandishing a firearm, as charged in Count 3, the Government
must prove: (1) the defendant possessed and brandished a
firearm; and (2) he did so during and in relation to a crime of
violence. United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 922 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2689 (2014); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(4) (defining “brandish” as “to display all or part of
the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known
to another person, in order to intimidate that person,
regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible to that
person”). Jenkins also was charged in Counts 1 and 3 with
*
The substantive offense in this case was using, carrying,
and possessing a firearm to commit the armed bank robbery
charged in Count 1.
4
aiding and abetting, and therefore is liable as a principal if
the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and
abetted those crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Whoever . . . aids
[and] abets [a crime against the United States] . . . is
punishable as a principal.”).
Witnesses testified at trial that two masked men with
firearms entered the TD Bank, which is federally insured, and
demanded money. Video surveillance corroborated eyewitness
accounts and showed one of the robbers displaying a firearm.
One of the robbers told the other to shoot one of the tellers.
The robbers left the bank with over $16,000 and drove off in a
silver Pontiac. However, shortly after leaving the bank, a dye
pack deployed inside the car, and they threw most of the money
out of the car as they fled. The robbers used a Dodge Charger
with Florida plates as a “switch car.” Jenkins rented a Dodge
Charger with Florida plates during the relevant timeframe and
paid for it with a CVS money order that had been purchased by
Joshua Watson using money stained with red dye and that tested
positive for bank dye. A spot of red bank dye was found on
Jenkins’ sock. Watson testified in court and gave a detailed
explanation of how he, James McGowan, and Jenkins planned and
executed the armed bank robbery. We conclude that this evidence
is sufficient to establish the elements of each of the counts of
conviction.
5
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Jenkins, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Jenkins requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jenkins.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6