Lester Ruston v. Eric Holder ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-6968
    LESTER JON RUSTON,
    Petitioner – Appellant,
    v.
    U.S. ATTORNEY   GENERAL   ERIC   HOLDER;   DIRECTOR   CHARLES   E.
    SAMUELS,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Terrence W. Boyle,
    District Judge. (5:12-hc-02090-BO)
    Submitted:   October 22, 2013              Decided:   October 25, 2013
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Lester Jon Ruston, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Lester Jon Ruston appeals the district court’s order
    denying Ruston’s motion to reconsider, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its order denying relief
    on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) petition. 1                       We affirm.
    We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse
    of discretion.            MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 
    532 F.3d 269
    ,       277    (4th    Cir.    2008).        Our    review      is    limited    to   the
    propriety         of    Rule   60(b)   relief        and    does   not    extend    to   the
    underlying         judgment.        Id.     A       movant   seeking      relief    from    a
    judgment         under   Rule     60(b)    must      make    a   threshold     showing     of
    “timeliness, a meritorious defense, a lack of unfair prejudice
    to the opposing party, and exceptional circumstances.”                              Dowell
    v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    993 F.2d 46
    , 48 (4th
    Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).                           If this showing
    is   made,        the    movant    also    must      demonstrate        one   of   the   six
    enumerated grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).                               See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 60(b); Heyman v. M.L. Mktg. Co., 
    116 F.3d 91
    , 94 (4th
    Cir. 1997); see also Aikens v. Ingram, 
    652 F.3d 496
    , 500-01 (4th
    1
    To the extent Ruston seeks to appeal the underlying
    judgment denying Ruston’s § 2241 petition, we lack jurisdiction
    to address this order, as his notice of appeal is timely only as
    to the order denying Rule 60(b) relief.     See Fed. R. App. P.
    4(a)(1)(B) (providing sixty-day appeal period), 4(a)(4)(A)(vi)
    (addressing tolling pending disposition of Rule 60(b) motion).
    2
    Cir. 2011) (en banc) (addressing requirements for relief under
    Rule 60(b)(6)).
    We have reviewed the record and discern no abuse of
    discretion,     as   we    conclude    that    Ruston     did   not   make   the
    requisite showing for relief under Rule 60(b). 2                  Accordingly,
    although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm
    the district court’s order.           We deny Ruston’s motions to expand
    the record on appeal, for an injunction, and for appointment of
    counsel.    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions      are   adequately    presented    in   the   materials
    before   this   court     and   argument   would   not    aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    2
    Additionally, while Ruston raises a claim of judicial bias
    in his informal brief, we find nothing in the record to support
    these allegations.    Rather, Ruston’s assertions appear to be
    based on his disagreement with the substantive rulings made by
    the district court. See Shaw v. Martin, 
    733 F.2d 304
    , 308 (4th
    Cir. 1984) (“Alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must
    stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on
    the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
    his participation in the case.”).
    3