Marcellus Brooks v. Travis Bragg ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-7404
    MARCELLUS RAYNARD BROOKS,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.
    WARDEN TRAVIS BRAGG,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
    Orangeburg. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (5:17-cv-01674-RMG)
    Submitted: August 23, 2018                                        Decided: August 27, 2018
    Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Marcellus Raynard Brooks, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Marcellus Raynard Brooks, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order
    accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 28 U.S.C.
    § 2241 (2012) petition challenging his 210-month sentence for being a felon in
    possession of a firearm. We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a challenge
    pursuant to § 2241. Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    412 F.3d 526
    , 530 (4th Cir. 2005).
    Generally, federal prisoners “are required to bring collateral attacks challenging the
    validity of their judgment and sentence by filing a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 2255.” In re Vial, 
    115 F.3d 1192
    , 1194 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A federal
    prisoner may, however, file a § 2241 petition challenging his conviction if § 2255 is
    “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [his] detention.” In re Jones, 
    226 F.3d 328
    , 334 (4th Cir. 2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). Brooks challenges only his
    sentence. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a sentence
    when:
    (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme
    Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the
    prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled
    substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on
    collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping
    provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to
    this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently
    grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.
    United States v. Wheeler, 
    886 F.3d 415
    , 429 (4th Cir. 2018). *
    *
    The district court did not have the benefit of our decision in Wheeler, which
    issued after the court dismissed Brooks’ § 2241 petition.
    2
    In his § 2241 petition, Brooks argued that, after Mathis v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 2243
    (2016), and Descamps v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 254
    (2013), his prior state
    convictions do not qualify as serious drug offenses and therefore he was erroneously
    subjected to an enhanced statutory minimum sentence as an armed career criminal,
    18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
    However, Descamps and Mathis did not announce a retroactively applicable
    substantive change in the law. Rather, these cases reiterated and clarified the application
    of the categorical approach or the modified categorical approach, to determine whether
    prior convictions qualify as predicates for recidivist enhancements. See 
    Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257
    (“Our precedents make this a straightforward case.”); 
    Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260
    (noting that Court’s prior case law explaining categorical approach “all but
    resolves this case”); United States v. Royal, 
    731 F.3d 333
    , 340 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In
    Descamps, the Supreme Court recently clarified whe[n] courts may apply the modified
    categorical approach”).
    Because Brooks’ § 2241 petition does not rely on a retroactively applicable change
    in substantive law subsequent to his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, he cannot
    satisfy the requirements of Wheeler. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in
    forma pauperis, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Brooks § 2241 petition,
    modifying its dismissal to be without prejudice because it lacked jurisdiction to consider
    the § 2241 petition. 
    Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 426
    (holding requirements of the savings
    clause of § 2255(e), are jurisdictional). We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    3
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-7404

Filed Date: 8/27/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021