United States v. Tineka McLaughlin , 813 F.3d 202 ( 2016 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4920
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
TINEKA S. MCLAUGHLIN,
Defendant − Appellant,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00057-F-1)
Argued: January 28, 2016 Decided: February 16, 2016
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Phillip
Anthony Rubin, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara,
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
This case concerns the proper construction of a waiver of
appellate rights signed by Tineka McLaughlin as part of her plea
agreement. She argues that despite the waiver, she is still
allowed to challenge on appeal the district court’s imposition
of a four-level role-in-the-offense enhancement under Section
3B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. For the
reasons that follow, we believe the issue was within the scope
of her waiver. We accordingly dismiss this appeal.
I.
Tineka McLaughlin pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 after she participated in an ATM fraud
scheme in Fayetteville, North Carolina. As part of her plea
agreement, McLaughlin agreed
To waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred
by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to appeal the conviction and
whatever sentence is imposed on any ground, including
any issues that relate to the establishment of the
advisory Guideline range, reserving only the right to
appeal from a sentence in excess of the applicable
advisory Guideline range that is established at
sentencing, and further to waive all rights to contest
the conviction or sentence in any post-conviction
proceeding, including one pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, excepting an appeal or motion based upon
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or
prosecutorial misconduct not known to the Defendant at
the time of the Defendant’s guilty plea.
J.A. 42-43. At her August 4, 2014 plea hearing, the district
court questioned McLaughlin, asking, “Do you understand you
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reserve only the right to appeal from an upward departure from
the advisory guideline range established at sentencing and that
you otherwise waive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is
imposed . . . ?” J.A. 39. McLaughlin responded, saying, “Yes,
sir.” Id.The district court subsequently sentenced McLaughlin to pay
restitution and to serve twenty-seven months’ imprisonment. Two
aspects of McLaughlin’s sentence are relevant to this appeal.
First, the court calculated McLaughlin’s Guideline range using a
four-level role-in-the-offense enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a). This yielded an advisory Guideline calculation of 15
to 21 months. Second, the district court imposed an upward
departure sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1), sentencing
McLaughlin to 27 months on the ground that the lower Guideline
range underestimated “the seriousness of [McLaughlin’s] criminal
history and likelihood of recidivism.” J.A. 107.
McLaughlin appealed. She appealed only the § 3B1.1(a)
enhancement, not the upward departure. The United States moved
to dismiss, arguing that she waived her right to appeal issues
related to the establishment of her advisory Guideline range.
McLaughlin countered, arguing that because she received “a
sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guideline range
that [was] established at sentencing,” the appeal could go
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forward, even though the substance of the appeal did not
actually concern the upward departure.
The issue is not one that is unique to this case. See
United States v. Shawakha, 410 F. App’x 658 (4th Cir. 2011).
II.
We start by examining the text of the waiver. The operative
provision has two clauses, a waiver clause and a reservation
clause. The waiver clause waives all right to appeal “whatever
sentence is imposed on any ground, including any issues
[relating] to the establishment of the advisory Guideline
range.” J.A. 42. The reservation clause then withdraws from the
waiver “only the right to appeal from a sentence in excess of
the applicable advisory Guideline range that is established at
sentencing.” Id.
McLaughlin argues that under the reservation clause, she
has a right to challenge any part of a sentence when the overall
sentence represents an upward departure from the Guideline
range. In other words, she argues that “a sentence” means
“anything in that sentence.”
This reading focuses on one clause in the agreement at the
expense of the agreement in its entirety. As a matter of
tactics, the oversight is understandable, as the agreement in
its entirety contains a waiver provision that McLaughlin would
prefer to overlook.
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That waiver provision quite specifically waives the right
to appeal the sentence “on any ground, including any issues that
relate to the establishment of the advisory Guideline range.”
J.A. 42. McLaughlin’s appeal of the 3B1.1(a) enhancement is just
such an issue. It relates to the establishment of the advisory
Guideline range and therefore lies at the heart of the waiver
clause.
McLaughlin’s selective reading of the waiver provision
would render this heart of it superfluous. Under McLaughlin’s
reading, the waiver with respect to appeals of sentences may as
well have read:
To waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred
by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, reserving only the right to
appeal from a sentence in excess of the applicable
advisory Guideline range that is established at
sentencing.
The language “whatever sentence is imposed on any ground,
including any issues that relate to the establishment of the
advisory Guideline range” is conspicuously absent from
McLaughlin’s interpretation. But “the interpretation of plea
agreements is rooted in contract law.” United States v. Peglera,
33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994). And “[c]ontract terms must be
construed to give meaning and effect to every part of the
contract.” Goodman v. Resolution Trust Corp., 7 F.3d 1123, 1127
(4th Cir. 1993). We therefore decline McLaughlin’s invitation to
“reduce[]” much of her waiver “to mere surplusage.” Id.5
McLaughlin also argues that the plea agreement is at least
ambiguous and that ambiguity should be construed in her favor.
But the fact that parties in an adversary system unsurprisingly
argue for different interpretations of an agreement does not in
and of itself render an agreement ambiguous. In determining
whether an agreement is ambiguous, courts “examine the entire
contract,” considering “[p]articular words . . . not as if
isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as
a whole.” PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714
F.3d 161, 173 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting William C. Atwater & Co.
v. Panama R.R. Co., 159 N.E. 418, 419 (N.Y. 1927)). “Form should
not prevail over substance, and a sensible meaning of words
should be sought.” Id.Here, taken as a whole, the agreement makes good sense. It
allows challenges to upward departures from a Guideline range,
but not challenges to the establishment of a Guideline range.
McLaughlin was advised of this reading during her plea hearing
and yet raised no objection. The district court, moreover, did
not commit any error, much less plain error, in conveying this
understanding to McLaughlin in open court.
McLaughlin does not, for whatever reason, challenge her
sentence’s upward departure, which she is permitted to do, but
instead challenges the establishment of her Guideline range,
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which she is forbidden to do. This has her agreement in reverse.
We therefore dismiss her appeal.
DISMISSED
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