United States v. Antonio Anthony Williams , 705 F. App'x 160 ( 2017 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-4260
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ANTONIO ANTHONY WILLIAMS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
    Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00144-WO-1)
    Submitted: July 20, 2017                                          Decided: July 28, 2017
    Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Todd A. Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-
    Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Antonio Anthony Williams appeals his conviction and 51-month sentence
    imposed following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Williams’ counsel has filed a brief
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting that Williams can raise
    no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court erred in
    sentencing Williams. Williams was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental
    brief but has not done so. The Government has declined to file a response brief. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-
    discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). We first determine
    whether the district court committed significant procedural error, such as incorrect
    calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range, inadequate consideration of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2012) factors, or insufficient explanation of the sentence imposed. United
    States v. Dowell, 
    771 F.3d 162
    , 170 (4th Cir. 2014).
    In evaluating the district court’s Guidelines calculations, we review the district
    court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
    White, 
    771 F.3d 225
    , 235 (4th Cir. 2014). We review unpreserved Guidelines challenges
    for plain error. United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 
    792 F.3d 416
    , 422 (4th Cir. 2015); see
    Molina-Martinez v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1338
    , 1343, 1345 (2016) (describing
    standard).
    2
    If we find no procedural error, we examine the substantive reasonableness of the
    sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    . The sentence
    imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of
    sentencing. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). We presume on appeal that a within-Guidelines
    sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 
    756 F.3d 295
    , 306 (4th
    Cir. 2014). Williams bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by showing that the
    sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors.” 
    Id.
    In his Anders brief, counsel advises that Williams has questioned the impact of
    Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
     (2015), on his sentence. Williams received an
    enhanced base offense level based on the sentencing court’s finding that he committed
    his underlying federal offense “subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a
    crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2015); see USSG § 4B1.2(a) (defining “crime of violence”). As a
    predicate crime of violence for the enhancement, the court relied upon Williams’ prior
    North Carolina convictions for first degree burglary, each of which was consolidated with
    a North Carolina conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Counsel concedes
    that these prior offenses qualify as crimes of violence that support the enhanced base
    offense level. In light of recent authority, we conclude that counsel’s concession is well
    taken.
    In Johnson, the Supreme Court determined that the residual clause of the Armed
    Career Criminal Act (ACCA), reaching offenses that “involve[] conduct that presents a
    serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” see 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B)(ii)
    3
    (2012), is unconstitutionally vague. 
    135 S. Ct. at 2556-63
    . In Beckles v. United States,
    
    137 S. Ct. 886
     (2017), however, the Supreme Court declined to extend the reasoning in
    Johnson to the Guidelines, holding that the Guidelines are not subject to a due process
    vagueness challenge and that the residual clause under USSG § 4B1.2(a) is not void for
    vagueness. 
    137 S. Ct. at 895
    . In light of Beckles, Williams cannot raise a vagueness
    challenge to his predicate crimes of violence under Johnson. Further, any potential
    challenge Williams could raise to the classification of his predicate convictions as crimes
    of violence is foreclosed by recent opinions from this court. See United States v. Mack,
    
    855 F.3d 581
    , 586 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that North Carolina first degree burglary
    categorically qualifies as generic “burglary” enumerated under USSG § 4B1.2(a));
    United States v. Burns-Johnson, __ F.3d __, No. 16-4338, 
    2017 WL 3027872
    , at *1, *5
    (4th Cir. July 19, 2017) (holding that North Carolina robbery with dangerous weapon
    categorically qualifies as violent felony under ACCA’s force clause); see also United
    States v. Montes-Flores, 
    736 F.3d 357
    , 363 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that decisions
    evaluating whether offense qualifies as ACCA violent felony are used interchangeably
    with decisions evaluating whether offense qualifies as Guidelines crime of violence).
    Thus, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in Williams’ enhanced base offense level.
    Our review of the record reveals that Williams’ sentence is reasonable. The
    district court properly calculated Williams’ Guidelines range and sentenced him within
    that range and the applicable statutory maximum. The court considered the parties’
    arguments in sentencing Williams and articulated a reasoned basis for the sentence it
    imposed, grounded in the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors. Further, Williams fails to rebut
    4
    the presumption of reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.              See
    Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
    have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Williams’ conviction
    and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Williams, in writing, of the right to
    petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Williams requests
    that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Williams.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4260

Citation Numbers: 705 F. App'x 160

Judges: Duncan, Wynn, Floyd

Filed Date: 7/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024