United States v. Nkhenge Shropshire , 608 F. App'x 143 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4865
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NKHENGE SHROPSHIRE, a/k/a Konjay Shropshire,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00248-FDW-1)
Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015
Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tony E. Rollman, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Nkhenge Shropshire pled
guilty to conspiracy to impede the Internal Revenue Service, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and making a false statement
on a loan application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1014 (2012).
With Shropshire’s consent, a magistrate judge conducted a Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 hearing and accepted her guilty pleas. Shropshire
argues on appeal that the magistrate judge lacked the authority to
accept her guilty pleas. Because there is binding Fourth Circuit
precedent to the contrary, we affirm.
The sole issue Shropshire raises on appeal is that, in
accepting her guilty pleas, the magistrate judge exceeded the
authority vested in him under the Federal Magistrates Act. Central
to Shropshire’s argument is the recent decision in United States
v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2014), in which the Seventh
Circuit held “that the magistrate judge’s acceptance of
[defendant]’s guilty plea violated the Federal Magistrates Act.”
Id. at 891. This court has held, however, that the Magistrates
Act authorizes magistrate judges to accept a guilty plea and find
a defendant guilty when, as here, “the parties have consented to
the procedure” and the district court retains “ultimate control
. . . over the plea process.” United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d
424, 433 (4th Cir. 2008); cf. Harden, 758 F.3d at 891 (noting that
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Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits “authorize magistrate judges
to accept felony guilty pleas with the parties’ consent”).
Regardless of the Seventh Circuit’s contrary decision in
Harden, we are bound by Benton. See United States v. Collins, 415
F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A decision of a panel of this court
becomes the law of the circuit and is binding on other panels
unless it is overruled by a subsequent en banc opinion of this
court or a superseding contrary decision of the Supreme Court.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we reject Shropshire’s challenge to the
magistrate judge’s authority to accept her guilty pleas, and we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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