Diane Russell v. Absolute Collection Services ( 2014 )


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  •                                PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-2357
    DIANE RUSSELL,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ABSOLUTE COLLECTION SERVICES, INC.,
    Defendant – Appellant,
    and
    CHARLTON CLARKSON,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.   William L. Osteen,
    Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:09-cv-00515-WO-WWD)
    Argued:   April 11, 2014                    Decided:   August 15, 2014
    Before MOTZ, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion.    Judge Floyd wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Motz and Judge Diaz joined.
    ARGUED: Sean T. Partrick, YATES, MCLAMB & WEYHER, LLP, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.   Deepak Gupta, GUPTA BECK PLLC,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee.    ON BRIEF: Allison J. Becker,
    Jennifer D. Maldonado, YATES, MCLAMB & WEYHER, LLP, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.    Joanne Faulkner, New Haven,
    Connecticut; Suzanne R. Begnoche, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
    for Appellee.
    2
    FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
    Diane Russell was the target of a dunning campaign waged by
    Absolute      Collection          Services,       Inc.        (Absolute     Collection),
    wherein Absolute Collection made repeated collection demands to
    Russell for a debt that she incurred in 2008.                           Within one month
    of    receiving      Absolute       Collection’s         first    collection       letter,
    Russell      paid    the       outstanding     bill      in    full.       Although     the
    collection letter instructed Russell to send payment for the
    debt    to    Absolute         Collection,    she       instead   paid     the   creditor
    directly and notified Absolute Collection of her payment during
    two telephone conversations with collection agents. Yet, over
    the    next    few    months,       Absolute      Collection       continued      sending
    Russell demand letters falsely asserting that the already-paid
    debt remained due and threatening to report it to credit bureaus
    as “past due.”
    Russell filed suit against Absolute Collection in federal
    district      court       in     North   Carolina,         alleging       that   Absolute
    Collection’s conduct violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
    Act    (FDCPA),      
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    -1692p,         and    the    North    Carolina
    Collection Agency Act, 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-70-1
     et seq., by,
    inter     alia,      falsely      reporting       the    status    of     the    debt   and
    threatening to report the paid-off debt to credit bureaus as
    “past due.”         Following a five-day jury trial, the district court
    3
    granted Russell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with
    respect to certain claims under the FDCPA and allowed the state
    claims to go to the jury, which found in favor of Russell and
    awarded to her $37,501.00.
    Absolute Collection now appeals the district court’s orders
    (1)   denying      Absolute    Collection’s        motion    for    judgment    as    a
    matter of law; (2) granting Russell’s motion for judgment as a
    matter   of     law;   (3)    excluding         certain    evidence      relevant    to
    Absolute Collection’s bona-fide-error defense; and (4) denying
    Absolute Collection’s post-trial motions.                     We reject each of
    Absolute Collection’s challenges and affirm the district court’s
    judgment in its entirety.
    I.
    A.
    We begin with the salient portions of the FDCPA’s statutory
    framework and then survey the factual and procedural history
    before turning to the merits of Absolute Collection’s claims.
    Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection
    practices     by    debt     collectors.”          
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    (e).        To
    effectuate      this   purpose,       the       FDCPA     regulates      interactions
    between consumers and debt collectors by imposing affirmative
    statutory     obligations      upon    debt       collectors       and    proscribing
    4
    certain abusive conduct.             See, e.g., 
    id.
     § 1692b (setting forth
    debt collectors’ obligations when acquiring location information
    about    consumers); id.           § 1692d    (prohibiting         “any    conduct       the
    natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any
    person”); Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 
    741 F.3d 487
    , 490-91 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (explaining obligations
    triggered by a debtor’s oral dispute under § 1692g(a)(3)).                                As
    relevant here, the FDCPA makes it unlawful for debt collectors
    to make false or deceptive statements in the course of their
    collection activities.             See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
    Debt collectors that violate the FDCPA are liable to the
    debtor   for       actual    damages,     costs,      and       reasonable     attorney’s
    fees.    15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), (a)(3).                   The FDCPA also provides
    the potential for statutory damages up to $1,000 subject to the
    district court’s discretion.                 Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).                  A debtor
    generally     is    not     required    to   show     an    intentional        or    knowing
    violation on the part of the debt collector to recover damages
    under the FDCPA.            Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 
    676 F.3d 365
    ,    375    (4th      Cir.   2012)     (“[T]he      FDCPA      ‘imposes       liability
    without proof of an intentional violation.’” (quoting Allen ex
    rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 
    629 F.3d 364
    , 368 (3d Cir.
    2011))).           The    statute,      however,       excludes         from     liability
    violations      that        were    the      result        of    bona     fide       errors.
    5
    See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).             To qualify for the bona-fide-error
    defense, a defendant is required to show, by a preponderance of
    the evidence, that (1) it unintentionally violated the FDCPA;
    (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) it
    maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violation.
    Id.
    B.
    This appeal has its genesis in a $501 medical bill.                      After
    Diane   Russell     failed    to     remit    payment   for     medical     services
    rendered     to     her    husband,      Sandhills      Emergency          Physicians
    (Sandhills)       enlisted     Absolute       Collection      to     recover     the
    outstanding       $501    balance.       On    December    8,      2008,    Absolute
    Collection sent Russell an initial collection letter advising
    her that Sandhills “authorized us to extend to you a courtesy
    which allows you thirty (30) days in order to pay the balance on
    your    account     and    prevent     further,    more    serious         collection
    activity.”        Absolute    Collection       followed    its     initial     demand
    letter with five telephone calls to Russell over the next couple
    of weeks.     On December 30, 2008, Russell paid the entire balance
    owed by mailing a check directly to Sandhills, which applied the
    payment to her account on January 8, 2009.
    6
    A    collection      agent   from     Absolute    Collection        telephoned
    Russell on February 6, 2009, seeking to collect on the Sandhills
    bill.       Russell informed the agent that she paid the entire $501
    debt directly to Sandhills and that the check had cleared her
    bank account.          The agent noted Russell’s response in her call
    notes and ended the call without asking for proof of payment.
    Later       that    month,     however,   Russell       received    another       demand
    letter, stating, “We are dismayed by your inaction with respect
    to   our     previous     requests    that      you   settle     your   account    with
    Sandhills Emergency Physicians.                 Our records indicate that you
    still       owe    $501.00   for   services     which    were    rendered    to    you.”
    Russell telephoned Absolute Collection and again reported her
    payment to Sandhills.              The collection agent advised Russell to
    send proof of her payment and suggested that she could set up a
    payment plan to pay the bill.             Russell did neither.
    On March 31, 2009, Absolute Collection sent Russell another
    collection letter, stating, “As you are aware, your account with
    Sandhills Emergency Physicians has not been satisfied.”                             The
    letter also threatened, “[W]e will be reporting your past due
    account       to    national    credit    bureaus.        This     information     will
    remain on your credit file for the next seven (7) years.                            You
    may be denied credit in the future as a result.”                        Fearful that
    her credit would be ruined, Russell filed a complaint with the
    7
    Better Business Bureau.                  When the complaint was transmitted to
    Absolute      Collection,           an        employee    from        Absolute     Collection
    contacted      Sandhills       and       verified        that    Russell     had    paid     the
    entire    balance      on     the       bill.         Absolute    Collection       thereafter
    ceased its collection efforts with respect to Russell.
    C.
    Russell filed a complaint against Absolute Collection in
    federal district court, alleging violations of the FDCPA and
    parallel      North     Carolina          consumer-protection            laws.       Absolute
    Collection denied liability and raised a bona-fide-error defense
    to the FDCPA claims.               In March 2010, after the discovery period
    closed, Russell filed a motion for summary judgment on liability
    against       Absolute       Collection           under       the      FDCPA.        Absolute
    Collection opposed the motion, maintaining that Russell’s claims
    under the FDCPA failed as a matter of law because she never
    disputed       the     debt        in     writing.            Alternatively,         Absolute
    Collection       argued      that        it    presented        sufficient       evidence     to
    create    a    genuine       issue       of     material      fact     pertaining       to    its
    defense of bona fide error.                     Relying upon an affidavit from its
    chief operating officer, Absolute Collection explained that its
    bona-fide-error         defense         was     based    on     its   practice     of   asking
    debtors    for       proof    of    payment       as     well    as    its   reliance        upon
    8
    Sandhills to report subsequent payments on accounts that have
    been referred for collection.
    The    case     was    scheduled       for    trial    during       the    district
    court’s November 2010 term of court.                  That month, with Russell’s
    summary judgment motion still pending, the district court held a
    pretrial conference.            During the hearing, Absolute Collection
    clarified that it intended to base its bona-fide-error defense
    on   the    failure    of    its    internal       systems     to    receive       payment
    information     that        Sandhills     was      contractually          obligated    to
    report.      Following the conference, Russell filed a motion in
    limine, requesting the district court to exclude evidence of any
    procedures     between        Absolute       Collection      and      Sandhills       that
    Absolute     Collection       failed    to       disclose   during        the   discovery
    period.        The     district        court       postponed     the       trial     until
    January 2011.
    The    district       court   denied       Russell’s     motion      for     summary
    judgment on January 10, 2011.                    Although it rejected Absolute
    Collection’s contention that Russell’s claims failed as a matter
    of law because she did not dispute the debt in writing, the
    district court nevertheless found that there were genuine issues
    of material fact regarding Absolute Collection’s bona-fide-error
    defense.      That same day, the district court issued a separate
    order   continuing      the    trial     to      April   2011,      due    to   inclement
    9
    weather,    and   reopening     discovery      on      the    limited         issue   of
    Absolute     Collection’s       assertion         of     bona          fide      error,
    “specifically     with    respect    to     any     procedures         that     existed
    between    [Absolute     Collection]     and   Sandhills       .   .    .     requiring
    notice to [Absolute Collection] of payments made to an account.”
    During the reopened discovery period, Absolute Collection’s
    discovery responses revealed that the facts supporting its bona-
    fide-error defense had changed once again.                   Absolute Collection
    claimed    that    McKesson     Corporation—a          previously        undisclosed
    third-party—(or one of McKesson’s subsidiaries) was responsible
    for sending Absolute Collection weekly reports showing payments
    made directly to Sandhills, and it provided Russell with the
    payment reports it received from McKesson between December 2008
    and February 2009, the period during which Russell’s account was
    referred for collection and when she made payment to Sandhills.
    Absolute Collection also identified, for the first time, the
    manager of its payment processing department, Laura Pavesi, as a
    witness    with   knowledge    who   could     testify        about     the     payment
    posting procedure between McKesson and Absolute Collection.
    On March 22, 2011, Russell filed another motion in limine
    requesting the district court to prohibit Absolute Collection
    from   introducing     any    evidence      relating     to    its      practice      of
    relying upon McKesson to provide payment reports and blaming
    10
    McKesson    for       not     providing           the     payment      report    reflecting
    Russell’s    payment          to     Sandhills.           Following      a    hearing,   the
    district    court           found        that     Absolute      Collection’s         untimely
    disclosure of evidence pertaining to the factual basis for its
    bona-fide-error defense was neither substantially justified nor
    harmless, and, therefore, it excluded Pavesi’s testimony as well
    as all evidence related to McKesson and the duty of any third
    party to provide to Absolute Collection payment reports.
    The case was tried before a jury over the course of five
    days.     At the close of Russell’s evidence, Absolute Collection
    moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court
    denied.      At       the    close        of    all     evidence,      Russell   moved   for
    judgment    as    a    matter       of     law    on    her    claims    under   15    U.S.C.
    § 1692e(2)(A),         (8),        and    (10).         The    district      court    granted
    Russell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that
    the   representations          in        Absolute       Collection’s      dunning     letters
    were “objectively false” and that the March 31 letter contained
    a “threat to communicate false information to a credit bureau.”
    The district court also found that Absolute Collection failed to
    present    any    evidence          from        which    the    jury    could    reasonably
    conclude that the mistakes giving rise to Absolute Collection’s
    FDCPA violations were the result of a bona fide error, and,
    therefore, it determined that Russell was entitled to judgment
    11
    as   a    matter    of   law    on   Absolute    Collection’s      bona-fide-error
    defense.      The jury found in favor of Russell on her state law
    claims and awarded her $1,000 in statutory damages under the
    FDCPA, $6,000 in statutory damages under state law, and $30,501
    in actual damages.
    Absolute   Collection       filed     motions   for   a   new   trial   and
    relief from the judgment.             When the district court denied those
    motions, Absolute Collection timely appealed.
    II.
    We first address Absolute Collection’s contention that the
    district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a
    matter of law, a ruling we review de novo, viewing the evidence
    and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most
    favorable to Russell.            See Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc.,
    
    395 F.3d 485
    , 489-90 (4th Cir. 2005).
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 authorizes a district
    court to enter judgment as a matter of law when “a party has
    been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court
    finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
    evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”                    Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 50(a)(1).              Judgment as a matter of law “is properly
    granted if the nonmoving party failed to make a showing on an
    12
    essential element of his case with respect to which he had the
    burden of proof.”          Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., 
    390 F.3d 328
    , 332
    (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Singer v. Dungan, 
    45 F.3d 823
    , 827 (4th
    Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Absolute Collection argues that it was entitled to judgment
    as   a    matter    of    law    because    Russell       failed      to    present     any
    evidence     showing      that   she    disputed     the      debt    in    writing     and
    within thirty days of receiving the initial collection letter.
    Russell concedes that she did not dispute the validity of the
    debt in writing and within thirty days of receiving Absolute
    Collection’s first demand letter but submits that such steps are
    unnecessary to state a claim under § 1692e.                          Whether a debtor
    must dispute the validity of a debt as a condition to bringing
    suit      under     the     FDCPA      presents      an       issue        of     statutory
    interpretation, and we turn first to the relevant section of the
    statute.
    Section   1692g    requires       debt   collectors         to    send     written
    “validation notices” to debtors informing them of their rights
    to     require     verification     and     dispute       a   debt.         Pursuant    to
    § 1692g, the validation notice must include the amount of the
    debt, the name of the creditor, and “a statement that unless the
    consumer,        within    thirty   days     after    receipt         of    the    notice,
    disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the
    13
    debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.”                                 15
    U.S.C.    § 1692g(a)(1)-(3).              The    notice    also   must      apprise     the
    debtor that, upon written request within thirty days, the debt
    collector will provide verification of the debt and the name and
    address information of the original creditor if different from
    the current creditor.             Id. § 1692g(a)(4)-(5).              If, within the
    thirty-day period, the debtor notifies the debt collector in
    writing    that    the    debt    is    disputed     or    requests      the    name    and
    address    of     the    original       creditor,    the     debt     collector        must
    suspend collection activity until it obtains verification of the
    debt or the requested information is mailed to the consumer.
    Id. § 1692g(b).
    In Absolute Collection’s view, a debt collector cannot be
    liable     under    § 1692e       for     false,     deceptive,       or       misleading
    representations          unless     the     debtor        disputes    the       debt    in
    accordance with the validation procedures outlined in 15 U.S.C.
    § 1692g.        According     to       Absolute     Collection,       the      permission
    afforded by § 1692g to “assume[]” the validity of an undisputed
    debt must necessarily authorize a debt collector to continue
    seeking collection of such a debt.                   Because Russell failed to
    dispute her debt in writing and within thirty days of receiving
    the initial collection letter, Absolute Collection contends that
    14
    it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Russell’s
    § 1692e claims.       We reject this interpretation of the law.
    Nothing in the text of the FDCPA suggests that a debtor’s
    ability to state a claim under § 1692e is dependent upon the
    debtor first disputing the validity of the debt in accordance
    with § 1692g.       Given the FDCPA’s “comprehensive and reticulated
    statutory        scheme,    involving           clear     definitions,          precise
    requirements, and particularized remedies,” Sayyed v. Wolpoff &
    Abramson, 
    485 F.3d 226
    , 233 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
    marks omitted), the absence of an explicit pre-suit validation
    requirement is telling.         Put simply, had Congress intended for a
    debt   collector’s     liability      under      the    FDCPA     to    hinge    upon    a
    debtor’s    compliance      with     the   validation          provisions      found    in
    § 1692g,    we    suspect     that    it    would       have    so     indicated   with
    conspicuous language to that effect.
    We need not rely exclusively upon the statute’s silence,
    however,    because    both    the    express      language       and    the    remedial
    nature of the FDCPA persuade us that a consumer is not required
    to dispute the debt before bringing suit under § 1692e.                          As our
    colleagues on the Third Circuit recently observed when rejecting
    the very argument Absolute Collection advances here:
    The language of § 1692g indicates that disputing a
    debt is optional.  The statute lists consequences “if
    the consumer” disputes a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)
    (emphasis added), and it makes clear that failure to
    15
    dispute a debt cannot be construed as an admission of
    liability.   Thus, the statute protects a prospective
    litigant from being penalized in a lawsuit if he or
    she chooses not to seek validation.
    McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, __ F.3d __, 
    2014 WL 2883891
    , at *4 (3d Cir. June 26, 2014) (brackets omitted)
    (footnote    omitted)     (citation        omitted).          Given    the     explicit
    protection    conferred     upon    debtors      who   choose      not    to    dispute
    their debts, it would be anomalous to conclude that a debtor
    forfeits his or her ability to bring a lawsuit under the FDCPA
    simply     because    the        debtor     failed       to     invoke       § 1692g’s
    discretionary validation procedures.
    Further,     allowing       debtors    to   raise      claims     under    § 1692e
    without first contesting the debt best promotes the remedial
    nature of the FDCPA because it preserves debtors’ abilities to
    obtain a remedy for violations of the statute.                         See Atchison,
    Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 
    480 U.S. 557
    , 561-62 (1987)
    (recognizing the canon of statutory interpretation that remedial
    statutes are to be construed liberally).                      Although the statute
    authorizes enforcement of the FDCPA through the Federal Trade
    Commission, it also facilitates private enforcement by allowing
    aggrieved    consumers      to    bring    suit.       15     U.S.C.     §§ 1692k(a),
    1692l.      By providing prevailing plaintiffs statutory and actual
    damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees, Congress plainly
    intended     to   regulate        unscrupulous       conduct      by     encouraging
    16
    consumers who were the target of unlawful collection efforts to
    bring civil actions.           See id. § 1692k(a); Tolentino v. Friedman,
    
    46 F.3d 645
    , 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The reason for mandatory fees
    is that congress chose a ‘private attorney general’ approach to
    assume    enforcement     of    the   FDCPA.”).        To   require      debtors    to
    dispute their debts under § 1692g before bringing suit, absent
    an explicit statutory directive requiring them to undertake such
    action, would frustrate debtors’ abilities to vindicate their
    statutory       rights   and    “undermine     the     FDCPA’s     protection       of
    unsophisticated debtors, who would have no reason to suspect
    that     they    would   be     prevented     from    filing     suit    concerning
    deceptive communications as a consequence of failing to invoke
    the optional statutory validation procedure.”                  McLaughlin, 
    2014 WL 2883891
    , at *4.             The incongruity of Absolute Collection’s
    interpretation is evident in this case: Russell had no reason to
    challenge the validity of the debt within the first thirty days
    of receiving the initial collection letter because the debt was
    indeed valid.        Instead, she paid the bill and notified Absolute
    Collection of her payment.             It would be inconsistent with the
    FDCPA’s remedial scheme to hold that a plaintiff’s ability to
    state    a   claim    under     the   FDCPA   is     extinguished       because    the
    plaintiff failed to dispute the validity of the debt when he or
    she had no reason to seek validation in the first place.
    17
    Moreover, requiring debtors to dispute their debts as a
    condition to filing suit would produce consequences squarely at
    odds with the FDCPA’s essential purpose of preventing “abusive,
    deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.”                                 
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    (a).         Under      Absolute      Collection’s          construction        of     the
    statute, a debt collector would have free rein to make false or
    deceptive    representations             about      the   status      of   a   debt   if     the
    debtor failed         to    dispute      its   validity         within     thirty     days    of
    receiving      the     initial        collection          letter.          Shielding       debt
    collectors from liability for their falsehoods would thwart the
    statute’s        objective       of      curtailing         abusive        and      deceptive
    collection practices and would contravene the FDCPA’s express
    command that debt collectors be liable for violations of “any
    provision” of the statute.                  
    Id.
     § 1692k (“[A]ny debt collector
    who fails to comply with any provision of th[e] [FDCPA] with
    respect   to     any       person   is    liable       to   such      person     . . .     .”).
    Congress obviously did not intend to immunize debt collectors
    from liability for violations of the FDCPA while concomitantly
    depriving debtors of a remedy under the statute.                                 Indeed, the
    FDCPA’s legislative history suggests that the purpose of the
    validation notice requirement was to “eliminate the recurring
    problem     of     debt      collectors          dunning        the   wrong      person      or
    attempting       to    collect      debts      which      the    consumer      has    already
    18
    paid.”           S.    Rep.    No.     382,   95th   Cong.   at    4    (1977)     (emphasis
    added).
    Finally, contrary to Absolute Collection’s protestations,
    construing the FDCPA as permitting a consumer to bring a civil
    action without first disputing the debt would not drain § 1692g
    of meaning.              The debt validation provisions of § 1692g still
    serve the important purpose of ensuring that consumers receive
    notice of their rights of verification and to dispute the debt.
    See Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 
    943 F.2d 482
    , 484
    (4th Cir. 1991).                 Further, many debtors will prefer to avail
    themselves of the prompt and inexpensive validation procedures
    as an alternative to the costly and time-consuming method of
    filing a claim in federal court.                     Thus, allowing debtors to seek
    relief for violations of § 1692e without disputing their debts
    does not render the statute’s validation procedures superfluous.
    In sum, a pre-suit validation requirement is unfounded in
    the text of the statute, contrary to the remedial nature of the
    FDCPA, and inconsistent with the FDCPA’s legislative purpose of
    eradicating            abusive    collection       practices.          We   therefore    hold
    that    a    debtor       is     not    required     to   dispute      his    or   her   debt
    pursuant to § 1692g as a condition to filing suit under § 1692e.
    Thus,       we        affirm     the    district     court’s      denial      of   Absolute
    Collection’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
    19
    III.
    Absolute    Collection       also    assigns      error     to    the    district
    court’s granting of Russell’s motion for judgment as a matter of
    law on her claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.                        Aside from the
    arguments we have rejected above, Absolute Collection contends
    that Russell was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
    because her claims under § 1692e hinged upon unresolved factual
    issues   that   should     have    been       submitted     to   the       jury.     We
    disagree.
    Section 1692e broadly prohibits debt collectors from making
    “false, deceptive, or misleading” statements in the course of
    their    collection      activities,           and     it      includes        sixteen
    illustrative    examples    of    prohibited         conduct.         In   this    case,
    Russell relied upon three subsections: (1) § 1692e(2)(A), which
    makes it unlawful to misrepresent “the character, amount, or
    legal status of any debt”; (2) § 1692e(8), which prohibits a
    debt collector from “threatening to communicate to any person
    credit information which is known or which should be known to be
    false”; and (3) § 1692e(10), which proscribes “[t]he use of any
    false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to
    collect any debt.”
    Whether a communication is false, misleading, or deceptive
    in violation of § 1692e is determined from the vantage of the
    20
    “least sophisticated consumer.”              United States v. Nat’l Fin.
    Servs., Inc., 
    98 F.3d 131
    , 136 (4th Cir. 1996).                   The least-
    sophisticated-consumer          test   is    an   objective    standard     that
    evaluates § 1692e claims based upon how the least sophisticated
    consumer would interpret the allegedly offensive language.                  See
    Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C., 
    591 F.3d 130
    , 135 (2d Cir.
    2010) (“[The least-sophisticated-consumer test] is an objective
    standard, designed to protect all consumers . . . .”); Barany-
    Snyder v. Weiner, 
    539 F.3d 327
    , 333 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Courts use
    the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ standard, an objective test,
    when assessing whether particular conduct violates the FDCPA.”).
    Although we have never directly addressed whether application of
    the objective least-sophisticated-consumer test to the language
    of a dunning letter is a question of law, we have assumed that
    to be the case.       See Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    98 F.3d at 135-39
    (concluding that the debtor was entitled to summary judgment
    when   the   least     sophisticated        consumer   would   interpret     the
    collection    letter      as    falsely     threatening   legal    action    in
    violation of §       1692e(5), (10)).         We recognize, however, that
    the    decisions     of   our    sister     circuits   that    have   directly
    confronted the issue are not harmonious.                Compare Gonzales v.
    Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 
    660 F.3d 1055
    , 1060-01 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (a debt collector’s liability under § 1692e should be resolved
    21
    as an issue of law), and Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 
    74 F.3d 30
    ,
    36 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), with Gonzalez v. Kay, 
    577 F.3d 600
    ,
    606-07     (5th    Cir.    2009)   (whether     communication      was    false   or
    deceptive in violation of § 1692e is a question of fact for the
    jury), and Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky,
    LLC, 
    518 F.3d 433
    , 441 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).
    Here, we believe that the collection notices are so plainly
    false and misleading that the district court was justified in
    concluding, as a matter of law, that the communications violated
    § 1692e.      The    March    31   dunning    letter     represents      that   “your
    account     with     Sandhills      Emergency       Physicians     has    not   been
    satisfied.”          Upon     receiving       the    collection      letter,      the
    hypothetical       least     sophisticated      consumer       undoubtedly      would
    interpret this statement to mean that the debt remains legally
    due and owing.            Yet, it is undisputed that Russell had fully
    paid her debt with Sandhills at the time Absolute Collection
    sent the demand letter.            A debt collector’s false representation
    of the character or legal status of a debt violates the FDCPA.
    See   15    U.S.C.    § 1692e(2)(A).           Because     the    statement     that
    Russell’s debt “has not been satisfied” is false on its face and
    misrepresents       “the    character,    amount,      [and]     legal   status   of
    [the] debt,” the district court correctly concluded that Russell
    22
    was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for her claim under
    § 1692e(2)(A).
    We further agree with the district court’s determination
    that   the    March      31    dunning     letter      threatened        to   communicate
    “credit information which is known or which should be known to
    be false,” in violation of § 1692e(8), and that in doing so,
    Absolute Collection engaged in a “deceptive means to collect or
    attempt to collect any debt,” in violation of § 1692e(10).                                The
    collection        letter      expresses        Absolute      Collection’s      intent      to
    “report[] [the] past due account to national credit bureaus.”
    The only reasonable interpretation that the least sophisticated
    consumer     could      reach    after      reading       this   statement          is   that
    Absolute Collection was threatening to refer the debt to credit
    bureaus      as    delinquent        if   it     did   not     receive    payment        from
    Russell.          At   the    time   Absolute       Collection     sent       the    letter,
    however, it had in its files documentation of Russell’s oral
    reports that she paid the debt and that the check had cleared
    the bank.         Based upon Russell’s representations to collection
    agents, Absolute Collection knew or should have known that the
    information contained in the letter was false.                           See Clark, 741
    F.3d    at    491      (explaining        that      § 1692e(8)’s    protections           are
    triggered upon a debtor’s oral dispute of the debt).                            Thus, the
    district court correctly determined that, as a matter of law,
    23
    the   March      31   collection        letter       constitutes        a    “threat[]      to
    communicate . . . credit information which is known or which
    should    be    known      to    be   false,”      id.    § 1692e(8),        and   a   “false
    representation        or     deceptive       means       to   collect       or   attempt    to
    collect any debt,” id. § 1692e(10). ∗
    IV.
    We turn next to the district court’s determination that
    Absolute       Collection        violated     the    disclosure         requirements        of
    Federal    Rules        of      Civil   Procedure         26(a)   and        (e)   and     its
    corresponding decision to exclude evidence relevant to Absolute
    Collection’s bona-fide-error defense under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 37.         We review for an abuse of discretion both the
    district       court’s       finding    of   a     disclosure     violation        and     its
    ∗
    Absolute Collection asserts in passing that the district
    court erred in granting Russell’s motion for judgment as a
    matter of law regarding Absolute Collection’s bona-fide-error
    defense, claiming that the jury had sufficient evidence
    (notwithstanding   the  exclusion   of  evidence   pertaining  to
    McKesson)   to find that Absolute Collection’s FDCPA violations
    were the result of a bona fide error.       Absolute Collection’s
    opening brief does not contain any legal argument as to how the
    evidence Absolute Collection submitted at trial could support a
    valid bona-fide-error defense, nor does it include any record
    citations or pertinent legal authority supporting such a claim.
    We deem this perfunctory and undeveloped claim waived.        See
    Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 
    440 F.3d 648
    , 653 n.7 (4th Cir.
    2006) (conclusorily assigning error without providing supporting
    argument is insufficient to raise issue).
    24
    decision   to   exclude    evidence      as    a    discovery     sanction.       See
    Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 
    340 F.3d 187
    , 195 (4th Cir.
    2003); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 
    284 F.3d 505
    , 512 n.10 (4th Cir. 2002).               In doing so, we are mindful of
    the broad discretion accorded to district courts to supervise
    discovery, including the imposition of sanctions for discovery
    abuses, as part of their case-management authority.                      See Saudi
    v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 
    427 F.3d 271
    , 278-79 (4th Cir. 2005).
    Unless stipulated by the parties or otherwise ordered by
    the court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) requires the
    parties to disclose the identities “of each individual likely to
    have discoverable information . . . that the disclosing party
    may use to support its claims or defenses,” as well as “all
    documents . . . that the disclosing party has in its possession,
    custody,   or    control    and   may    use       to   support   its    claims    or
    defenses.”      Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii).                   The purpose
    of Rule 26(a) is to allow the parties to adequately prepare
    their cases for trial and to avoid unfair surprise.                     See Wilkins
    v.   Montgomery,    
    751 F.3d 214
    ,    221       (4th   Cir.   2014).      Under
    Rule 26(e), a party who has made a Rule 26(a) disclosure or
    responded to discovery must provide timely supplementation “if
    the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or
    response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or
    25
    corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the
    other parties during the discovery process or in writing.”                             Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, a party who
    fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)
    or the supplementation requirement of Rule 26(e) “is not allowed
    to   use   that   information         or   witness       to   supply     evidence      on    a
    motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
    substantially        justified       or    is     harmless.”          Fed.   R.   Civ.      P.
    37(c)(1).      In determining whether a party’s non-disclosure is
    substantially        justified        or        harmless,       thereby      excusing        a
    disclosure     violation,        a    district          court    is     guided    by     the
    following factors:
    (1) the surprise to the party against whom the
    evidence would be offered; (2) the ability of that
    party to cure the surprise; (3) the extent to which
    allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial; (4) the
    importance of the evidence; and (5) the nondisclosing
    party’s explanation for its failure to disclose the
    evidence.
    S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 
    318 F.3d 592
    , 597 (4th Cir. 2003).
    Here,    the    district       court      found    that    Absolute     Collection
    violated Rule 26(a) and (e)’s disclosure requirements by failing
    to disclose both the payment reports from McKesson and Pavesi as
    a    witness   during     the    initial          twenty      months    of   litigation.
    26
    Because the belated information revealed a new factual basis for
    Absolute Collection’s bona-fide-error defense and much of the
    information Absolute Collection had either known or should have
    known   throughout      the   initial    discovery     period,    the     district
    court   found    that   Absolute      Collection’s     disclosure       violations
    were neither substantially justified nor harmless.                       Thus, it
    excluded     Pavesi’s     testimony      and     all   evidence        related   to
    McKesson, including the collection payment reports.
    Absolute Collection’s principal argument on appeal—that its
    identification of Pavesi as a witness and its disclosure of the
    McKesson information were timely because they were made during
    the   reopened    discovery    period—cannot         survive    scrutiny.        The
    district court’s January 10 order reopening discovery did not
    authorize the parties to conduct the broad discovery Absolute
    Collection suggests.          To the contrary, the order, by its own
    terms, was limited to information “specifically with respect to
    any procedures that existed between [Absolute Collection] and
    Sandhills . . . requiring notice to [Absolute Collection] of
    payments   made.”       Significantly,         the   January    2011    order    was
    predicated      upon    Absolute      Collection’s      prior    representation
    during the November 2010 pretrial conference that its claim of
    bona fide error was based upon its failure to receive updated
    payment      information       that     Sandhills,       its      client,        was
    27
    contractually obligated to provide.                    The information Absolute
    Collection      produced       during     the    reopened          discovery      period
    relating   to    McKesson,      however,       revealed      a    different       factual
    basis for the bona-fide-error defense altogether.                          Contrary to
    Absolute     Collection’s       assertion,       therefore,         nothing      in     the
    district court’s January 2011 order reopening discovery supports
    Absolute   Collection’s        contention       that   its       belated   disclosures
    were approved by the district court’s decision to reopen limited
    discovery.      See Saudi, 
    427 F.3d at 279
     (“The district court
    should not be a victim of its own lenity, nor should [a party]
    capitalize on his noncompliance with the court’s rules.”).
    It   is    undisputed      that     Absolute       Collection         failed      to
    disclose   Pavesi     as   a    witness    related      to   its     bona-fide-error
    defense    or   the   McKesson     payment       reports     during        the   initial
    discovery period or at any time before the first trial date of
    November 2010 or the second trial date in January 2011.                               Given
    the broad discretion accorded to district courts to supervise
    discovery, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding that Absolute Collection failed to satisfy
    its disclosure obligations under Rules 26(a) and (e).
    We further conclude that the district court acted within
    its   discretion      in   excluding       Absolute       Collection’s           evidence
    relating to its claim of bona fide error to ensure that there
    28
    would   be    no    unfair    surprise      at    trial.      The     district    court
    discussed each of the Southern States factors and reasonably
    concluded that Absolute Collection’s disclosure violations were
    neither substantially justified nor harmless.                         Throughout the
    year and a half of litigation leading up to trial, including
    (1) Absolute Collection’s responses to Russell’s first discovery
    requests in November 2009, (2) its amendment to those responses,
    (3) its initial disclosures in December 2009, (4) its response
    to Russell’s motion for summary judgment, and (5) its pretrial
    disclosures        filed   before     the    anticipated       November       2010    and
    January 2011 trial dates, Absolute Collection failed to identify
    Pavesi—its own employee—as a potential witness or disclose the
    McKesson      payment      reports.         Not    only      was    the    information
    pertaining     to    McKesson       disclosed     to   Russell      just   two   months
    before trial, but the belated discovery materials presented an
    entirely new factual basis as to Absolute Collection’s bona-
    fide-error defense.           Given the advanced stage of the litigation
    and   the    significance      of    the    evidence    to    Russell’s       case,   the
    district court justifiably concluded that the late disclosures
    were not harmless.            See NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng’g Co., 
    227 F.3d 776
    , 786 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding harm when disclosure was
    made after the district court postponed the trial date once and
    trial   was    set    to     begin    in    six   weeks).          Further,    Absolute
    29
    Collection has failed to provide any justification—much less a
    substantially justified one—for the late disclosures.               Without
    any   legitimate   reason   for   the    disclosure   violations,    we   are
    unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion
    in excluding the evidence under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure.
    V.
    Last, Absolute Collection appeals the denial of its motions
    for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and for
    relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    60(b).     Because Absolute Collection’s assignments of error with
    respect to its post-trial motions rest upon identical arguments
    rejected above, we affirm the district court’s denial of those
    motions.
    VI.
    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
    judgment of the district court in its entirety.
    AFFIRMED
    30