United States v. Kendrick Lewis , 606 F. App'x 121 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4954
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KENDRICK LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:14-cr-00139-D-1)
Submitted: June 16, 2015 Decided: June 30, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Robert E. Waters,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Carrie D. Randa, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kendrick Lewis pled guilty to two counts of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). He
was sentenced to 57 months on each count, to run concurrently.
Lewis now appeals, claiming that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a sentence “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” See Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 41 (2007). When reviewing for substantive
reasonableness, we “examine[] the totality of the circumstances
to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
concluding that the sentence . . . satisfied the standards set
forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) [(2012)].” United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the
sentence is within the correctly calculated Guidelines range, as
it is here, we may apply a presumption on appeal that the
sentence is substantively reasonable. Id. This presumption is
rebutted only if the defendant shows “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court stated at sentencing that it had
considered the arguments of counsel, Lewis’ statement to the
court, the Guidelines range, and all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
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(2012) factors. The court was particularly troubled by Lewis’
criminal history, noting that his criminal activity seemed to be
escalating. The court also was concerned about the likelihood
of recidivism and stated that the selected sentence was intended
to have have a deterrent effect. The court additionally noted
the serious nature of the firearm offenses and adequately
addressed Lewis’ troubled childhood.
We conclude that the sentence is substantively reasonable
and that Lewis failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
we accord his within-Guidelines sentence. Accordingly, we
affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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