United States v. Dennis Howard , 773 F.3d 519 ( 2014 )


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  •                                 PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4296
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DENNIS RAY HOWARD,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 13-4299
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DENNIS RAY HOWARD, a/k/a D,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.     James C. Dever III,
    Chief District Judge. (5:97-cr-00098-D-1; 5:12-cr-00009-D-1)
    Argued:   September 17, 2014                Decided:   December 4, 2014
    Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Judgment in No. 13-4296 affirmed in part, and vacated and
    remanded in part; appeal in No. 13-4299 dismissed by published
    opinion.   Senior Judge Davis wrote the opinion, in which Judge
    Motz and Judge Diaz joined.
    ARGUED:   Robert  Lonnie   Cooper,   COOPER,  DAVIS   &  COOPER,
    Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellant.     Yvonne Victoria
    Watford-McKinney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.      ON BRIEF: Thomas G. Walker,
    United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United
    States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    2
    DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:
    In appeal No. 13-4296, a jury convicted Dennis Ray Howard
    on one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
    to    distribute         a    controlled        substance,       phencyclidine        (“PCP”),
    nine counts of distribution of PCP, and one count of possession
    of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The
    district court sentenced Howard to a term of life imprisonment
    plus    60        months.    In    appeal       No.    13-4299,    the     court    imposed    a
    consecutive sentence of 60 months for violation of supervised
    release arising from the convictions in appeal No. 13-4296.
    Howard noted timely appeals from both judgments, but he has
    abandoned his appeal of the revocation sentence in No. 13-4299,
    which        we    dismiss.        As     to    the    drug    trafficking         appeal,    he
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of
    his     convictions          and        the    substantive       reasonableness       of     his
    sentence.          For   the      reasons       set    forth     within,    we     affirm    the
    convictions, vacate the sentence as substantively unreasonable,
    and remand for resentencing.
    I.
    A.
    In        September       2010,        Wilson,    North      Carolina        narcotics
    investigator Jason Corprew was investigating drug activity at a
    residence           on   Black      Creek        Road     when     he    learned      from    a
    3
    confidential informant, C.B. 1, that Howard, or “D” as he was
    commonly known, sold C.B. a “dipper” from the residence. Dippers
    are cigarettes that are saturated in PCP. Over the course of the
    next month, C.B., along with another informant, A.B., returned
    to the Black Creek Road residence at the direction of Corprew to
    make several controlled purchases of PCP from Howard. All told,
    the informants purchased PCP from Howard, either together or
    individually, six times between September 20 and October 13,
    2010. A third confidential informant, A.I., participated in two
    controlled purchases of PCP from Howard in 2011. At the first
    transaction, a middle man for Howard, Desmond Farmer, delivered
    a one-ounce vial of PCP to A.I. on Howard’s behalf. At the
    second     transaction,    however,     Howard   personally    delivered     two
    vials of PCP to A.I.
    The controlled purchases continued with the assistance of
    T.W. In May 2011, Wilson Police arrested T.W. on drug charges.
    T.W. agreed to assist Corprew in the investigation of Howard,
    and   arranged   to   purchase    one    ounce   of   PCP   from   him.   Howard
    agreed to bring the PCP to T.W.’s house. Surveillance officers
    at    Howard’s   house    on   Vick   Street     observed   him    leaving   the
    1
    We have withheld the full names of the confidential
    informants and government cooperators in this case in accordance
    with recent guidance issued by the Judicial Conference Committee
    on Court Administration and Case Management.
    4
    residence and driving to T.W.’s house, talking to a woman who
    answered        the        door,      and      returning        to     his    vehicle.         Shortly
    thereafter, a Wilson police officer conducted a traffic stop of
    Howard’s        car    and       he    detected        the     odor    of    PCP.    A       search    of
    Howard’s car revealed a glass vial containing one ounce of PCP.
    Officers placed Howard under arrest and then obtained a search
    warrant for Howard’s home, where he lived with his girlfriend.
    Officers found a loaded pistol with one round in the chamber and
    a box of ammunition in the living room. In an adjoining den,
    officers        found        an       operational        police        scanner,      an        envelope
    bearing Howard’s name and address that contained black plastic
    caps   of       the   type        used      in   the     sale    of    PCP,    and       a    piece    of
    cardboard         with       a        description         of     vial        containers         and    a
    “discountvial.com” web address. Officers did not find any PCP
    during their search of Howard’s home.
    B.
    On January 17, 2012, a federal grand jury in the Eastern
    District        of    North        Carolina        returned      a     nine-count            indictment
    against     Howard.          Count       One     charged       Howard       with    conspiracy        to
    distribute           and     possess        with       intent     to     distribute           PCP,    in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Counts Two through Seven and Count
    Nine charged Howard with distribution of PCP, in violation of 21
    U.S.C.      §    841(a).          Count     Eight       similarly       charged      Howard          with
    distribution of PCP, and aiding and abetting another to do the
    5
    same.      On   September       25,    2012,     the   grand     jury    returned      a
    superseding indictment, which retained the original charges and
    added two new charges: an additional count of distribution of
    PCP   in    violation     of    21     U.S.C.    §   841(a),    and    one    count   of
    possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
    offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Prior to trial, the
    Government filed a notice of intent to seek an enhanced penalty
    based on Howard’s previous convictions in state court in North
    Carolina of felony drug offenses.
    Trial began on October 15, 2012. Investigator Corprew, two
    confidential informants, and T.W. testified to the controlled
    purchases,      some    of     which    were    recorded   by    audio       and   video
    surveillance.      Four      cooperating        individuals     also    testified     to
    their previous PCP drug dealing with Howard. 2 At the close of the
    2
    One individual, Q.S. testified that, beginning in January
    2010, he visited Howard’s home at least once a week over the
    course of five months to purchase vials of PCP.
    D.W. and R.W. were coconspirators of Howard but were
    indicted together in a separate case, entered into plea
    agreements, and testified against Howard. They explained how the
    PCP drug trade in Wilson operated. D.W. testified that he, R.W.,
    and Howard shared the same PCP supplier in Washington, D.C. D.W.
    also testified that, given the relatively few PCP dealers in
    Wilson, when his supply of PCP was depleted, he would refer
    customers to Howard. On several occasions, D.W. and Howard
    purchased PCP directly from one another, rather than from their
    shared Washington, D.C. supplier. D.W. also admitted to
    participating in PCP deals with Howard at Howard’s home. R.W.
    testified to his practice of “cutting” or diluting his PCP
    supply with olive oil. Customers in search of a more potent
    (Continued)
    6
    evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts in
    the superseding indictment. On October 22, 2012, Howard timely
    renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29
    of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.             The district court
    denied the motion.
    C.
    During the above events, Howard was on supervised release
    based      on   a   1997    federal   narcotics   trafficking    conviction.
    Accordingly, in January 2013, Howard’s probation officer filed
    an amended petition for revocation of supervised release based
    on   the     instant     convictions.    Thereafter,   the   district    judge
    conducted Howard’s sentencing and revocation hearings.
    The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) for the new
    drug       trafficking     convictions   originally    recommended   a   base
    offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of III,
    which equated to a Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months. 3 As the
    Government had filed a notice of enhanced sentence pursuant to
    21 U.S.C. § 851, however, the enhanced Guidelines range was 120
    product would purchase PCP from Howard. In an effort to redirect
    business back to himself, R.W. would purchase unadulterated PCP
    from Howard for resale.
    3
    There is no dispute that on Count Eleven, the gun count, a
    mandatory sentence of 60 months consecutive to the sentence on
    the conspiracy and drug trafficking counts would be imposed as
    required under the applicable statute.
    7
    months, the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. The Government
    also objected to the drug weight described in the PSR, pointing
    to some of the anecdotal testimony of other drug deals from some
    of its trial witnesses. The district court agreed that the drug
    weight in the PSR underestimated the amount of PCP within the
    realm of relevant conduct, and adopted an increased drug weight,
    which bumped Howard’s base offense level from 26 to 28, slightly
    modifying the Guidelines range to 120 to 121 months. 4
    The   district    court       next       considered     whether    to    depart
    upwardly,    a    possibility      the     court    had     previously    expressed
    pursuant    to    Federal    Rule    of     Criminal      Procedure     32(h).    The
    Government argued that under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1), an upward
    departure    was    warranted       because        Howard’s    criminal       history
    category (III) substantially underrepresented the seriousness of
    his   criminal    history.    It    requested       an    upward   departure     to   a
    criminal history category of VI, which, at an offense level of
    28, yielded a sentencing range on the drug trafficking counts of
    140   to    175    months.    Thus,        in    its     initial    allocution        at
    sentencing, the Government urged the district court to impose a
    sentence within that Guidelines range.
    4
    Hereafter, we treat Howard’s final Guidelines calculation
    on the drug trafficking counts, with grouping and before the
    departure, as offense level 28, criminal history category III.
    8
    The district court was not satisfied. It elected to analyze
    Howard as       a    “de   facto”     career    offender   and   thereby   consider
    Howard’s otherwise stale (and thus unscored) prior convictions.
    In so doing, the court arrived at a criminal history category of
    VI   and   an       offense   level    of   37.   After    following   the   Career
    Offender Guidelines, the district court arrived at a sentencing
    range of 420 months to life for the conspiracy charge in Count
    One, and a range of 360 months to life for the substantive
    charges in Counts Two through Ten, which carried a statutory
    maximum of 360 months. 5
    5
    The district court then suggested that it was proper to
    add “the 60 months consecutive” for Count Eleven (“the gun
    count”) on top of the “420 months to life on count 1 and [the]
    360 months on counts 2 through 10.” J.A. 725. This suggestion
    was erroneous, however, because § 4B1.1(c) of the Sentencing
    Guidelines already factors in a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
    924(c) (“the gun count”) in prescribing the appropriate career
    offender guideline range.   Section 5G1.2 of the Guidelines and
    the accompanying application notes then provide instructions on
    how to apportion a career offender sentence to ensure that the
    sentence complies with all statutory minimums. For instance, if
    the district court here had selected a sentence of 420 months,
    360 months would have been apportioned to Count 1 (the
    conspiracy count) and 60 months would have been apportioned to
    Count 11 (the gun count) to comply with the requirements of 18
    U.S.C. § 924(c).   See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 app. n.4(B)(i).    It is
    impossible,   however,   to   subtract   a   mandatory  60-month
    consecutive sentence from a sentence of life in prison.      The
    district court’s sentence in this case - life in prison plus 60
    months - was therefore consistent with the Guidelines.
    9
    The district court next considered the § 3553(a) factors
    and concluded that Howard deserved the maximum sentence of life
    in prison:
    I do think for all the reasons outlined under the 3553
    (a) factors, the nature and circumstances of the
    offense, these 11 very serious offenses, the history
    and   characteristics  of   this  defendant  and   the
    unrelenting, unrepenting, unreformed drug dealing,
    society needs to be protected. He needs to be
    incapacitated. People need to be deterred. There needs
    to be just punishment. There needs to be serious
    consequences for serious crimes.
    J.A. 737-38. 6 The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment
    on Count One, 360 months imprisonment (concurrent) for Counts
    Two through Ten, and 60 months (consecutive) for Count Eleven.
    It also stated that, in the alternative, it would impose the
    same sentence as an alternative variant sentence.
    At the subsequent hearing on the petition for revocation of
    supervised   release,   the   court    revoked   supervised   release   and
    sentenced Howard to the maximum possible sentence: 60 months
    imprisonment    consecutive     to     the   sentences    for    his    new
    convictions. Thus, Howard is now serving a consolidated sentence
    of life plus 120 months. As we have mentioned, although Howard
    timely appealed both judgments, he has abandoned the appeal of
    his supervised release revocation sentence.
    6
    Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
    by the parties in this appeal.
    10
    II.
    Howard presents two issues. First, we consider his argument
    that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment
    of    acquittal    because       the    evidence       presented       at    trial     was
    insufficient      to    support   his       convictions.    Second,         pursuant    to
    supplemental briefing ordered nostre sponte by this Court, we
    consider   whether       the    district      court    imposed     a    substantively
    unreasonable sentence. We address each issue in turn.
    A.
    Howard contends that the evidence presented at trial was
    insufficient      as    a     matter    of    law     to   sustain      each    of     his
    convictions.      For    purposes      of    our    analysis,    we     have     grouped
    Howard’s distribution convictions together and will discuss the
    sufficiency of the evidence for the conspiracy, distribution,
    and firearm convictions separately.
    We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for
    judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
    of Criminal Procedure, de novo. United States v. Smith, 
    451 F.3d 209
    , 216 (4th Cir. 2006). In its assessment of a challenge to
    the    sufficiency      of     evidence,      a     reviewing    court       views     the
    evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
    decide[s] whether ‘substantial evidence’ supports the verdict.”
    United States v. Jeffers, 
    570 F.3d 557
    , 565 (4th Cir. 2009)
    (quoting   
    Smith, 451 F.3d at 216
    ).    Substantial          evidence    is
    11
    “evidence       that       a    reasonable         finder      of   fact          could    accept    as
    adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
    guilt    beyond        a       reasonable       doubt.”        
    Smith, 451 F.3d at 216
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    We begin our analysis with Count One, which charged that
    Howard conspired to distribute and possess with the intent to
    distribute       100        grams       or     more      of    a    mixture          or    substance
    containing a detectable amount of PCP. Howard contends that the
    Government failed to establish evidence that he was aware of, or
    agreed    to    participate            in,     a    conspiracy.          He       argues    that    the
    Government made no showing of mutual trust, standard dealings,
    or   drug      fronting         between        himself        and   any       coconspirator.         We
    disagree.
    To establish a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the
    government must prove that “(1) [the defendant] entered into an
    agreement with one or more persons to engage in conduct that
    violated 21 U.S.C. §[] 841(a)(1). . . ; (2) that [the defendant]
    had knowledge of that conspiracy; and (3) that [the defendant]
    knowingly       and        voluntarily          participated         in       the     conspiracy.”
    United States v. Mastrapa, 
    509 F.3d 652
    , 657 (4th Cir. 2007).
    Given the “clandestine and covert” nature of conspiracies, the
    government       can           prove     the       existence        of        a     conspiracy       by
    circumstantial evidence alone. United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    ,     857    (4th        Cir.       1996)       (en   banc).      A        mere    buyer-seller
    12
    relationship is insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction.
    United States v. Hackley, 
    662 F.3d 671
    , 679 (4th Cir. 2011).
    However, such evidence “‘is at least relevant (i.e. probative)
    on the issue of whether a conspiratorial relationship exists.’”
    
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Mills, 
    995 F.2d 480
    , 485 n.1 (4th
    Cir.    1993)).       “[E]vidence           of        continuing         relationships         and
    repeated transactions can support the finding that there was a
    conspiracy, especially when coupled with substantial quantities
    of drugs.” United States v. Reid, 
    523 F.3d 310
    , 317 (4th Cir.
    2008) (citing 
    Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858
    ).
    Against     this     legal         framework,         we     do    not    hesitate       to
    conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence to
    support the conspiracy conviction. Several witnesses testified
    to    Howard’s     role     in      the    PCP        drug    trade      in     Wilson,    North
    Carolina. Howard and D.W. sourced PCP from the same Washington,
    D.C. supplier. When D.W.’s supply of PCP was exhausted, he would
    refer       customers     to     Howard.         Howard,       in     turn,      would     refer
    customers to D.W. when his own supply was low. At times, both
    men purchased PCP from one another when traveling to D.C. was
    inopportune.       Howard      also       sold    PCP    to       frequent      customers       who
    often resold the drugs. A.I. testified that she regularly sold
    PCP    in    Wilson   and      at   times    she       replenished         her    supply       from
    Howard,      her   “local      source.”      J.A.       285.      R.W.    testified       to    his
    practice of selling low-quality PCP before purchasing potent PCP
    13
    from Howard in an effort to regain customers. Taken together,
    this evidence demonstrated that Howard was part of a “loosely-
    knit association of members linked only by their mutual interest
    in sustaining the overall enterprise of catering to the ultimate
    demands of a particular drug consumption market” in the Wilson
    area.    United         States       v.    Banks,       
    10 F.3d 1044
    ,     1054        (4th   Cir.
    1993). Accordingly, the jury’s verdict as to Count One is amply
    supported.
    B.
    Turning         to    the    distribution            convictions         in      Counts     Two
    through Ten, we also find that the Government’s evidence was
    sufficient         to    sustain          the    convictions.         Howard        merely    states,
    without explanation, that his motion for judgment of acquittal
    as to the distribution convictions should have been granted.
    While such a passing, conclusory assertion is “insufficient to
    raise    on    appeal          any    merits-based           challenge         to     the    district
    court’s ruling[,]” see Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 
    440 F.3d 648
    , 653 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006), we nevertheless briefly address
    the abundance of evidence demonstrating Howard’s guilt.
    To    prove          that     a     defendant         distributed            a     controlled
    substance          in        violation          of     21    U.S.C.       §    841(a)(1),          “the
    prosecution         is        obliged      to        prove   ‘that       (1)    [the]       defendant
    knowingly or intentionally distributed the controlled substance
    alleged       in    the        indictment,            and    (2)    at    the       time     of    such
    14
    distribution the defendant knew that the substance distributed
    was a controlled substance under the law.’” United States v.
    Alerre,   
    430 F.3d 681
    ,    689     (4th          Cir.    2005)      (alteration          in
    original) (quoting United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 
    18 F.3d 1132
    , 1137 (4th Cir. 1994)).
    The Government presented evidence of controlled purchases
    between Howard and several others, including two confidential
    informants and a cooperating individual. C.B. purchased dippers
    and one ounce of PCP from Howard. A.I. directly purchased PCP
    from Howard on one occasion, and Howard personally delivered an
    ounce of PCP to T.W.’s home. Count Eight further charged Howard
    with   aiding    and     abetting   the      distribution            of    PCP,    which        the
    Government established by virtue of A.I.’s testimony that she
    purchased PCP through Howard’s middle man, Desmond Farmer. The
    Government’s evidence is plainly sufficient as to Counts Two
    through Ten, and we discern no infirmity in the jury’s verdicts.
    C.
    We next turn to Count Eleven, which charged that Howard
    “knowingly      possessed     a     firearm         in     furtherance            of     a   drug
    trafficking offense . . . in violation of Title 18 United States
    Code   924(c).”    J.A.     68.   In    order       to    convict         Howard       of    Count
    Eleven,    the    prosecution          was        required      to        prove        beyond    a
    reasonable doubt that Howard “(1) used, carried, or possessed a
    firearm   (2)     in     furtherance         of     a    drug    trafficking             crime.”
    15
    
    Jeffers, 570 F.3d at 565
    (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). In
    United States v. Lomax, 
    293 F.3d 701
    (4th Cir. 2002), we defined
    the statutory term “furtherance” in § 924(c) as “the act of
    furthering, advancing, or helping 
    forward.” 293 F.3d at 705
    .
    Thus, we concluded that § 924(c) “requires the government to
    present evidence indicating that the possession of a firearm
    furthered,       advanced,      or    helped        forward    a     drug      trafficking
    crime.”   
    Id. Whether the
       firearm       served     such      a     purpose,    we
    explained, is a factual inquiry. 
    Id. Factors that
    could lead a
    fact finder to conclude that a defendant possessed a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug crime include: “the type of drug activity
    that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type
    of   weapon,     whether      the    weapon    is    stolen,       the   status     of    the
    possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded,
    proximity      to     drugs     or    drug     profits,        and       the     time     and
    circumstances under which the gun is found.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    The evidence adduced by the Government here crosses the
    threshold from minimal to legally sufficient. Officers found a
    loaded pistol with a round in the chamber and ammunition in the
    living    room      of   Howard’s      residence.        In    the       adjoining       den,
    officers found a working police scanner and plastic vial caps.
    The Government also established, from the testimony of Q.S. and
    D.W., that Howard often sold PCP from the shed on his property.
    16
    While officers did not find drugs in Howard’s home at the time
    of   the   search,    the   theory    that      the   presence    of    the   firearm
    served to protect Howard from a potential theft of his drugs or
    profits is nevertheless a plausible one. See 
    Lomax, 293 F.3d at 705
    .
    The firearm was readily accessible to Howard; it was hidden
    beneath a couch cushion in the living room. The ammunition was
    stored nearby in the couch’s center console. The firearm and
    drug paraphernalia were also in close proximity to one other, as
    they were found in adjoining rooms. Drawing from the evidence of
    black plastic caps and the cardboard with the “discountvial.com”
    web address and vial description, a rational jury could conclude
    beyond     a   reasonable     doubt   that      Howard   used    the    firearm    to
    protect his drug trafficking operation. It may be that, at the
    time of the search, Howard’s supply of PCP was low or exhausted,
    and that he was preparing for a new supply; this might explain
    the absence      of   drugs   in   the    residence.     But     such   speculative
    hypotheticals have no role to play in our sufficiency appraisal.
    For these reasons, we decline to find error in the district
    court’s denial of Howard’s motion for judgment of acquittal as
    to Count Eleven.
    III.
    Having affirmed Howard’s convictions, we now decide whether
    the sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable.
    17
    A.
    We review the reasonableness of a sentencing decision under
    an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Heath, 
    559 F.3d 263
    ,    266    (4th        Cir.    2009).       “This    standard       of    review
    encompasses        both        procedural       and    substantive       reasonableness.”
    United      States       v.    Myers,    
    589 F.3d 117
    ,    123   (4th     Cir.    2009)
    (citation omitted). A district court commits procedural error
    when,       for    example,         it   fails        to   calculate        (or    improperly
    calculates)        the        Guidelines      range,       fails    to   consider        the    §
    3553(a)       factors,         or     selects     a     sentence     based        on    clearly
    erroneous facts. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).
    Howard      does    not       claim    that    the    district      court    committed         any
    procedural error, and we agree with that assessment. 7 Our review
    of Howard’s sentence, therefore, is limited only to substantive
    reasonableness.
    A review for substantive reasonableness takes into account
    the “totality of the circumstances.” 
    Id. As part
    of this review,
    we consider
    the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range .
    . . [I]f the sentence is outside the Guidelines range,
    7
    As we explained at 
    n.5, supra
    , the district court’s
    misstatement of the proper method for factoring in an 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(c) conviction under the Career Offender Guidelines did not
    affect the sentence the court chose to impose in this case.
    18
    the   court   may   not    apply   a   presumption  of
    unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the
    deviation, but must give due deference to the district
    court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
    whole, justify the extent of the variance.
    
    Id. If the
    district court deviates from the Guidelines range and
    provides two or more independent rationales for its deviation,
    the appellate court cannot declare the sentence unreasonable if
    it finds fault with only one of the rationales. United States v.
    Evans,   
    526 F.3d 155
    ,   165    (4th       Cir.    2008).    Such    an   approach
    “would   be        wholly    inconsistent            with      the   Supreme      Court's
    directives to examine the totality of the circumstances, and to
    defer to the considered judgment of the district court.” 
    Id. B. The
    district court reached its life imprisonment sentence
    by making an upward departure based on Howard’s de facto career
    offender status, and by reasoning that the § 3553(a) factors
    supported      a    sentence     at     the        top    of   the   Guidelines      range
    determined after the departure. Because we are persuaded that
    the extent of the upward departure is unwarranted and amounts to
    an abuse of discretion, and because, in any event, a sentence of
    life in prison on this record is not justified by consideration
    of the § 3553(a) factors as articulated by the district court,
    we   conclude        that    the       sentence          imposed     is     substantively
    unreasonable.
    19
    1.
    Howard’s       original         Guidelines       range      called    for       120-121
    months of imprisonment, plus a consecutive 60 months for the
    firearm offense. The district court made an upward departure and
    treated Howard as a de facto career offender, which resulted in
    an increase from criminal history category III to VI, and an
    increase from a base offense level of 28 to 37.
    Section        4B1.1(a)       of     the    Guidelines        provides          that     a
    defendant is a career offender if: (1) the defendant was at
    least eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the
    instant   offense         of   conviction;       (2)     the     instant       offense       of
    conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a
    controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has been
    convicted    of     two    prior     crimes,      each      of   which    was    a    felony
    conviction     of    either      a      crime    of    violence     or     a    controlled
    substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A district court may
    depart directly to the career offender Guideline range when the
    defendant’s       criminal     history      demonstrates         that     the    defendant
    would be sentenced as a career offender “but for the fact that
    one or both of the predicate convictions may not be counted.”
    United States v. Cash, 
    983 F.2d 558
    , 562 (4th Cir. 1992). Thus,
    de   facto    career       offender       status       is    permissible        when        the
    defendant has been convicted of two prior crimes, each of which
    constitutes a career offender predicate offense. Myers, 
    589 F.3d 20
    at 126. While the de facto career offender doctrine is settled
    law    in    the     Fourth   Circuit,        see    
    Cash, 983 F.2d at 562
    ,    the
    district court’s departure to de facto career offender status in
    this case resulted in a sentencing range — and, ultimately, an
    actual sentence — that was “greater than necessary” to achieve
    the purposes of federal sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see
    also Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 350 (2007) (explaining
    that the Guidelines seek to embody § 3553(a) factors and that
    they       reflect    “a   rough       approximation        of    sentences    that     might
    achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives”).
    “When       reviewing       a    departure,         we    consider     whether      the
    sentencing         court   acted       reasonably         both    with   respect    to     its
    decision      to     impose   such      a    sentence      and    with   respect      to   the
    extent       of    the   divergence         from    the    sentencing     range.”     United
    States v. McNeill, 
    598 F.3d 161
    , 166 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d on other grounds,
    
    131 S. Ct. 2218
    (2011). 8 An upward departure may be warranted if
    8
    We have recognized that our deferential reasonableness
    review of sentences is the same whether the district court
    departed within the formal strictures of the Sentencing
    Guidelines or, instead, imposed a variant sentence outside the
    explicit boundaries of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States
    v. Hargrove, 
    701 F.3d 156
    , 160 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012); United
    States v. Diosdado–Star, 
    630 F.3d 359
    , 365 (4th Cir. 2011).
    Thus, in this case, the district court’s explanation that it
    would have imposed the same sentence as a variant sentence even
    if it were determined that its upward departure to the career
    offender guideline was an abuse of discretion does not alter our
    (Continued)
    21
    “reliable   information        indicates     that   the    defendant’s        criminal
    history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness
    of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the
    defendant will commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). A
    district court may base an upward departure pursuant to § 4A1.3
    on a defendant’s prior convictions, even if those convictions
    are too old to be counted in the calculation of the Guidelines
    range. See § 4A1.2(e) (describing the applicable time period for
    calculating prior sentences).
    Howard’s conviction in 1997 for conspiracy to distribute
    and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base
    undoubtedly     qualified      for   calculation.      Howard       was   twenty-five
    years old when he was convicted, and he served more than ten
    years in prison. The district court found that three otherwise
    stale convictions, incurred by Howard from 1990 and earlier,
    justified      its   qualification      of    Howard      as   a    virtual    career
    offender. In 1988, at the age of sixteen, Howard pled guilty to
    two   counts    of   selling    cocaine      to   an   undercover         officer.   He
    served approximately four months in prison. In 1990, at the age
    of eighteen, Howard pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter
    and served nine months in prison and one additional month after
    analysis of the substantive            reasonableness          of   Howard’s     life-
    plus-sixty-months sentence.
    22
    his    parole    was    revoked         for   technical      violations.         While    the
    inclusion of Howard’s prior convictions in the calculation of
    the Guidelines range has raised no procedural error, it resulted
    in a range that was nothing short of extreme.
    2.
    The district court’s decision to upwardly depart rested
    heavily    on     our     Myers     decision,        which     the        district   court
    concluded was “almost on all fours.” J.A. 718. We disagree with
    that   characterization.           In    Myers,     we   rejected     the       defendant’s
    argument    that        his   sentence        was    substantively             unreasonable
    because the district court made an upward departure based on his
    outdated    predicate         convictions.          Only     one     of    Myers’s       four
    predicate convictions had been counted in his PSR, and but for
    the dates of his earlier convictions, and an intervening term of
    imprisonment, Myers would have qualified as a career offender.
    Similarly, here, Howard would have been classified as a
    career offender had his juvenile convictions for the sale of
    cocaine    and    voluntary        manslaughter       not    been    outdated.       Myers,
    however,        displayed      a        consistent         pattern        of    recidivism
    immediately upon release from prison, and an offense for which
    Myers was convicted involved conspiracy to distribute cocaine
    base with an eighteen-year-old female. Most of Howard’s serial
    convictions occurred between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.
    23
    After Howard’s release from prison in June 2008, he held steady
    employment for more than a year.
    The     facts        of     the        present          case     are      also    readily
    distinguishable from those in United States v. Lawrence, 
    349 F.3d 724
       (4th       Cir.    2003),       and    Cash,       in    which    we     similarly
    affirmed decisions by district courts to depart upward on the
    basis    of    de   facto        career       offender         status.    In     Lawrence,    the
    district court determined that an upward departure of one level
    in the criminal history category did not reflect the seriousness
    of Lawrence’s past criminal conduct. The court concluded that
    Lawrence was a de facto career offender, in part, because two of
    his     qualifying        predicate           convictions         were     consolidated       for
    sentencing       purposes.        Lawrence’s          criminal         history    was    violent,
    and    quite   dissimilar          to    Howard’s          record.      While     Lawrence   and
    Howard    share       a    lengthy       juvenile         record,       Lawrence’s       juvenile
    convictions consisted largely of thefts and assaults. Lawrence
    hardly       ever     completed          parole           or    probation        successfully.
    Furthermore,        Lawrence       attempted          a    jail       break    and    carjacking
    while en route to prison, and he admitted to committing two
    other bank robberies for which he was never convicted.
    The defendant in Cash challenged his upward departure on
    the     ground      that         one     of     his        predicate          convictions     was
    constitutionally invalid. We concluded that the district court
    was free to consider a constitutionally invalid conviction as
    24
    evidence     of     the    defendant’s      prior       criminal      conduct      for   the
    purpose      of    determining       the    extent       of     a    departure.      Cash’s
    criminal history included a remarkable number of forty prior
    adult convictions over a seventeen-year period, a far cry from
    Howard’s criminal record.
    An    additional       point   is    worth       noting.       Despite   the    grave
    criminal records that Myers, Lawrence, and Cash had in common,
    not one of those defendants was sentenced to life in prison as a
    result of an upward departure to the career offender Guideline.
    The district court sentenced Myers to 360 months imprisonment;
    Lawrence’s sentence was a total of 262 months of imprisonment;
    and    the        district    court        sentenced          Cash     to    210     months
    imprisonment.        These   sentences       pale      in   comparison       to    Howard’s
    sentence of life imprisonment plus 60 months. Cf. United States
    v.    Abu    Ali,     
    528 F.3d 210
    ,       261     (4th       Cir.    2008)(“[W]hen
    determining whether the district court’s proffered justification
    for    imposing        a     non-guidelines            sentence       is    sufficiently
    compelling to support the degree of the variance, common sense
    dictates that a major departure should be supported by a more
    significant justification than a minor one.”) (internal citation
    and quotations omitted).
    3.
    We acknowledge that Howard would never be mistaken for a
    model citizen, but we cannot ignore the fact that most of his
    25
    serious criminal convictions occurred when he was eighteen years
    old or younger. Two convictions, when Howard was seventeen years
    old,    involved     providing      fictitious         information        to      a    police
    officer.    Howard’s        other   juvenile         convictions        include         second
    degree    trespass     and    possession       of    cocaine.       Three      convictions
    that Howard received as an adult are related to driving without
    a license or driving while his license was revoked. The facts
    presented   here      are    thus   distinct        from    those    in     our       relevant
    circuit precedent.
    The district court abused its discretion by focusing too
    heavily on Howard’s juvenile criminal history in its evaluation
    of    whether   it    was    appropriate       to    treat       Howard     as    a    career
    offender and in its weighing of the § 3553(a) factors after
    having done so. An appellate court owes “due deference” to a
    district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors, and mere
    disagreement with the sentence below is “insufficient to justify
    reversal of the district court.” 
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    . A review
    for    substantive        reasonableness,           however,      “demands        that        we
    proceed    beyond     a   formalistic     review       of    whether       the        district
    court recited and reviewed the § 3553(a) factors and ensure that
    the    sentence      caters    to   the    individual            circumstances          of    a
    defendant, yet retains a semblance of consistency with similarly
    situated    defendants.”       
    Evans, 526 F.3d at 167
        (Gregory,          J.,
    concurring).
    26
    Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall, this Court has,
    on     rare      occasion,             found      a     district        court’s     sentence
    substantively unreasonable. In United States v. Engle, 
    592 F.3d 495
    (4th Cir. 2010), we vacated a district court’s sentence of
    four years probation for a defendant convicted of tax evasion
    because we could not glean from the district court’s decision
    why it failed to impose a term of imprisonment as recommended by
    the Guidelines. We also addressed the substantive component of
    the sentence and noted that the district court committed error
    by its “near-exclusive focus on Engle’s financial ability to pay
    restitution.” 
    Engle, 592 F.3d at 504
    . We noted that “[i]t may
    well    be     that     in    many       cases,       the    sentencing     decision        will
    ultimately turn on a single § 3553(a) factor.” 
    Id. However, we
    viewed the district court’s rationale of declining a term of
    imprisonment      based        solely       on    the   defendant’s       ability      to    pay
    restitution as a “constitutionally suspect” ground. 
    Id. at 505.
    Here,    too,     the      district       court      focused     extensively      on    a
    single factor — Howard’s early criminal history — and it did so
    at   the      expense    of       a    reasoned        analysis    of     other   pertinent
    factors.       “Sentencing            courts     remain      obligated      not   to    ‘give
    excessive       weight       to       any   relevant        factor’   and    to   impose      a
    sentence ‘which effect[s] a fair and just result in light of the
    relevant facts and law.’” United States v. Tucker, 
    473 F.3d 556
    ,
    562 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 27
    449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Hampton,
    
    441 F.3d 284
    (4th Cir. 2006) (vacating defendant’s sentence as
    unreasonable       because        the        district   court      relied    on   only   one
    aspect of one § 3553(a) factor).
    The district court began its discussion of the § 3553(a)
    factors    by    discussing            the    “nature   and     circumstances”      of   the
    offense and “history and circumstances of the defendant.” J.A.
    733. The court ticked through the instant offenses of conviction
    and stated that it understood the difficult circumstances in
    which    Howard       was    reared.         J.A.    733.   The    district   court      then
    summarized Howard’s criminal record, labeling it as “robust.”
    J.A. 733. As we have described, Howard received most of his
    convictions       when      he    was    eighteen       years     old   or   younger.     The
    Supreme Court has recognized, in the sentencing context, the
    diminished culpability of juvenile offenders, given their lack
    of maturity, vulnerability to social pressures, and malleable
    identities. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    , 2464
    (2012) (holding that a state sentencing scheme that mandated
    life without parole for offenders under the age of eighteen at
    the     time    the      offense         was     committed        violates    the   Eighth
    Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 68 (2010) (adhering
    to Roper’s statements regarding the nature of juvenile offenders
    and holding that a life without parole sentence for a juvenile
    defendant       who    did       not    commit       homicide     violates    the   Eighth
    28
    Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Roper
    v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    , 569-70 (2005) (describing these three
    general       differences      between    juveniles          under    eighteen        and
    adults).      “These   salient       characteristics         mean    that    ‘[i]t    is
    difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between
    the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate transient
    immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
    irreparable corruption.’” 
    Graham, 560 U.S. at 68
    (quoting 
    Roper, 543 U.S. at 573
    ).
    The district court’s sentence failed to appreciate what we
    cannot ignore – that the three predicate convictions, upon which
    the district court focused so heavily in assessing its departure
    and sentencing options, occurred when Howard was between sixteen
    and eighteen, and that youth is a “mitigating factor derive[d]
    from    the    fact    that    the    signature        qualities     of     youth     are
    transient;       as    individuals       mature,       the     impetuousness         and
    recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”
    
    Roper, 542 U.S. at 570
    (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Cf. Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough To
    Do The Crime, Too Young To Do The Time, 11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
    107, 137 (2013) (“The [Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence of youth
    recognizes that juveniles who produce the same harms as adults
    are    not    their    moral    equals    and     do     not   deserve       the     same
    consequences for their immature decisions.”).
    29
    4.
    We    are      persuaded,       as     well,     that     the        district      court
    committed       an    abuse    of     discretion       insofar      as      it    concluded,
    summarily, that a life sentence was not greater than necessary
    in this instance based on its belief that Howard was “at the
    top” of its list of criminal offenders. J.A. 720. According to
    the court, Howard was, at his core, a career criminal: “It’s who
    he is. It is what he has done. It’s what he has always done.
    It’s how he lives his life.” J.A. 722. Despite the fact that
    Howard     is    now    a     middle-aged          offender,    the        district     court
    predicted that, “the likelihood of recidivism for this man [is]
    100 percent. Absolutely 100 percent. If he is living free, he
    will be committing crimes. He will be dealing drugs. It’s who he
    is. It’s what he does.” J.A. 727. The court, in an apparent
    attempt    to     justify      the    life    sentence       that     it    was    about    to
    impose,     noted      the     need     to    deter     Howard        individually,         to
    incapacitate him, and to “prevent [him] from poisoning people.”
    J.A. 735.
    Given     the    long    sentence       (short    of     life)       that    Howard   no
    doubt would have received from any federal judge reviewing the
    instant record, sound empirical evidence strongly suggests that
    the likelihood that Howard will recidivate upon his release is
    substantially lower than the district court suggested. Howard
    was   forty-one        years   old     when    he     was    sentenced,          and   studies
    30
    demonstrate that the risk of recidivism is inversely related to
    an inmate’s age. A 2014 Bureau of Justice Statistics report,
    which tracked the recidivism rates of state prison inmates for
    five years post-release, notes that three years after release
    from prison, 75.9% of inmates age 24 or younger at the time of
    release had been rearrested for a new offense, compared to 69.7%
    of inmates ages 25 to 39, and 60.3% of inmates age 40 or older.
    Matthew R. Durose, et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in
    30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, Bureau of Justice
    Statistics                              12                              (2014),
    http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4986.                  A      2002
    report, which tracked inmates three years after release, noted
    that   more   than   80%   of   prisoners    under     18   were   rearrested,
    compared to 45.3% of those age 45 or older. Patrick A. Langan et
    al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, Bureau of Justice
    Statistics                              12                              (2002),
    http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1134.                 No     doubt
    statistics for offenders released after age 60 are even more
    compelling.   See    generally   Vera     Inst.   of   Justice,    It’s   About
    Time: Aging Prisoners, Increasing Costs, and Geriatric Release
    (April    2010),      http://www.vera.org/pubs/its-about-time-aging-
    prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release-0.                     Indeed,
    there is no reason to believe that offenders sentenced in North
    Carolina are significantly different in this regard from those
    31
    sentenced in, say, Iowa: “There is a statistically significant
    drop in recidivism for offenders aged 45 to 54 compared with 35
    to 44 year olds, and rates for those aged 55 and older are even
    lower.”    Lettie    Prell,       Iowa       Recidivism         Report:          Prison    Return
    Rates,                FY                     2013                     7                   (2014),
    http://www.doc.state.ia.us/Research/TrendsRecidivismFY13.pdf.
    (All reports saved as ECF opinion attachments).
    One might gather from the district court’s statements that
    it   was   sentencing       a   notorious          drug    lord       at    the     top    of    an
    unremittingly      violent       and   widespread          organization,            but    Howard
    hardly fits that description. Under § 3553(a)(1), courts are to
    consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history    and    characteristics            of    the    defendant.”            Part     of   this
    analysis     contemplates        the     “extent          and    seriousness”             of     the
    instant offense. United States v. Diosdado-Star, 
    630 F.3d 359
    ,
    367 (4th Cir. 2011). As noted above, the district court recited
    the offenses for which Howard was convicted. However, the facts
    underlying       Howard’s       convictions         simply       do        not    warrant        the
    sentence    imposed.       Howard      was    not    a    drug    kingpin.          He     had   no
    stronghold on the PCP market in Wilson. To the contrary, at
    trial, several witnesses testified to their own participation in
    the PCP drug trade. A.I., D.W., and R.W. all imported PCP from
    Washington, D.C. into Wilson, just as Howard did. Indeed, by
    virtue of the conspiracy conviction, the Government proved that
    32
    Howard was no lone wolf in the Wilson PCP drug trade. Howard
    also has not dealt drugs near children or school zones, and he
    has    not       resorted      to     violence.         Howard’s      convictions        are   not
    insignificant,           and     we    credit      the     Government’s          contention     at
    sentencing that the PCP drug problem in Wilson is terrible and
    pervasive.        J.A.    730.        However,      by    all    of   the    descriptions        of
    Howard presented at trial and reflected in the record before us,
    he was little more than a run-of-the-mill drug dealer.
    5.
    Notably, even after the district court had expressed its
    view       that    Howard      should        be    treated       as    a    de   facto     career
    offender,         the   Assistant        United         States   Attorney        herself      twice
    urged      the    court     to      impose     a   far     shorter     sentence        than    that
    ultimately         imposed       by     the       district       court.     In    its    initial
    allocution at sentencing, in supporting its request for a modest
    upward      departure,         and     even       while    acknowledging         the     district
    court’s elaboration of its belief that Howard should be treated
    as     a    career      offender,        the       Government         requested     an     upward
    departure only in his criminal history category (from III to
    VI), and advocated for a sentence at the top of the resulting
    range of 175 months. 9
    9
    The Assistant United States Attorney stated:
    (Continued)
    33
    The district court immediately challenged the prosecutor to
    explain “why . . . shouldn't [the sentencing range] be higher.”
    J.A. 720. After discussion, see 
    id. at 720-25,
    the Government
    agreed with the court that Howard should be treated as a career
    offender, see 
    id. at 726,
    but then, the Government suggested a
    360-month   sentence   (mindful,    no   doubt,   that   through   the
    combination of the mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence to be
    Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, as the court is
    familiar and has already referenced, the Government
    did file a motion for upward departure, but the court
    beat the Government to the punch in filing its notice.
    Your Honor, as I have set out in my motion, this
    defendant has, as the court has already mentioned, his
    robust criminal history, basically almost none of
    which was scored for the purposes of this PSR. Your
    Honor, not only does it involve drug trafficking since
    the age of 16, but also homicide, a voluntary
    manslaughter conviction was pled down from murder
    where the defendant received a six months sentence,
    and I have set out and I don't know that I need to
    talk about it in any kind of detail, kind of walking
    through the criminal history and how basically almost
    all of the criminal history overlaps each other. He is
    basically either on probation or on parole or on some
    sort of supervision just about during his entire
    criminal history and during the course of his time in
    the department of corrections, the bureau of prisons,
    didn't do terribly well there either. But based on
    those things, the fact that he really, you know, but
    for the age of the convictions would be a career
    offender, the Government is asking this court to
    upwardly depart and I think, as I set out in the
    motion for upward departure, I think the appropriate
    guideline range would be one of a 28 as a career
    offender as a VI, with advisory guideline range of 140
    to 175.
    J.A. 719-20 (emphasis added).
    34
    imposed on the gun count, and the still outstanding adjudication
    of   the   supervised   release   violation,     another         ten   years    was
    available to further seek retribution against Howard). 10
    We acknowledge, as we must, that no district court is ever
    mandated to impose the sentence recommended by the prosecution;
    the very idea is unthinkable in our constitutional system rooted
    in an independent judiciary. Still, the prosecutorial experience
    of the assistants in the Office of the United States Attorney in
    any district can serve as an important pillar in the achievement
    of one of the principal goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of
    1984 and its system of (now advisory) Guidelines sentencing: the
    avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 28 U.S.C. §
    991(b)(1)(B)    (describing    the   purposes        of   the    United    States
    Sentencing   Commission);     U.S.S.G.    ch.   1,    pt.   A,    subpt.   3;    28
    10
    We note in passing that Howard’s coconspirators, D.W. and
    R.W., who entered into plea agreements with the Government and
    testified against Howard, 
    see supra
    n.2, were sentenced to
    prison terms of 131 months, and 76 months, respectively. We
    further observe that, in a commonly-encountered reversal of
    fortunes well known to the members of this Court, Howard himself
    had pled guilty and provided “substantial assistance” to the
    Government against others in connection with his 1997 drug
    trafficking conviction in the Eastern District of North
    Carolina, and thereby obtained a sentence reduction from 227
    months to 150 months of incarceration pursuant to Federal Rule
    of Criminal Procedure 35(b).
    It is in light of these kinds of considerations, among
    others, that the sentencing recommendations of the members of
    the Office of the United States Attorney are entitled to genuine
    consideration by district courts.
    35
    U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)(instructing courts of “the need to avoid
    unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
    records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). 11
    6.
    By   declaring      Howard   a    serial   recidivist       dedicated     to
    dispensing “poison” with no hope of redemption, and by basing
    this judgment on stale criminal history, the bulk of which was
    non-violent     and   committed     when    Howard   was    a    juvenile,   the
    district court failed in its effort to comply with the aims of
    sentencing prescribed by § 3553(a)(2). 12 The sentencing purposes
    set out in § 3553(a)(2) identify the need for the sentence to
    reflect   the    seriousness      of    the   offense      and   provide     just
    punishment,     afford   adequate      deterrence    to    criminal   conduct,
    protect the public from the defendant’s crimes, and provide the
    11
    Cf. Berger v. United States, 
    295 U.S. 78
    , 88 (1935) (“The
    United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
    party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
    govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
    at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
    is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
    done.”).
    12
    It seems quite apparent that the court was concerned that
    Howard’s   decades-old  homicide   conviction,  which   in   the
    representation of the prosecutor, had been “pled down” to
    manslaughter, 
    see supra
    n.9, especially justified, or at least
    warranted, harsh sentencing treatment in this case. Without
    passing on the propriety of that apparent choice, we simply
    observe that Howard was not charged, convicted, or sentenced in
    this case for any assaultive or other physically violent
    behavior.
    36
    defendant      with       rehabilitation.         “The       proper    application      of     §
    3553(a) therefore requires a sentencing court to focus on the
    four purposes of sentencing as applicable in a particular case,
    and to consider, in determining a sentence that achieves those
    purposes, the seven factors listed in § 3553(a)(1)-(7).” United
    States v. Shortt, 
    485 F.3d 243
    , 249 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphases in
    original); see also United States v. Dowell, --- F.3d ---, No.
    13-4576,      at    *31    (4th   Cir.     2014).       “A    sentence     that      fails    to
    fulfill      the    purposes      of    sentencing       cannot       be   saved,     even    if
    supported by consideration of the six other factors.” 
    Shortt, 485 F.3d at 249
    .
    The   district       court       plainly    sought      to     intone   all     of    the
    principles         underlying       §    3553(a)(2)          when     it    announced        its
    sentence.      It     stated      the      need    for        individual       and    general
    deterrence, incapacitation, and just punishment. J.A. 735. There
    is no doubt that the sentence sent a “message” of deterrence to
    the people of Wilson and the Eastern District of North Carolina.
    The district court made those intentions clear. But we simply
    fail to see, on the whole record, how the life-plus-60-months
    sentence reasonably reflects the seriousness of the offense or
    just   punishment.         Manifestly,       it    is    a     sentence     “greater        than
    necessary,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to achieve the purposes of §
    3553(a)(2).
    37
    We    again     acknowledge        and    reiterate       that     the   sentencing
    judge “is in a superior position to find facts and judge their
    import under the § 3553(a) factors in the individual case[,]”
    see 
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    , but a district court’s choice of
    sentence   is   not       without   limit.         “Inherent      in   the    concept    of
    reasonableness       is    the   notion       that    the   rare       sentence   may    be
    unreasonable,      and     inherent     in    the    idea   of    discretion      is    the
    notion that it may, on infrequent occasion, be abused.” 
    Engle, 592 F.3d at 504
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    This case presents an example of that rare sentence presented to
    us on those infrequent occasions. It goes without saying then,
    that our holding is limited to the facts of this case, and we do
    not suggest that all life sentences plus a term of years for
    convictions     of        the    type    here        are    per    se     substantively
    unreasonable.
    IV.
    For the reasons set forth, we affirm the convictions on all
    counts, vacate the sentence as substantively unreasonable, and
    remand this case for resentencing.
    JUDGMENT IN NO. 13-4296 AFFIRMED IN PART,
    AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART;
    APPEAL IN NO. 13-4299 DISMISSED
    38
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-4296

Citation Numbers: 773 F.3d 519, 2014 WL 6807270

Judges: Motz, Diaz, Davis

Filed Date: 12/4/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (26)

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united-states-v-william-kenneth-banks-aka-kenny-united-states-of , 10 F.3d 1044 ( 1993 )

United States v. Clarence J. Lomax , 293 F.3d 701 ( 2002 )

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Rita v. United States , 127 S. Ct. 2456 ( 2007 )

Gall v. United States , 128 S. Ct. 586 ( 2007 )

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United States v. Eric Bernard Smith, A/K/A E, A/K/A Pac-Man,... , 451 F.3d 209 ( 2006 )

United States v. Myers , 589 F.3d 117 ( 2009 )

eriline-company-sa-edgardo-bakchellian-v-james-p-johnson-universal , 440 F.3d 648 ( 2006 )

Berger v. United States , 55 S. Ct. 629 ( 1935 )

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