United States v. Ralph Roseboro , 609 F. App'x 145 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4949
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RALPH ANTHONY ROSEBORO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:06-cr-00005-RJC-DCK-1)
Submitted: June 23, 2015 Decided: July 2, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Demers, THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID DEMERS, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ralph Anthony Roseboro appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing
him to 24 months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Although
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief,
Roseboro has not done so. The Government has declined to file a
response brief. Following our careful review of the record, we
affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
judgment revoking supervised release and imposing a term of
imprisonment. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir.
1992). The district court need only find a violation of a
condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); Copley, 978 F.2d at
831. The court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Padgett, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 3561289, *1 (4th
Cir. 2015). We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in finding that Roseboro violated a condition of supervised
release. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by
revoking supervised release and ordering a term of imprisonment.
2
We will affirm a revocation sentence if it falls within the
prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,
applying the same general considerations employed in review of
original criminal sentences. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This initial inquiry takes a more
deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for
[Sentencing G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Only if we find the sentence unreasonable will we
consider whether it is “plainly” so. United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considered the policy
statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable
to revocation sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Webb, 738
F.3d at 641. A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable
if the district court stated a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
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In this case, the record reveals no procedural or
substantive error by the district court. We thus conclude that
Roseboro’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Roseboro, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Roseboro requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Roseboro. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4