United States v. Antonio Staten , 614 F. App'x 661 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4858
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO EUGENE STATEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00225-MOC-1)
Submitted: June 22, 2015 Decided: July 7, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denzil H. Forrester, THE LAW OFFICES OF DENZIL H. FORRESTER,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose,
Acting United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
An indictment charged Antonio Eugene Staten with possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012) (Count 1), and using or carrying a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012) (Count 2). Prior to trial, Staten
moved to suppress his confession, testifying that police failed to
deliver Miranda * warnings before obtaining his confession and that
police used threatening and coercive tactics to obtain his
confession. The district court found Staten’s testimony not
credible and denied the motion to suppress. A jury convicted
Staten on Count 1, but acquitted him on Count 2. At sentencing,
the district court, based on Staten’s testimony at the suppression
hearing, applied a two-level obstruction of justice adjustment
when setting Staten’s Sentencing Guidelines range and imposed a
21-month sentence. On appeal, Staten challenges the district
court’s application of the obstruction of justice adjustment.
Finding no error, we affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, first ensuring that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
* Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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range.” United States v. Cox, 744 F.3d 305, 308 (4th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In reviewing the
district court’s application of the Guidelines and its imposition
of a sentencing adjustment, we review factual findings for clear
error, legal conclusions de novo, and unpreserved arguments for
plain error. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th
Cir. 2012).
An obstruction of justice adjustment is appropriate, as
relevant here, when a defendant provides “materially false
information to a judge or magistrate judge.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(F) (2013). Information is
“material” where, “if believed, [it] would tend to influence or
affect the issue under determination.” USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6.
Having reviewed the record, we reject Staten’s argument that
the district court failed to sufficiently articulate its reasons
for applying the adjustment. The district court’s statement that
Staten’s testimony at the suppression hearing was “completely
concocted in order to try and get out of a confession” encompasses
all of the elements necessary to impose the adjustment and permits
for meaningful appellate review. Cf. United States v. Perez, 661
F.3d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[R]equiring district courts to
clearly articulate the findings necessary to reach a legal
conclusion preserves our ability to conduct meaningful appellate
review.”).
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Staten also contends that the district court erred with
respect to its credibility determination. We “defer to a district
court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the
district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility
during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Staten’s arguments regarding who actually owned the
firearm are irrelevant to whether he provided false statements
when he testified that police did not deliver timely Miranda
warnings.
Finally, Staten argues that even if his statements were false,
they were not material because they did not impact the jury’s
verdict. Because Staten did not raise this argument in the
district court, we review for plain error. Strieper, 666 F.3d at
292. When Staten testified, “the issue under determination” was
whether his confession was admissible. Staten’s false testimony
about events surrounding his confession was clearly material to
the admissibility of that confession.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately expressed in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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